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This thesis critically engages with the politics of citizenship, immigration and 
identity in Europe. It asks why different public and political responses to the 
presence of Romanian immigrants have arisen in Italy, where this nationality has 
been presented as a threat to security and public order, compared to Spain where this 
has not been so. In doing so, it has sought to bring an understudied immigrant 
population into mainstream academic view whilst contrasting the prevalent idea in 
academia and politics that immigrants constitute culturally homogeneous and 
bounded groups or communities.  
It argues that different responses are due not to the cultural characteristics of 
immigrants themselves but rather to the choices and strategies of mobilisation of 
structurally-situated actors who negotiate what it means to be categorised as being of 
one of these nationalities. It then examines the implications of the accession of 
Romania to the European Union in 2007, finding that the legal category of EU 
citizen does not directly herald an increasing presence in the public sphere for 
Romanian immigrants. Instead, the impact of the rights of citizenship of the EU on 
public references to Romanian immigrants are contingent on local contexts and 
dependent on the ability of specific actors to take advantage of national and local 
opportunities for inclusion and participation.  
The research project thus contributes empirically and methodologically to 
diverse literatures on the role of identity in contemporary politics, immigrant and 
ethnic minority political participation and social movements, and the implications of 
European Union integration on immigration, immigrant integration and social 
citizenship in the current phase of globalisation. It thus provides a perspective on the 
political dimension of immigration and ethnic relations as well as a way of unveiling 
and explaining the mobilisation of populist xenophobic discourses found in some 
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In October 2007 the body of Giovanna Reggiani was found in a ditch in a northern 
suburb of the city of Rome, Italy. The police, politicians and press immediately 
initiated a hunt for her killer, who would be revealed as the Romanian Romulus 
Nicolae Mailat. Perceptions of Romanian immigrants as a violent, criminal threat to 
Italy burst out in spectacular fashion. Walter Veltroni, the Mayor of Rome from the 
centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), declared that the accession 
of Romania to the European Union (EU) earlier that year had opened the doors to the 
arrival of particularly aggressive criminals and that there were ‘too many Romanians 
[...] who do inacceptable things’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e 
Veltroni: interventi tardive, 1
st
 November 2007, Barbagli 2008). Romanians in Italy 
were defined as ‘crime-tourists’ (Il Giornale, I turisti del crimine, 4th November 
2007), and the areas of their settlement as dangerous places ‘where women are killed 
and raped in front of everybody’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e 
Veltroni: interventi tardive, 1
st
 November 2007). Mass deportations were suggested 
as the answer with the Rome Prefecture rapidly announcing that 5,000 Romanians 
could be expelled in order to ‘clean the water of infected fish’ (La Repubblica, 
Romeni, scattano le espulsioni. “Via i primi cinquemila”, 2nd November 2007). 
When the Romanian government suggested that the treatment being directed at this 
population was disproportionate, the response from the right wing MP Paolo 
Grimoldi was to ask why they had not shown ‘the same concern when their citizens 
invaded our cities, stole from our aged citizens and raped our women?’ (Movimento 







. Across the political spectrum, from those in 
power to those in opposition, the consensus dictated that Italian citizens were the 
victims of a dangerous, violent, criminal Romanian immigrant population. 
Romanians were unwanted.  
Meanwhile, in the Spanish town of Badalona on the outskirts of Barcelona, 
tensions arose in 2010 when electoral pamphlets were published stating ‘we do not 
want Romanians’. The pamphleteer, the conservative candidate Xavier García 
Albiol, argued that a group of Romanian gypsies had committed too many crimes 
and lowered the security of the area. Yet the pamphlet was met with a barrage of 
criticism; Albiol’s party disassociated itself from him and the president of the 
regional wing of the party publicly apologised for causing any offence, a manifesto 
from 74 trade unions, NGOs charities and immigrant associations warned of ‘the 
increase of racism and xenophobia in Catalan politics’ and the right wing politician 
Felip Puig stated that ‘the discourse of Mr Albiol brings together all that I fully reject 
and that Convergence and Union [his party formation] wants to eject from political 
debate’ (CDC Noticies, Felip Puig reclama al PP no utilitzar la immigració com a 




. In April 2010 a case was 
presented against Albiol under Spanish penal law on offensive material (Organic 
Law 10/1995, art. 510) and racial discrimination (art. 607bis), brought by a group of 
organisations led by the human rights organisation SOS Racismo (El Pais, El PP 
juega con la xenophobia, 27
th
 April 2010). These responses illustrate clearly how in 
Badalona and across Spain there was wide consensus on the victim status of 
Romanian immigrants who were considered to be at risk of being unfairly 
stigmatized. 
These two examples are illustrative of a more general distinction in responses 
to the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain: in the former, this 
nationality has been negatively represented and there has been an escalation of 
inflammatory rhetoric, whilst in the latter such a critical, aggressive approach has not 
                                                             
1 Surprisingly, this increased securitization came when the number of arrests of Romanians was 
reported to be decreasing, with a fall of 13.7% between 2006 and 2009 (Caritas Italia 2010) 
2 This is particularly surprising if it is considered that the same person also commented in September 
2011 that “there is a certain tendency of some communities to end up organising according to tribes 
or clans, like the Peruvians on the motorway, determined Romanian communities stealing copper and 
South Americans in urban gangs”, La Vanguardia, Puig creu que alguns col-lectius immigrants 
abusen del nostre sistema de llibertats, 4th September 2011 
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been common and in fact quite the opposite has been found. As is evident, tension, 
xenophobia, discrimination, exclusion and stigmatization may or may not arise with 
the presence of immigrants. But why do distinct responses arise in different places? 
And what, in the specific cases of Italy and Spain, has brought about such distinct 
responses to Romanian immigration in particular? The contemporary significance of 
an understanding of these topics is unquestionable in a European context in which 
immigration has become a fiercely contested political issue and where millions of 
mobile workers and third country nationals now reside in countries extraneous to 
their place of birth.  
Addressing these questions, the objective of this thesis is to understand how 
and why responses to Romanian immigration have been so divergent in these 
countries. In doing so, it contributes to social science studies of the politics of 
immigration in three principal ways.  
Firstly, it offers a case study of the political integration of Romanian 
immigrants in Italy and Spain, a nationality that has remained relatively understudied 
in Western Europe despite the fact that it is the second largest single nationality 
population of migrants in the EU, totalling over 2.5 million registered individuals 
(data from Eurostat).  
Secondly, it argues against the prevalent idea in much academia and politics 
that the presence of immigrants is problematic due to the way that they constitute 
culturally homogeneous and bounded groups or communities (for this view see 
Huntington 1996, 2004, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 2000, Putnam 
2007, Schlesinger 1992, Walzer 1983, Wiener 1995). Indeed, the different responses 
to Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain are due not to the cultural characteristics 
of Italians, Spaniards or Romanians themselves but rather to the negotiation by 
structurally-situated political and social actors of what it means to be categorised as 
being of one of these nationalities. These negotiations have little to do with ‘real’ 
cultural similarities or differences between hosts and foreigners, but a great deal to 
do with the relations of power concerning who can influence and control this process 
and who cannot.  
Thirdly, it contributes to an understanding of European political integration 
and citizenship in the EU by examining what it means for a population of 
geographical, political and legal ‘outsiders’ of the European Union project, as the 
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Romanians were until their country’s accession in 2007, to formally become citizens 
‘inside’ the EU. Much academic literature has expected this supranational citizenship 
category to cause a shift in individuals’ status to one of equality of rights, loyalty 
towards shared institutions and a sense of united cultural and political belonging 
(Eder 2006, Herrmann and Brewer 2004, Laffan 2004, Maas 2007, Spohn 2005). 
However, here it is found that the legal category of EU citizen does not directly 
herald an increasing presence of Romanian nationals in the Italian and Spanish 
public spheres. Instead it provides only an opportunity for such a development, the 
impact of which is dependent on local, national and transnational dynamics of 
political mobilisation and claims making. The legal category of EU citizenship thus 




Why Romanians in Italy and Spain? 
 
This introduction will explore how Italian and Spanish experiences of immigration, 
and Romanian experiences of incorporation in these countries, are broadly similar. In 
this way it illustrates how different responses to Romanian immigration cannot 
simply be explained by looking at the migration experience in Italy and Spain or the 
nature of the Romanian populations in these countries but must examine the 
meanings and political dynamics that underpin the relations between them. In this 
way the argument that will be developed in this thesis states that the different 
responses to Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain are the outcome of processes 
of identification and categorisation which are inherently political. 
A range of academic research has suggested that Italy and Spain are broadly 
comparable in their experiences of immigration, including them within a general 
‘Southern European’ model of immigration (for example, Arango et al 2009, 
Baldwin-Edwards 2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, Castles and Miller 2003: 82-85, 
Danese 2001, Hartman 2008, Hepburn 2009, King 2000, 2001, King and Thomson 
2008, Triandafyllidou 2009, Schierup et al 2008: 102-107). Migration flows to the 
Southern European countries have been described as contrasting the post-War labour 
migration experience of Northern European ones, which was largely state-regulated 
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(but not entirely, see Huysmans 2000), drew migrants from a limited range of 
geographical origins and was seen as temporary, with return assumed (at least in 
theory) once their labour was no longer necessary (King and Thomson 2008: 267). 
In the Southern European countries the rapid growth and diversity of migratory 
flows has been seen as a ‘surprise element’ for policymakers who were not expecting 
immigration at all (King et al 1997: 4). In response to insufficient ad hoc, piecemeal 
and often ambiguous policy approaches to immigration and integration, the key 
structures for the incorporation of foreigners in these countries have been the labour 
market and interpersonal networks rather than host society political or social 
institutions (Triandafyllidou 2009: 51). Legal residence has been tied to 
employment, which has itself been shaped by a demand for cheap and flexible 
precarious workers in secondary and informal or underground labour markets, 
resulting in a large degree of immigrant residence in Southern Europe being 
undocumented (King 2000: 18). The outcome is a context in which immigrants enjoy 
little access to rights or representation, as well as the seemingly paradoxical situation 
of rising immigration rates at a time of rising unemployment (Mendoza 1997).  
Both Italy and Spain have considerable histories of emigration and 
immigration. Just to consider, from centuries of movement around the Mediterranean 
to the arrival of tourists and retirees from Northern Europe and workers from North 
Africa in the twentieth, foreigners have been moving to both countries before they 
became net receivers of immigration (Carfagna 1998, King 2001). However, since 
the 1980s a quantitative shift in the size of migratory flows to these countries has 
made them two of the principal receivers of immigration to the EU whilst a 
qualitative diversification of countries of origin has brought migrants from new 
places such as Albania (Italy), Latin America (Spain) and Romania (Italy and Spain). 
Indeed, data from Eurostat signals that in 1988 only 85,791 registered immigrants 
arrived in Italy and 24,380 in Spain, and that this rate saw little change until the mid-
1990s when it began to expand rapidly, reaching 556,714 annual arrivals in Italy and 
958,266 in Spain in 2007. This produced an increase over the decade between 1998 
and 2008 of the total immigrant population of Italy from 991,678 to 3,432,651 
(according to data from Institute of Multi-ethnic Studies, ISMU and the Institute for 
Statistics, ISTAT), and of Spain from 719,647 to 4,473,499 (according to data from 
the National Statistics Institute, INE). At the same time, continued emigration has 
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resulted in there being 3,649,377 Italians registered outside of Italy (on the AIRE 
register) and 1,194,350 Spaniards registered on the Spanish census for voters 
resident abroad (on the CERA register) in 2007. 
In keeping with the Southern European model, in both countries underground 
labour markets have provided employment opportunities for immigrants regardless 
of their legal status, and these are characterised by a high degree of informality and 
lack of regulation or social welfare provisions (Arango et al 2009, Baldwin-Edwards 
2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, King 2000, King and Thomson 2008, Hartman 2008, 
Schierup et al 2008). Immigrants thus respond to a demand for cheap and flexible 
precarious workers (King 2000: 18), illustrating, as noted by Reyneri, that 
‘immigrants, while they certainly do not bring the underground economy into 
existence, contribute to its reproduction’ (2004: 88). In response to this informality 
and an associated high level of undocumented residence, amnesties for 
undocumented migrants have been regular in both countries, coming in 1986, 1990, 
1995, 1998, 2002 and 2009 (for domestic carers and nurses only) in Italy and in 
1986, 1991, 1995 and 2001 in Spain. Amnesties do not result in permanent legal 
residence, however, because the renewal of permits is dependent on presenting a 
work contract. In this way the boundaries between legality and informality in Italy 
and Spain are blurred and shifting. 
Finally, despite the fact that Italy and Spain became countries of net 
immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, their first comprehensive immigration laws 
were only passed in 1998 and 2000, respectively. Policy objectives in both countries 
have been described as ambiguous and contradictory, as well as criticised for 
producing immigrant illegality. Whilst Italian policies from the 1990s and 2000s 
have been accused of rejecting legal entry in favour of undocumented entry followed 
by regularisation amnesties (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b: 66, see also Sciortino 
1999, Reyneri 2004, Zincone 1998, 2006), Spanish ones have been criticised for 
tying relatively short residence permits to precarious work contracts, thereby actively 
‘irregularising’ immigrants by making it all but impossible to retain legal status over 
time (Calavita 1998: 531, see also Cachón Rodríguez 2009, Calavita 1998, Schierup 
et al 2008). In this context, immigrants have had few formal opportunities for stable 
residence, enfranchisement or sustained political participation in either country. 
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The political, economic and social circumstances of Romanian immigration 
to Italy and Spain mirror these general patterns. Migration flows began arriving in 
the 1990s but grew very quickly. Under the Romanian Communist Party regime, 
restrictive control policies for most residents prohibited emigration without 
securitate secret surveillance, until the regime’s fall in 1989 (Sandu et al 2004: 3, 
Stan and Turcescu 2005). During the early 1990s, emigration was primarily directed 
to Germany, with small flows to Italy as rising unemployment in Romania was 
accompanied by falling GDP and rising inflation from 1.9% to 210% in 1992 
(according to the Institutul National de Statistica Romania, see also Ban 2009, 
Maddison 2008, Sandu et al 2004). The decline in living standards acted as a push 
factor for emigration whilst comparatively high salaries in Europe acted as a pull 
factor, encouraging movement in search of employment and stability (Ban 2009, 
Sandu et al 2004). Indeed, despite fluctuations throughout the decade, by the year 
2000 the average monthly salary of a Romanian citizen was equivalent to 150 euros, 
compared to over 1,900 in the Eurozone (Viruela Martinez 2002: 234). The 
emigrants at this time were mostly educated individuals leaving Romania to look for 
professions that would enable them to earn a wage more fitting to their 
qualifications, bridging the education-income gap of their homeland (Uccellini 2010, 
Viruela Martinez 2002). 
These migratory patterns changed from 2002 when a combination of lowered 
legal constraints on entry to EU Member States and improved travel connections 
contributed to flows growing and becoming more dynamic, with settlement often 
more temporary (Sandu et al 2004, Viruela Martinez 2008). Visa requirements for 
entry to the EU for stays of up to three months were removed, simplifying entry, 
whilst increasingly stable cross-border Romanian migration networks facilitated 
movement to destinations such as Italy and Spain where friend and kinship networks 
helped with finding regulated or informal labour market opportunities, housing and 
so on (Cingolani 2007, Cingolani and Piperno 2005, Elrick and Ciobanu 2009, Eve 
2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008, Hartman 2008, Marcu 2009a, 2009b,, 2011, Pajares 
2007, Potot 2008, Sandu 2005, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008). This ease of travel 
was confirmed in 2007 by the accession of Romania to the EU, granting nationals 
from these countries rights to freedom of movement between Member States, 
although not without restrictions, as will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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These changes in migration patterns meant that, despite forming a very small 
population in Italy and Spain in 2000, by 2009 Romanians were the highest ranking 
in size in both of these countries (see figure 1). 
The growth of the Romanian population in Italy and Spain has subsequently 
been constant and rapid, whilst also undergoing a change in composition as migrants 
have arrived not only from Romania’s urban middle classes but also the rural poor, 
and chosen to live all across Italy and Spain, from small villages to the large cities 
(Sandu 2005). Despite these diverse backgrounds, the dominant employment roles in 
Italy and Spain have been restricted to domestic care, construction and agriculture 




Destination 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Italy 69,000 239,426 555,997 796,477 
Spain 10,983 54,688 211,325 718,844 
 
Figure 1: Growth of Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain post-2000 
(Sources: Caritas Italia Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2001, 2004, 2009, Observatorio Permanente 
de la Inmigración 2001, 2004, 2009) 
 
 
Marcu 2009a, Perrotta 2006, Viruela Martínez 2008). Informal employment in these 
sectors has meant that legal residence and work permits have not been absolutely 
necessary in order to enter the labour market whilst waiting for a regularisation 
amnesty or to save money to return to Romania (Gabriel Anghel 2008, Perrotta 
2006, Uccellini 2010). In both countries precarious or informal employment and 
undocumented residence, among other factors, have given Romanians little stability, 
few opportunities for political representation, and restricted bargaining power with 
their bosses or within trade unions (Perrotta 2006). However, the granting of a new 
EU citizenship status to two comparable populations such as these in 2007 provides 
a particularly interesting opportunity to see how a supranational structural change 





The politics of immigration in research 
 
The broad similarities between the migration histories and Romanian populations of 
Italy and Spain outlined above mean that an understanding and explanation of the 
different responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants in these countries needs 
to go beyond describing the characteristics of the immigrant populations or host 
societies.  
Patterns of international migration and immigrant integration are tied into a 
wide range of political, economic, social and cultural processes across diverse local, 
national and global scales. As globalisation and the increased mobility of 
populations across international borders has contributed to the widening of humanity 
across expanding geographical and political spaces, in societies of immigration 
apparent divisions and a lack of consensus over shared understandings and cultures 
seem to provoke conflict and unrest. In this way, as noted by Saskia Sassen, 
‘economic globalisation denationalizes national economies; in contrast, immigration 
is renationalizing politics’ (1996: 63). The resultant context has been described as ‘a 
scramble of differences in a field of connections’ (Geertz 2000: 250), as boundaries 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ or ‘Us-natives’ and ‘Them-immigrants’ are 
repeatedly debated and expressed or repressed in public debate, policies, laws and 
everyday life (Fennema 2000, Schierup et al 2008). Identity, it appears, has been 
brought to the forefront of the politics of immigration (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 
1, Zapata-Barrero 2008: 13). 
It has been widely noted in much research that the presence of immigrants 
can become an increasingly contentious and controversial source of tension, conflict 
and discrimination (Ariely 2012, Buonfino 2004, Buzan et al 1998, Caldeira et al 
2003, Castles and Kosack 1973, Diehl and Schnell 2006, Fennema 2000, Gutmann 
2003, Huysmans 2006, Katznelson 1973, Koopmans and Statham 2000, Putnam 
2007, Sassen 1996, Schierup et al 2008, Schlesinger 1992, Sniderman et al 2000, 
Wiener 1995). On the one hand, large scale surveys have often suggested that 
immigrants’ cultural diversity is problematic and inhibits their integration (Ariely 
2012, Diehl and Schnell 2006, Putnam 2007). On the other hand, national case 
studies have described a sense of invasion and a loss of one’s cultural identity in the 
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face of foreigners, such as Huntington’s declaration that Mexican and Asian 
immigration to the United States has threatened the dominant Anglo-Protestant work 
ethic, and with it the social and political integrity of the United States, and so should 
undergo greater assimilation to the dominant culture (2004: 27, 180, 243). Similarly, 
Weiner has described a ‘global migration crisis’, stating that societies have an 
absorption limit, beyond which tensions between natives and foreigners grow and 
public safety lowers, giving governments a moral obligation to restrict immigration 
in response to the fact that ‘in many countries, citizens have become fearful that they 
are now being invaded not by armies and tanks but by migrants who speak other 
languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures’ (1995: 2). These concerns 
fit into a wider academic literature which has understood identity and cultural 
difference to be problematic for democracies as groups with distinct histories, 
languages and appearances exist as mutually exclusive, antagonistic entities 
challenging the liberal goals of equality and freedom of the individual (Appiah 1994, 
Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 2000, Rawls 1971, Taylor 1994, 
Waldron 1992, Walzer 1983).  
However, these approaches are built on an inadequate understanding of 
groups and group identities, assuming that individuals belong exclusively to one 
group and that group identities are therefore fixed and clearly bounded as well as 
internally homogeneous and unchanging over time. In short, they define groups and 
group identities as objects, despite the fact that this view has been contrasted by a 
wealth of empirical and theoretical research from the 1960s to today which has 
illustrated how groups are liable to change their composition and defining character 
over time and in differing contexts (Barth 1967, 1969, 1981, Brubaker 2001, 2004, 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Castells 2010, Cohen 1985, 1986, Eriksen 2002 [1993], 
Firth 1951, 1964, Goffman 1987 [1959], 1963, 1967, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 
2007, Leach 1954, Loveman 1999, Modood 2007, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009). 
Groups and group identities are defined according to the choices that individuals 
make concerning the representation of specific cultural criteria that establish 
similarity between group members and difference with group outsiders. These 
choices are tied to the social relations between social and political actors who 
emphasise or minimise group membership according to the opportunities for action 
in their particular setting and their interests, such as gaining access to some resources 
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through membership of a group. With this in mind, the aim here is therefore not to 
describe what identities are as objects and blindly accept cultural similarity and 
difference as explanatory variables, but rather to understand and explain the 
processes by which certain claims to group membership and group identity gain 
popular resonance and dominance as legitimate views of the world (Malesevic 2011: 
272). It is not necessarily identity and cultural difference that cause tensions to arise 
in public and political responses to the presence of immigrants but rather, in the 
words of Jenkins, the political negotiation of the meaning of ‘who is who’ (2008).  
This thesis argues that the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant is 
negotiated and cannot be explained without examining how, when, and why different 
negotiation patterns occur (Castells 2010: 7). There exists already a significant body 
of research from political scientists and sociologists exploring the political dynamics 
of when and why immigration is presented and interpreted in different ways. As will 
be examined in chapter three, much of this literature has focused on structural 
variables such as class (Calavita 2005, Castles and Kosack 1985, Castells 1975, 
1978, Phizacklea and Miles 1980), ideas and conceptions of nationhood (Bleich 
2002, Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Gil Araujo 2004, Zapata-Barrero 2004), and 
institutional arrangements (Bauböck 2006, Cachón Rodríguez 2009, Cinalli and 
Giugni 2011, Ireland 1994, 2000, Katznelson 1973, Schmitter 1980, Soysal 1994, 
Waldinger 1989). However, in doing so they underestimate the importance of the 
agency of political actors and immigrants themselves to adapt to their structural 
setting by suggesting, appropriating or resisting dominant ways of presenting and 
interpreting social relations and issues (Adamson 2011, Buonfino 2004, Dembinska 
2012, Huysmans 2000, 2006, van Dijk 1987, 1993, 2006). Indeed, the ‘survival 
strategies’ of individuals who adapt to the institutional and social characteristics of 
the local environment have been emphasised as important examples of immigrant 
agency influencing the process of incorporation (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004). 
The analytical approach of this thesis attempts to overcome this divide 
between agency and structure. It analyses the negotiation of a group identity through 
dialectic processes of identification by group members and categorisation by non-
members. Through identification and categorisation social and political actors stake 
a claim to who belongs to a group and what their shared characteristics are. 
Moreover, these actors are themselves embedded in specific social and political 
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contexts (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Jenkins 1997, 2008). 
Political responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain are 
therefore explained as the negotiation of the meaning of being a Romanian 
immigrant by social and political actors who are situated in layered discursive 
frameworks, institutional opportunities and relations of power. This constitutes a 
‘de-ethnicised’ research design which views identity as a form of claims-making by 
politicians, policy makers, activists, the press, trade unions, charities and members of 
civil society propose perceptions of ‘who is who’ (Jenkins 2008). The challenge is to 
understand how and explain why some perceptions gain popularity and dominance 
as legitimate views of the world (Castells 2010, Jenkins 2008, Malesevic 2011, 
Wimmer 2008, 2009). 
Despite being focused in Italy and Spain, this study cannot simply be built on 
a study of the Italian and Spain national contexts. Although immigration and 
citizenship have typically been considered questions of national identity and state 
sovereignty (Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Marshall 1992 [1950], Diehl and Schnell 
2006, Joppke 1998a), during the contemporary period of globalisation international 
flows of finance, trade and workers have transformed the state’s control of its 
borders whilst universal human rights regimes have led to demands for the 
protection of individual rights beyond national boundaries (Castles 2002, Sassen 
1996, 2006; Soysal 1994, 1996). Yet at the same time, decentralisation, new modes 
of urban governance and sub-state demands for welfare and administrative powers 
below the level of the state have emphasised the importance of the regional and local 
levels of politics and society in drawing the social boundaries of membership of the 
political community (Ambrosini 2012, Borkert and Caponio 2010, Caponio 2005, 
Davis 2009, Helbling 2010, Hepburn 2011, Guibernau 2007, Keating 1998, 2009, 
Zapata-Barrero 2004).  
This layered structural context is particularly visible in the EU, where the 
introduction of a supranational category of citizenship has questioned whether the 
state is disconnecting from the control of its territory, accompanied by a 
transformation of its sovereignty and the rise of a post-national universal citizenship 
(Geddes 2001, 2008a, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, Habermas 2001a, 2001b). At the 
same time, regional administrations from EU Member States have set up numerous 
regional offices and interregional associations in Brussels, EU structural funds have 
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been given directly to regional administrations rather than national governments and 
subsidiarity has urged decisions in the EU to be made at the closest administrative 
level to their impact (Marks et al 1996, Thielemann 2002, Vignali 2009). In short, 
the EU is a multi-level polity in which the rights, allegiances and identities of 
individuals are bundled at different administrative levels within and across national 
borders, whilst also being embedded in specific local contexts. In this way, 
horizontal and vertical ties between local, national and cross-border actors and 
institutions are an important part of politics and social relations in the EU; they 
potentially influence the way that identity negotiations and patterns of political 
mobilisation play out within and across Member States. Due to this complexity, the 
analysis of the following chapters is designed to incorporate diverse local, national 
and cross-border structures and dynamics whilst avoiding falling into 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck 2005). 
 
 
Thesis structure and contents 
 
The thesis is divided into two principal sections. The first is comprised of chapters 
two and three and presents the theoretical framework and methodological approach 
to the study.  
Chapter two delves deeper into the conceptual debates regarding identity, 
ethnic relations and immigrant integration that have been outlined in this 
introduction, highlighting the shortcomings of much of the previous literature whilst 
setting out the conceptual content of an understanding of immigrant identity as a 
classification of ‘who is who’. This provides the foundations for the thesis’ study 
because it justifies a shift in focus from the characteristics of immigrants and host 
societies to the meaning of groups and group identities as negotiated by actors who 
are motivated by specific interests. 
Chapter three outlines the methodological approach and research methods 
that are employed in the project’s ‘de-ethnicised’ research design, aimed at 
explaining how responses to the presence of immigrants are negotiated by social and 
political actors who are situated in, and adapt to, institutional and discursive 
structures (Wimmer 2007). The chapter argues that agency can be introduced into 
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the analysis through building on theories of teamwork (Goffman 1987 [1959], 1986 
[1974]), fields (Bourdieu 1986, 2010 [1990]) and networks (Castells 2009, 2010 
[1997]), and borrowing from empirical insights offered by complementary literatures 
on social movements and neo-institutionalist and systems theory. 
The empirical analysis of the thesis will be presented in chapters four to 
seven. Firstly, chapter four outlines the historical development of laws and policies 
determining the status and rights of immigrants in Italy and Spain. These laws and 
policies are viewed as an important part of the process of categorising Romanian 
immigrants due to the way that they ‘mark a distinction between members and 
outsiders’ (Bauböck, 2006: 15), as well as demarcating the structural opportunities 
for and limitations against social integration and political participation (Brubaker 
1992). The intention of the chapter is to show how Romanian immigrants have been 
formally categorised in the laws and policies of these countries and the implications 
that this has had for the evolution of their legal and social status over time. In doing 
so, it also provides a backdrop to the subsequent analyses because these laws and 
policies contribute significantly to defining the institutional structural context for this 
population’s integration and political participation. 
Chapters five to seven examine respectively the national, local and cross-
border dimensions of the negotiation of ‘who is who’ in Romanian immigration. 
These chapters bring these dimensions into one analytical framework by showing 
how institutional and discursive structures, distributions of resources and actor 
mobilisations have been embedded in diverse contexts, from national parliaments, 
political parties and press (chapter five) to local political parties, press, NGOs, and 
Romanian cultural associations in Rome and Madrid (chapter six) and cross-border 
Romanian government members, political parties, Churches and European 
parliament members (chapter seven). 
Finally, the conclusions in chapter 8 will bring together these diverse 
dimensions into one summary of the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and 
Spain, illustrating how actors respond and adapt to their multi-dimensional structural 
context and availability of resources when engaging in situated negotiations of ‘who 
is who’. The chapter will also conclude by drawing out lines of convergence and 
difference with other case studies and by briefly addressing the implications for local 
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and national public policies regarding immigrant integration and the development of 














Theoretical framework:  











As noted in the introduction, this thesis asks why different responses have arisen to 
the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. The objective is to 
understand how and explain why different Romanian identities are found in these 
countries, which implies being concerned with the study of what it means to be an 
immigrant and why varying patterns of classification are found in different countries. 
Without identity we cannot know who we are, who others are, or what relations exist 
between us and other individuals or objects, or as succinctly stated by Richard 
Jenkins, ‘identity is the human capacity – rooted in language – to know “who’s who” 
(and hence “what’s what”)’ (2008: 5). Furthermore, the process of defining these 
relations enables political and social issues to be outlined and given meaning (see for 
example the idea of ‘boundary work’ from Gieryn 1983), and can justify the choices 
and actions of individuals, groups, organisations or institutions. In this way, for 
example, claims to national identity have driven nationalist movements to compete 
for control of resources, legitimised the granting or denial of rights to members of a 
polity and posed as a powerful justification for war and violence throughout modern 
history (Kedourie 1993 [1960] 8-11, Smith 1991: 16-7). As will be argued here, 
identity is therefore a relational concept that is contextually situated in networks of 
meaning and power: actors do things with identity, at the same time that their actions 
are informed and motivated by it.  
The present chapter will outline a relational concept of identity as a process 
of classification, understood as a dialectic between self-identification and 
categorisation by others, that will provide the foundations for the study. In doing so, 
it illustrates how the analytical puzzle is not to simply describe what identities are or 
what form they take, but rather to account for how, when and why claims to identity 
and group difference gain popular resonance and dominance as legitimate views of 
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the world (Castells 2010: 7, Malesevic 2011: 272). The implication of such a 
conceptualisation for this study is that responses to immigrants such as the 
Romanians in Italy and Spain should be interpreted not as reactions to a clash 
between incompatible cultures, but rather as part of a process of competition and 
negotiation of meanings, of determining ‘who is who’. The challenge for the 
remainder of the thesis will thus be to reveal what it means to be Romanian and who 
is doing what by defining it. 
The chapter develops over two main sections. The first reviews a significant 
body of theoretical and empirical academic literature on citizenship, identity and 
immigration in liberal democracies. This body of work has defined identity as a fixed 
and shared characteristic of bounded, clearly demarcated and internally 
homogeneous social groups and argued that particular relations develop between 
groups, such as ones of inequality, exclusion or discrimination, due to their diverse 
identities. Identity is thus conceived as a fixed object that can be objectively 
measured and employed as a variable for explaining social relations. The second 
section takes a critical approach to this literature and reveals, in contrast, how groups 
are very rarely bounded, clearly demarcated or internally homogeneous, and that the 
terms of membership of groups are liable to change from one context to another. 
Groups and group identities are thus understood as constructed and negotiated over 
time: they are claims, rather than objects. This will be illustrated with examples of 
historical conceptions of national identity in Romania, Italy and Spain. Finally, it 
sets out the view of this thesis by conceptualising identity and group boundaries as a 
relational process of classification of individuals built on the selective presentation 
or recognition of similarity between group members and difference with group 
outsiders (Barth 1969, Brubaker 2001, 2004, Malesevic 2004, 2006, 2011, Jenkins 
1997, 2008). In this sense identity is not an object with explanatory power, it is a 
political process of claims making that merits explaining (Zimmer 2003). The 
conclusion to the chapter will relate these concepts to the objective of this thesis and 







Reviewing the literature: the problem of identity 
 
Over the latter half of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty first centuries, 
identity has become a central concern of much academic research and political 
debate. Much of this concern has taken as its starting point the assumption that 
identities are problematic because they cause particular social relations such as 
inequality, social exclusion or discrimination to arise between groups. However, at 
the heart of this assumption is a conceptual fallacy that views groups to be fixed and 
bounded and group identities to be homogeneous and shared between all members. 
The two sub-sections below will illustrate the prevalence, and associated 
shortcomings, of this view in both theorising on identity and cultural difference in 
liberal democracies and empirical research that has taken groups and identity as 
measurable objects. 
 
The problem of conceptualising identity 
 
From the 1970s onwards, identity and equality became two of the central concerns of 
much Western liberal democratic political theory (Appiah 1994, Kymlicka 1995, 
Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 2000, Rawls 1971, Taylor 1994, Waldron 1992, 
Walzer 1983). This was fuelled by events such as the burgeoning civil rights 
movement in the USA, race relations in the UK and the political and public 
responses to the incorporation of immigrants from across the world in the countries 
of Western Europe.  
These studies saw identity and cultural difference to be problematic, in 
particular the question of how to achieve equality and freedom for citizens in 
societies characterised by a diverse range of cultural practices and varying 
conceptions of the good. These were not new challenges: Isaiah Berlin, for example, 
had already argued in the 1960s that the subjective nature of every individual’s self 
identity and beliefs meant that it would be impossible to demonstrate that some 
lifestyles should be a priori superior to others (Berlin 1962). In the face of different 
conceptions of right and wrong, it was argued that just state institutions should not 
dictate or promote conceptions of the good, and therefore of individuals’ cultural 
practices, as this would restrict the freedom of citizens and cause dominance of some 
25 
 
over others (Berlin 1969: 152, Walzer 1983: xiii). Cultural difference and diversity 
were therefore presented as a problem of group dominance when majority population 
values and practices restricted and limited the freedom and equality of minority 
groups (see for example Walzer 1983, Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995). Perhaps the 
most well known proposed solution was the Rawlsian race and ethnicity-blind state 
structure, established, in theory, from a universal moral starting point which could 
not impinge on individual, subjective cultural norms (1971). For Rawls, this 
structure should be hidden by a ‘veil of ignorance’ between citizens and institutions 
in order to eradicate any value bias (Ibid.). Identities were thus understood as 
problematic because they caused the dominance of some groups over others, but it 
was thought that equal citizenship could be obtained instead through ignoring 
cultural differences. 
 Yet this liberal theory did not appear to take liberal democracies closer to the 
equal outcomes that were intended (Modood 2007: 22). In particular, a primarily 
North American group of academics was concerned with the status of historic 
minority groups and the preservation of their cultures (see for example, Appiah 
1994; Gutmann 2003, Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 2000; Taylor 
1994). These authors argued that inequalities remained because the laws and 
institutions of the nation state were already biased towards the cultural norms and 
traditions of the majority population, in detriment to the status of minority racial, 
ethnic and identity groups. In contrast to Rawls, it was thus claimed that blindness to 
cultural difference could not translate into parity of social status because ‘the rights 
of recognition, language and culture are ignored by liberal democracy but do not 
come under civic, political or welfare rights’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 5). 
Biased cultural practices, embedded in state institutions and laws, resulted in 
inequalities because ‘different sorts of groups have different histories, needs, 
aspirations and identities; and these differences influence the sorts of claims that they 
tend to make on the state’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 24). In response, they 
proposed a multicultural conceptualisation of equal citizenship that took as its 
starting point the recognition of the diverse cultural beliefs and practices of groups, 
whilst advocating the granting of differentiated rights to accommodate differences 
between them (Taylor 1994, Waldron 1992). Identity and cultural difference thus 
continued to be understood as problematic due to causing dominance and inequality, 
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but could be addressed by policy measures aimed at accommodating more groups’ 
diverse beliefs and practices. In this way identity and cultural difference were 
interpreted as both a problem and a solution. 
The view of identity and cultural difference as problematic has also been 
particularly noticeable in studies of immigration which interpret the cultural diversity 
of foreigners as posing a challenge to the perceived stability and cohesion of the host 
society. Such diversity confronts the previously-held assumption that citizenship 
constituted membership of a culturally homogeneous political community 
(Huntington 2004, Joppke 2010, Marshall 1992 [1950], Smith 1991). In this vein, 
Walzer has suggested that states should regulate immigration to protect the equality 
and common understandings of a polity and the freedom, welfare and culture of its 
citizens, preventing neighbourhoods from becoming 'fortresses' against internal 
mobility (Walzer 1983: 39, Wilcox 2009: 2-3). Kymlicka and Norman also 
suggested that a degree of assimilation of immigrants was vital in order to protect the 
claims of historical minorities that were already disadvantaged in relation to the 
dominant majority culture (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 362-369), whilst 
Huntington has famously claimed that Mexican immigration provides a threat to the 
United States’ apparently unified Anglo-Protestant culture, arguing that the outside 
influence of diversity from ‘societies with cultures significantly different from those 
of the wealthy countries’ has risked ‘deconstructing’ America’s identity rather than 
allowing it to persist in its ‘essential character’ (2004: 180-181). Similarly, 
Schlesinger has suggested that ‘the historic idea of a unifying American identity is 
now in peril’ due to the cult and militants of ethnicity and multiethnic dogma (1992: 
17). These authors are accompanied by other academics and policy makers in their 
concern for the assimilation of immigrants into the ‘national mainstream’ through 
acceptance of the national identity of the host society and rejection of the identity of 
the country of origin, evidenced by the establishment of 'civic integration' and 
assimilation policies in liberal states (Adamson et al 2011, Alba 2005, Alba and Nee 
1997, Joppke 2010, Ono 2002, Triadafilopoulos 2011, Zhou 1997). These policies 
reveal the contradiction at the heart of liberal states that, as Joppke has noted, are 
‘inclusionary and democratic to the inside [... but] necessarily exclusionary and 
undemocratic to the outside’ (1999: 2). 
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However, at the heart of these studies there lay problematic 
conceptualisations of groups and group identities. It was claimed that individuals 
could have one, authentic identity and that this identity was subjective to the person 
in question, arguing as a result that liberal states should be culturally neutral because 
any imposition of cultural ways on citizens would ‘violate the dignity and the 
autonomy of the individual’ (Joppke 1998a: 32). They then extrapolated identity and 
autonomy from individuals to groups and reached the conclusion that groups shared 
one homogeneous identity that should not be violated by others. In doing so, they 
drew fixed boundaries around populations of individuals that were perceived as 
sharing cultural traits and declared that some of these populations should benefit 
from specific policy measures to prevent their traits from changing. In response, 
Modood has argued that the problem with dividing between groups to benefit from 
protection in this way is to falsely suggest that some identities and cultural practices 
have a greater ontological value than others, evidenced by Kymlicka’s distinction 
between historic and contemporary identities and the suggestion that groups that 
have been present in a place for a longer period of time are more deserving of 
protection against dominance than newly-arrived immigrant ones and should 
therefore have their practices protected from change (2007: 26-31). This assumes 
that after a certain period of time a group identity will gain its own status as a social 
object, but without clarification of how or when it may happen. In this way, 
Kymlicka (and others) ‘distorts the circumstances of some kinds of migrants in order 
to highlight the condition of national minorities and indigenous peoples’ (2007: 34). 
Furthermore, the extrapolation from individuals to groups and the promotion 
of group-specific policies has led these authors to perceive groups as isolated and 
separate from one another. Yet this has done little to clarify whether individuals can 
be members of different groups contemporaneously, if group identities are felt and 
perceived by all members in the same way or how the composition of groups and the 
cultural content of their identities can change over time. Indeed, the authors 
mentioned above argue instead that groups are exclusive and that change should not 
occur in the content of their identities (Appiah 1994, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 
2000). This objectifies identity without asking how groups are formed, what 
membership means to individuals or which similarities or differences are significant 
and when. Whilst the ontological argument that identity is a person’s understanding 
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of who they are (Taylor 1994: 25) is logical, the claim that this is more authentic 
than that presented socially is misleading because an individual cannot be taken out 
of their social context, and vice versa, social identities are themselves varied because 
individuals build a range of connections and cultural characteristics over the course 
of their lives. In short, as noted by Jenkins, all identity is social and embedded in 
multiple, varied and changing social relations (2008). 
 
The Problem of Measuring Identity 
 
The conceptual problem underpinning the studies mentioned above is not only a 
theoretical one. In fact, it has been repeated in empirical studies that, despite 
adopting different theoretical paradigms, research designs and scales of analysis, 
present groups and identities as fixed, bounded, and therefore also measureable, 
objects. 
On the one hand, macro-level studies of ethnic relations and immigration 
have analysed empirical data from censuses, election results, electoral registers and 
socio-economic surveys to examine how cultural diversity, immigration and ethnic 
relations play out in different ways according to the structural characteristics of the 
host society. These have included studies of class (Castells 1975, Castles and Kosack 
1985), institutions (Katznelson 1973) and spatial segregation (Castells 1978, 
Martiniello 2000). For example, Castles and Kosack studied how the socio-economic 
circumstances of immigrants contributed to the formation of communities by 
analysing census surveys in in Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland (which the 
authors admit present problems of comparability, see 1985: 483-486), in order to 
measure the labour market status and access to education, healthcare and housing of 
immigrant populations (1985). Similarly, Castells examined survey data to attempt 
to explain how urban communities were formed by patterns of collective 
consumption, labour market participation and spatial segregation in cities (1978). 
The effect of spatial segregation on political participation was also analysed through 
a study of electoral results by Martiniello in which he assessed whether high levels 
of residential concentration of immigrants corresponded to levels of voting for 
political candidates from the same ethnic background (2000). These studies have all 
assumed that measures of nationality and ethnicity recorded through censuses and 
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electoral registers reflect the existence of such groups in society and take correlations 
of these with levels of inequality or location in cities to be illustrative of a causal 
relation between structural context, social status and group identity.  
Micro-level studies, however, have focused their search for groups and group 
identities on the perceptions, identifications and allegiances of individuals. These are 
usually large-scale surveys using refined quantitative methods of analysis to assess 
the strength or weakness of certain identities according to the number of people that 
identify themselves in one way or another (see for example Ariely 2012, Diehl and 
Schnell 2006, Ono 2002, Putnam 2007). For example, Putnam has famously 
investigated the effects of diversity on social capital and trust in the United States by 
surveying 30,000 individuals, categorised as Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black and Asian, and recording their in-group and out-group attitudes 
(2007: 144). Similarly, Diehl and Schnell examined whether ethnicity was 
responsible for the non-integration of immigrants in Germany by collecting data on a 
sample of ‘foreigners’ from a 15 year repeated survey to find trends in ethnic 
identification, habits and social ties, particularly in reference to attachments to their 
homeland (ethnic) or host society (integrated) (2006: 787-8, 795-800). A similar 
design from Ariely used cross-national survey data from sixty three countries to 
determine whether a country’s level of globalisation was linked to individual-level 
attitudes towards national identity, concluding, rather confusingly, that higher levels 
of globalisation are linked with declining patriotism but that the relation to 
nationalism is inconclusive (2012: 461-2, 475-6). However, these surveys classify 
individuals into a reduced selection of ethnic or national categories and only allow 
respondents to be classified in one way. Cultural ‘distinctiveness’ is often presented 
as an explanation for the forms of social relations within and across these groups 
precisely because the survey format itself emphasises their exclusivity and requires 
them to be clearly differentiated in order to carry out subsequent statistical analyses 
and make general conclusions. 
As noted above, despite their diverse orientations and methods, all of these 
studies treat social groups and identities as fixed and bounded objects that can be 
clearly demarcated and measured. In doing so, they set up false dichotomies between 
categories such as ‘natives’ and ‘immigrants’ or ‘Hispanics’ and ‘Asians’ that have 
been determined a priori and overly simplify the variety of possible identifications 
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that individuals may express. Furthermore, these studies also position these ethnic or 
national categories as the explanatory variable or explanans of research, rather than 
the phenomenon to be explained or explanandum (Wimmer 2007, 2009). In other 
words, as noted by Brubaker and Malesevic, by attempting to impose general 
categorisations onto populations, they use identity to explain things rather than 
attempting to explain the political and social processes that contribute to the 
perception of groups and their boundaries as things-in-the-world (Brubaker 2001, 
2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Malesevic 2006, 2011). Thus, in the same way 
that Ulrich Beck has proposed a new academic view of the world away from the 
general categorisation of people and processes according to their national origin 
(2005: 43-5), in studies of identity and ethnic relations a distinct methodological 
focus is required to be able to uncover and explain the meanings, power relations and 
legitimising relationships that underpin the perception and definition of groups. 
As a result, the choice to analyse Romanian immigrants in this thesis requires 
qualification. Indeed, it may seem counter intuitive to advocate a move away from 
general categorisations of social groups based on nationality or ethnicity as part of a 
study of immigrants of one nationality. However, social and political actors in both 
countries speak of 'the Romanian community' and offer their view of what it means 
to be a Romanian immigrant. This thesis is directed at understanding how and 
explaining why they do so, viewing the Romanian nationality not as an object or an 
explanatory variable but rather as the social category to be studied. Indeed, these 
views are sometimes similar, but also often quite different from one another, 
illustrating the way that identities are varied, layered and under constant negotiation 
between multiple viewpoints. In other words, different public representations of 
Romanian immigrants have not arisen in Italy and Spain simply because they are 
Romanian, but rather because the category of ‘Romanian immigrant’ has different 
meanings in these countries. As will be illustrated in the remainder of this chapter, 
this task requires a reconceptualisation of identity as a dialectic between the 
processes of identification and categorisation through which actors make a claim and 






A conceptual framework: identity as negotiated claims-making 
 
The theoretical and empirical literatures outlined above deny the findings of much 
social anthropology and sociology throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In contrast to the work addressed so far, these studies were based on empirical 
fieldwork in varying settings and illustrated the malleable, blurred and messy reality 
of processes of group formation and perceptions of cultural similarity and difference 
(Barth 1967, 1969, Cohen 1985, 1986, Eriksen 2002 [1993], Firth 1951, 1964, Leach 
1954, Goffman 1959, 1963, 1967). On the one hand, they argued that cultural 
differences between groups were not the product of their separation from others but 
rather would arise through contact and interaction between individuals and groups 
(see for example Firth 1951, 1964, Malinowski 1945). On the other hand, they also 
claimed that cultural practices and group membership were not fixed in time and 
place but could vary according to the selective representation of specific cultural 
criteria by individuals. Groups and group identities were thus conceptualised as 
forms of social organisation, negotiated through relations between individuals and 
developing over time. 
This relational and processual perspective was evidenced perhaps most 
clearly and concisely in the Introduction by Fredrik Barth to the collection of essays 
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969). For Barth, groups enabled individuals and 
cultural practices to be classified, and thereby existed as a type of social organisation 
which could give meaning to social relations and behaviour (Ibid.: 29-30). But 
instead of describing groups’ cultural practices, Barth shifted his attention from the 
‘cultural stuff’ that characterised them to the boundaries and processes of boundary 
maintenance that demarcated them (Ibid.: 10). In this argument it was considered 
that group boundaries were constituted through the emphasis of specific cultural 
differences between interacting individuals, which would involve only certain 
cultural features, meaning that ‘most of the cultural matter that at any time is 
associated with a human population is not constrained by this boundary’ (Ibid.: 38). 
The selection of traits for drawing and maintaining boundaries was understood as the 
outcome of actors’ choices, which could vary according to the context and the group 
against which distinction was being defined. Aside from the select differences that 
were to be effective at drawing boundaries, Barth argued that groups should in fact 
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be structurally similar in order to be comparable (1969: 14, 35), leading him to claim 
that groups were not accidental or arbitrary, but were constructed through ongoing 
processes of boundary definition, and that these boundaries were at the same time 
permeable to exchange across them. Cultural difference and group boundaries were 
in this sense constructed through interaction which was facilitated by a certain 
degree of similarity. 
Barth’s view would go on to provide the dominant constructivist paradigm 
for the concepts of ethnicity, identity, race, community and nationalism throughout 
the second half of the twentieth century (for studies of ‘race’, see Banton 1983, 
1987; for ‘community’ see Cohen 1985, 1986; for ‘national identity’ see Anderson 
2006 [1983], Eriksen 2002 [1993]). Such an emphasis on selected traits for 
differentiation built on that previously noted by Max Weber when he declared that 
‘all differences of customs can sustain a specific sense of honour or dignity in their 
practitioners’ and ‘any cultural trait, no matter how superficial, can serve as a 
starting point for the familiar tendency to monopolistic closure’ (2010: 19). 
Furthermore, social closure, which is based on the recognition of group members’ 
similarities with each other and differences with outsiders in order to control access 
to resources and status, need not be a reflection of real or material cultural practices 
and traits. In this sense, as famously noted more recently by Benedict Anderson, 
although members of an identity group beyond the dimensions of face-to-face 
contact will never meet most of their fellow members, ‘in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion’ (2006: 6). Thus the idea of unity within a group is 
necessarily imagined, and defined by the ideological emphasis of cultural and 
symbolic similarities between community members and selected, contextual 
boundary-establishing differences with others. 
In light of these findings, the problem of cultural diversity in contemporary 
normative liberal theory is found to be built on a conceptual fallacy which falsely 
grants identity groups fixed and exclusionary boundaries and classifies their 
members according to a generalised perception of cultural similarity. As illustrated 
above, because individuals were understood as belonging to only one group and 
groups were at the same time taken as exclusionary and antagonistic in relation to 
each other, their identities were perceived as objects enclosed by fixed boundaries. In 
doing so, they presented ‘an uneasy amalgam of constructivist language and 
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essentialist argumentation’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 6). The arguments outlined 
above problematically assumed that the boundaries of (national) society, identity and 
culture coincided harmoniously, presenting national polities as culturally 
homogeneous and stable cultural entities to which immigration would provide an 
external shock (Wimmer 2007). However, an exploration of the claims to national 
identity of Romanians, Italians and Spaniards can illustrate with clarity how, in the 
succinct words of Jenkins, ‘the secure hermetically bounded group is an imaginative, 
somewhat romanticised retrospect’ (1997: 38). 
Claims to nationhood in Romania have most commonly been founded on the 
differentiation of the Romanian people from their neighbours by emphasising a 
Roman heritage originating with the colonisation of the region of Dacia by Emperor 
Trajan in the second century and epitomised by the Latin roots of the Romanian 
language (Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997: 31-3). Under the Ceausescu 
regime, the historiography of direct continuity of the Romanian people from these 
Daco-Roman origins was such that the 2050
th
 anniversary of the Dacian state was 
celebrated in 1980 (Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997: 33). Yet in the 
eighteenth century there was coexistence between different ‘nations’ such as those of 
Hungarian and Wallachian origin, as well as Saxon and Magyar elites and Roman 
Catholic, Lutheran, Unitarian, Calvinist and Orthodox religions (Hitchins 1999). The 
modern state of Romania was formed in 1878 by the independence of the 
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia from Ottoman rule, but its contemporary 
form was established only in 1918 through the addition of Transylvania, which was 
previously part of Hungary (Brubaker 2004: 165).  
Today, these elements remain in balance and tension. Predominantly, 
conceptualisations of Romanian nationhood have continued to emphasise the 
synthesis of the Orthodox religion and a Roman-Latin heritage, leading migratory 
networks across Europe to be defined as the construction of a ‘Latin bridge’ from 
Romania in the East to Spain in the West (Marcu 2005). Yet since the 1990s neo-
protestant Churches of Pentecostals and Adventists have been growing in Romania 
and there continues to be significant minority ethnic populations of Hungarians, 
Romanis and Germans, as well as an Italian community that is also recognised as a 
protected minority (Ricci 2010). Diverse ways of ‘being Romanian’ are also to be 
found in the immigrant populations found in Italy and Spain, reflected in the 
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interviews carried out for this thesis, from Orthodox Christians to Adventists or 
atheists, nationalists to Europeans, and from modernists emphasising literary and 
artistic achievements to traditionalists remembering rural folk customs. To state that 
there is a unitary, homogeneous Romanian cultural way of being either in Romania 
itself or across the emigrant populations in Italy and Spain would therefore constitute 
a vague generalisation. Instead, at various points in time there have been differing 
degrees of consensus around the meaning of Romania’s past and symbols (Brubaker 
2004, Brubaker et al 2006, Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997). These cultural 
ways are best interpreted as claims to a Romanian identity that is remembered and 
enacted in diverse and historically-contingent ways (Brubaker 2004: 161-164).  
Similarly, the development of a modern Italian conception of nationhood has 
been piecemeal and varied. Machiavelli’s sixteenth century manual to political 
power and rule, The Prince, confronted the difficulty of governing across the 
individual kingdoms making up the peninsula (2005 [1532]), and two hundred years 
later Napoleon also failed to found a new unitary Italian State (Duggan 2007). 
Indeed, until the nineteenth century the Italian term nazione was used to refer not to 
the nation, but rather to the place of one’s birth, giving rise to Lombard, Piedmontese 
and Venetian ‘nations’ and today the Italian word paese can ambiguously refer to the 
country or to a town or village. Local dialects have also remained prevalent, with a 
reported 48.5% of the population speaking either a mixture of Italian and dialect or 
solely their dialect with their family (ISTAT 2007). 
The legacy of these persistently strong local and regional tendencies is often 
lamented, as noted by Ugo Amoretti’s statement that ‘this diverse array of historical 
experiences [...] sowed the seeds of a territorial differentiation that political 
unification could not fully sweep away’ (2004: 182). This territorial differentiation 
was recently brought to the fore in the politics of the 1990s and 2000s as there arose 
the Northern Leagues (Lega Nord, LN) which constructed a historical Celtic identity 
for the North of Italy based on local dialects, songs, heroes and stories that 
‘demonstrated’ its difference to the South and ‘uncovered’ cultural roots in North 
European tradition (Albertazzi 2006). In defining this invented Northern identity, the 
Leagues ignored or actively rejected the international population movements that had 
defined Northern Italy over the course of history, from the diverse merchants of 
medieval Venice to the industrial workers from the south of Italy and the 
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contemporary immigrants from around the world (Albertazzi 2006, Cento Bull 
2010). Moreover, this has not simply been a northern phenomenon. In the southern 
regions of Sicily and Apulia historical movements of diverse linguistic, religious and 
cultural populations have meant that Albanian and Greek villages where ancient non-
Italian dialects are still spoken can also be home today to contemporary arrivals of 
North African and Eastern European immigrants who do not always speak Italian but 
often master the dialect (Douglas 2010 [1915]). In this way, population movements, 
cultural diversity and shifting group boundaries have been part of the ‘normal’ 
development of Italian identities. 
Finally, modern Spanish identity has also been long-debated and conflicting 
accounts have come to dominate at different moments in time. On the one hand, the 
Spanish nation has been described as emerging from the fires of resistance against 
Napoleonic occupation, united against its common enemy to fight for independence, 
with anti-French groups ‘unanimous in their will to re-establish independence and 
the unity of the Spanish patria’ (de la Granja et al 2001, Nadal Oller 1975). On the 
other hand, however, it has been argued that the diversity of different legal codes, 
customs, laws, languages, traditions and identities of Catalans, Basques, Galicians 
co-existing in the same country have meant that the term ‘Spain’ largely reflected a 
geographical definition rather than a political community (Núñez Seixas 1999, 
Ringrose 1998). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Spanish identity 
was framed by competition between these traditionalist and liberal canons of 
patriotism (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Molina 2010).  
From the end of the 1930s to the 1980s the fascist regime of Franco intended 
to put an end to cultural plurality. It explicitly associated Spanish identity with the 
concepts of Hispanidad, built on the Castilian language and the belief that all 
nationals of Spain and its colonies were of the same race and bore the same 
characteristics, and National-Catholicism, tying national unity to a culturally 
homogeneous Catholic Church (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 32-34, Molina 2010: 
250, Núñez Seixas 2001: 720). Yet resistance movements mobilised frequently 
around regional identities contrasting the official discourse, such as the opposition 
from Basque nationalists, the Catalan anarchists and trade unionists, or the artistic 
Catalanisme movements (Domènech Sampere 2012). With the fall of the Francoist 
regime, the new Constitution in 1978 defined Spain ambiguously as a nation of 
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‘indivisible unity’ made up of different peoples, regions and nationalities, whilst 
explicit affirmations of allegiance to the nation in public were associated with 
fascism and de-legitimised (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Martínez-Herrera and Miley 
2010, Núñez Seixas 2001, 2005). National and international migrations over the 
course of the twentieth century have further led to a diversification of the 
populations within these regions.  
In this sense, certain configurations of national or regional identities have 
arisen and become more salient in specific periods over the respective histories of 
Romania, Italy and Spain. It is clear that within broad definitions of nationhood there 
are diverse interpretations of identity. These national identities are not, therefore 
reflections of homogeneous, fixed and unitary national populations, but rather claims 
that are influenced by social, political and economic developments over time. As 
briefly illustrated here, plurality has been common although the contexts in which 
the memories and cultural traits of these countries have been debated, interpreted, 
accepted or rejected and, at times, imposed and enforced, has changed. As the 
following sub-section will suggest, this illustrates how the formation and 
maintenance of identity groups is tied to wider social and political balances of 
power. 
 
Identity as a negotiated boundary-making process 
 
As mentioned above, the problem of identity and cultural diversity in liberal 
democracies and social science research is based on an interpretation of groups as 
fixed and bounded, exclusionary objects that denies much of the diversity and 
change over time that really characterises groups and group identities. In this way, 
they see immigration as a challenge to an apparently homogeneous and unified 
normality that is often imagined. However, if cultural diversity and change over time 
is common, as noted above, then the sociological challenge lies in understanding 
why some cultural similarities and differences become more significant in certain 
times and places rather than others. What is presented as an ontological problem 
regarding the nature of identity groups is therefore in reality an epistemological 
problem of knowing why certain representations of identity are perceived as true and 
legitimate at specific times and how they dominate over others. 
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 Significant research across the social sciences has already been concerned 
with this task (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Castells 2010, 
Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 2007, Loveman 1999, Modood 2007, Wimmer 2007, 
2008, 2009). Leading on from Barth's work on ethnic groups and their boundaries 
(1969), the central arguments of this perspective state that identity is a process of 
presentation and interpretation of select cultural criteria in interactional contexts, that 
groups are defined through the self-ascription of members as similar to each other 
and perception of non-members as culturally different, and that the boundaries that 
mark groups are not fixed and discrete but rather malleable and potentially changing 
according to the choices of actors regarding their presentation in interaction with 
others. As with the original constructivist position, identity is in this way 
conceptualised as a relational, generative process (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Jenkins 
1997, 2008, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009).  
 However, there has also been divergence from Barth's original position. In 
particular, Rogers Brubaker and others have suggested that ethnic or identity groups 
do not truly exist, and even if they do the concept of groups either means too much 
or not enough to be epistemologically useful anyway (Brubaker 2001, 2004, 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Malesevic 2004, 2006, 2011). Brubaker has argued that 
ethnicity and identity, as well as groups and nations, exist in fact ‘only through our 
perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorisations and identifications’ 
(2004: 17). These categorisations and identifications do not reflect the social reality 
of groups, but contribute to a sense of groupness, increasing the tendency to 
recognise individuals and cultures as discrete and bounded entities, which Brubaker 
has in turn defined groupism (2004: 8). Consequently, the analyst’s aim should be to 
account for levels of groupness that can explain effective groupism, rather than 
attempting to use identity, ethnicity, race, nation and their respective groups to 
explain social phenomena because identity ‘belongs to our empirical data, not to our 
analytical toolkit’ (2004: 9). Malesevic has similarly declared that ethnicity (and by 
extension, identity) is ‘not a thing or a collective asset of a particular group; it is a 
social relation in which social actors perceive themselves and are perceived by others 
as being culturally distinct collectivities’ (2004: 4). As a result, he claims that groups 
and their boundaries constitute ‘specific group labels in a particular moment of time 
and with a particular social and political reason’ (2004: 4). For Malesevic, these 
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labels are our empirical evidence: it is only through their discursive expression that 
we recognise the existence of group boundaries, and it is only through their being 
presented by actors in social contexts that they arise. Thus he argues that ‘groups [...] 
are not billiard balls, they do not and could never exist on their own’ (2006: 27). For 
these authors, identity is therefore an analytical category defined in social and 
political relations rather than a social object or independent variable.  
These authors have suggested a re-orientation of the study of group identity 
by breaking the concept down into constituent analytical parts. These can be 
summarised as the following: 
 
1. Firstly, they argue that identity must be understood in its cognitive 
dimension, that is to say, as a way of perceiving, positioning, interpreting 
and ordering the social world (Brubaker 2004). Identity is thus an 
ideological map that can provide structure and coherence to otherwise 
meaningless images, events and acts, as well as framing political 
competition and mobilisation (Malesevic 2011: 283).  
 
2. Secondly, if identities and groups are processes and cognitive schemata, 
they cannot be actors and do not do anything. Actors frame identities and 
shape the interpretation of their actions in line with certain cognitive 
maps and according to their interests and motivations. In this sense, 
ethnic boundaries are defined not by ethnic groups but by organisations, 
individuals and institutions, from political parties to the state, social 
movements, schools, the military, mass media, local authorities, and so 
on (Brubaker 2004, Malesevic 2011: 285-6).  
 
3. Finally, the classification of individuals in groups is a two-way process of 
self-identification and other-categorisation (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 
14-5). This is a multi-layered and competitive process. For Malesevic, the 
concepts of ideology and solidarity can replace macro-categories such as 
national identity in order to grasp this multilayered interaction of 




In summary, it is claimed that by analysing the processes by which individuals, 
institutions and organisations identify themselves and categorise others into 
apparently bounded groups, levels of groupness can be explained. The limitations of 
essentialising analytical groupism can thus apparently be overcome by a focus on the 
socially and historically situated processes by which identifications and categories of 
individuals come to be recognised as substantial entities with agency and 
permanence (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Brubaker et al 
2006). As with Barth's work on ethnic groups, this advocates a move away from 'the 
cultural stuff' of identities to the process by which categories of individuals are given 
meaning and publicly presented. 
However, the work of Brubaker and Malesevic has also been controversial. 
In particular, the ontological assertion that groups and identity do not exist has been 
criticised. One example is Modood’s multiculturalism, in which this author has 
agreed with the need to not essentialise the identities that are under examination, but 
taken issue with the overly analytical anti-essentialism of Brubaker that denies 
groups any sense of continuity and coherence (2007: 93). Another example comes 
from Jenkins who states that by declaring that identity and groups do not exist, 
Brubaker and Malesevic have pushed ‘a broadly sensible argument’ against viewing 
groups as clearly demarcated and bounded to ‘somewhere less sensible’ by denying 
their existence all together (2008: 8). In contrast, Jenkins argues that ‘groups may be 
imagined, but this does not mean that they are imaginary’ (Ibid.: 11). Nevertheless, 
despite these controversies, there has been broad agreement on the need for and 
benefits of a new analytical approach to identity. In this way, for Modood the 
challenge for multiculturalism and multicultural policies is to take as the starting 
point the relational context and changing perceptions of difference between groups 
rather than either a vague and generalised notion of culture or a too specific and 
essentialised idea of groups. For Jenkins and others, moreover, our understanding of 
identity and groups should similarly be founded on an awareness of patterns and 
dynamics of identification and categorisation of individuals and their cultural beliefs 
and practices (Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 2007, 
Loveman 1999, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009).  
In particular, Jenkins’ attempts to construct a unified analytical approach to 
individual and group identity have also placed the processes of identification and 
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categorisation at their core (1997, 2008). Heavily influenced by Barth, for Jenkins 
identity is a transactional, relational and generative process inasmuch as it is 
constituted through the constant negotiation of cultural similarity and difference 
between contextually-situated individuals. As emphatically stated throughout his 
work, identity must therefore always be considered a social process. Unlike Barth, 
however, for Jenkins identity boundaries are defined from the outside, by non-
members, as well as on the inside by group members. Jenkins’ conceptualisation of 
identity is therefore concerned with the dialectical relationship between self-
identifications and other-categorisations of cultural similarity and difference. 
Identity, whether ethnic or national, individual or collective, is defined in its internal 
and external dimensions: individuals and groups define who they themselves are 
(their ego, in Freudian terminology), at the same time that they are also defined by 
others in ways that can validate or conflict with their own perspective (1997: 53). 
The boundaries of identifications and categorisations do not necessarily coincide, 
and a group identity is therefore necessarily a synthesis (an accomplishment, in 
Jenkins’ words) with the others’ perspective (2008: 41-3, see also Habermas 1985). 
These internal and external dimensions of groups and group identities are therefore 
constitutive processes reflecting a differential of power and the dominance of a 
specific world view placing individuals together (1997: 54-5, 2008: 43-5, see also 
Loveman 1999).  
Finally, for Jenkins groups and group identities are also inseparable from the 
interests and objectives of the actors who stake a claim to their reality. Indeed, 
patterns of classification undoubtedly have the potential to affect the everyday lived 
experience of being something or someone and, vice versa, they can provide 
opportunities to adopt, reinterpret or resist the way that they are named (1997: 72, 
2008: 45). In this sense, on one hand, identification establishes a self-conscious 
sense of collectivity as a group identifies and defines itself, whilst on the other hand, 
external people, groups and institutions can place individuals in categories according 
to their perceived similarities to each other or their difference to non-members. As 
witnessed with citizenship statuses, the categorisation of individuals by a state, for 
example, can entail the allocation of resources and/or penalties such as voting rights, 
access to education or a deportation order, depending on the status granted, which 
will in turn affect their lived experience and social status. The everyday lives of 
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individuals are therefore influenced not only by who they say they are, but by who 
they are categorised as by others (Jenkins 1997: 64-70, 2008: 127, see also Loveman 
1999: 892). 
 As noted by Barth’s original approach, these contemporary theories illustrate 
how ethnic groups and identities cannot be explained only by describing their 
cultural traits, but instead must be analysed as a pattern of social organisation and 
claims making (1969, see also Barth 1981). Groups are therefore construed through a 
negotiation of similarities and differences that is in turn the outcome of the layered 
and varied dialectic between those who may or may not identify themselves as 
groups and others who may or may not be placed in categories. At the heart of this 
dialectic is the continuation of the work of Barth and Weber on the processual, 
relational and changing process of group boundary definition and closure in 
accordance with selected similarities and difference. However, it also goes further by 
shifting the analytical focus onto the multiple and diverse ways in which the 
meaning of identities is formally and informally negotiated in different social, 
political, cultural and institutional contexts, that are themselves characterised by 
power relations. It also permits ‘the inclusion of individual and collective identities 
within a unified analytical framework’ (Jenkins 1997: 71), along with the previously 
distinct concepts of ethnicity, ‘race’ and nation, as part of the socially-embedded 





This chapter has outlined the meaning of the key concept of this thesis: identity. The 
objective of understanding how and explaining why different public responses to 
Romanian immigration have arisen in Italy and Spain has thus been conceptualised 
as a question of analysing how different claims to a Romanian identity are expressed, 
negotiated, resonate publicly and gain dominance. Rsponses to Romanian 
immigration are therefore understood as dialectic classificatory processes rather than 
reactions to a clash between incompatible cultures. 
In outlining this conceptual approach, this chapter also highlighted 
weaknesses in a large portion of the previous literature on immigration, identity and 
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cultural diversity. Indeed, previous theoretical and analytical research has 
consistently understood groups and group identities as fixed, bounded and 
unchanging objects. On the one hand, theorists have supposed that these identities 
should be ignored or accommodated in public policy in order to ensure equality and 
freedom between culturally different individuals and groups. On the other hand, 
social scientists have supposed that these identities can be quantitatively measured 
because they are clearly demarcated and do not change over time. Both of these 
approaches suppose that identities cause problems or specific forms of social 
relations, and so can be put forward as an explanatory variable in analyses. 
However, here a distinct viewpoint advocates that groups and group identities 
themselves require explaining. Indeed, the expression and character of individual and 
group identities are prone to change over time, according to the actions and interests 
of actors in relation to others. In short, individuals choose how to identify themselves 
and categorise others, according to the context in which they find themselves. The 
subsequent success or failure of these identifications or categorisations to gain 
dominance as legitimate reflections of the presence of groups is dependent on the 
competition and negotiation between them. The process of determining ‘who is who’ 
in the context of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain is thus tied to the claims 
making of actors who are embedded in social contexts and relations with others. In 
light of this, this thesis must ask: what is the content of claims to Romanian 
identification and categorisation? How do actors negotiate their claims? How and 
why do some actors' claims gain dominance over others? As the next chapter will 
outline in more detail, these processes are embedded in social relations between 
actors who are situated in specific structural contexts, mobilise with varying logics 
according to their beliefs, expectations, resources and objectives. Thus the question 
of ‘who is who’ is understood as an analysis not of ‘what’ a Romanian immigrant 










The previous chapter has outlined the foundations for understanding responses to 
Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain as negotiations of the meaning of 
identities, of ‘who is who’ and ‘what is what’ (Jenkins 2008). These definition of 
who is who is constituted through the emphasis of certain similarities between 
individuals and their differences in relation to others, establishing a sense of 
groupness when there is consensus on the common perceptions and tacit 
understandings of what it means to be classified as part of a group. However, this 
classification is a negotiation between members of groups, who identify themselves 
in a certain way, and non-members who categorise groups as similar to each other. 
The negotiation of who is who is therefore a dialectic process of identifying groups 
and imposing categorisations through processes of labelling, knowledge production, 
political mobilisation and resistance, which can change over time due to the 
changing contexts, interests, motivations and power differentials of the actors 
undertaking them (Karner 2007: 52-68). In this way, negotiating identity is a process 
which is embedded in frameworks of meanings and relations of power. 
This chapter will build on this conceptual outline by developing an analytical 
framework that will permit an explanation of why some claims to identity dominate 
over others. Its focus is on the following questions; how are group identifications 
and categorisations given meaning? Who influences the meaning of collective 
identities? And why do some meanings dominate? 
The first section of the chapter critically assesses previous studies that have 
explained social and political responses to immigration as due to the structural 
conditions of the host society. This literature takes factors such as class and 
institutional structures, from discourses, to political frameworks or laws and policies, 
as drivers and shapers of ethnic community formation, immigrant political 
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participation and immigration policy making. However, it also neglects the choices 
and strategies of individuals in this process. The second section will illustrate how an 
awareness of agency can be brought into this structural framework via theories of 
symbolic interactionism and field and network analyses. This is necessary because 
structural settings of discourses, political frameworks, laws and policies do not only 
open or close opportunities for action, but are themselves strategically constructed, 
negotiated and subverted by mobilising actors. The third section will provide a way 
of explaining the choices and logics of action of these structurally situated actors as 
legitimacy-seeking frame alignment strategies through which they aim to build 
consensus with partners and audiences in order to achieve their interests. The fourth 
and final section will elaborate a three-dimensional, 'de-ethnicized' (Wimmer 2007) 
research framework which situates actor framing and network strategies within the 
context of institutional structures and the distribution of resources.  
 
 
Structural explanations of the politics of immigration 
 
A range of previous studies of immigration and ethnic relations have underlined the 
importance of structural conditions for explaining the way that societies categorise 
immigrants and how immigrants and ethnic minorities participate politically and 
identify themselves as sharing a sense of groupness. These can be summarised as 




Some of the founding texts in contemporary immigration and ethnic relations studies 
have looked to explain immigrant-native and ethnic group relations within wider 
patterns of class relations (e.g. Body-Gendrot 2000, Castles and Kosack 1985, 
Castells 1975, 1978, Calavita 2005, Miles and Phizacklea 1977, Phizacklea and 
Miles 1980, Schierup et al 2008). Segregation between groups along lines of 
nationality or race were explained by these authors as ensuring the incorporation of 
immigrants into social divisions that were instrumental in maintaining the 
exploitation of the working class (e.g. Body-Gendrot 2000, Castles and Kosack 
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1985, Castells 1975, 1978, Calavita 2005, Miles and Phizacklea 1977, Phizacklea 
and Miles 1980).  
In these studies, host society responses to immigrants were viewed as the 
product of perceived competition between separate ethnic, racial and national 
communities. Competition facilitated divisions between workers of different 
national, racial or ethnic backgrounds that were in turn viewed as an important way 
of keeping a divided working class subordinated in relationships of production. For 
example, for Phizacklea and Miles, racism and discrimination in response to the 
presence of immigrants could not be understood in isolation from wider economic 
divisions and material inequalities which maintained black and white workers in a 
state of competition and conflict (1980: 225-9). For Castles and Kosack, however, 
the incorporation of immigrants into the worst jobs and the lowest social status 
regarding access to housing and education was understood as a possible source of 
commonality with the native working class (1985: 6-9), if not for socialisation 
processes in the host society which promoted prejudice towards them for not 
conforming to accepted norms and values (Ibid.: 448-50). This established the 
subordination of immigrants within the working class and reproduced the conditions 
for the exploitation of their labour (Ibid.: 458-60). More recently it has similarly 
been suggested that in Italy and Spain a subordinate status of immigrant populations 
has been due to their incorporation into a ‘segmented realm’ of the informal labour 
market (Schierup et al 2008: 58, 104). Calavita has in this way also argued that the 
labour market structure in these countries has created a segregated, primarily 
informal, immigrant underclass that is excluded from the rights and material benefits 
of the rest of society (2005: 48-70). Thus, she claims, ‘racialized immigrants, denied 
the economic rewards of late modern society and excluded from socio-cultural 
belonging, are scapegoated for the denials and exclusions experienced by others’ 
(2005: 165). 
 However, this class framework is problematic on various accounts. Firstly, it 
is highly normative and as a result explains prejudice as a lack of class consciousness 
rather than the presence of other possible modes of collectivity or community 
formation (Ireland 1994: 6). In this respect it adopts a teleological perspective of 
immigrant politics as developing, sooner or later, into class conflict. Secondly, it 
presents immigrants and ethnic groups as homogeneous categories of workers, 
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failing to account for diverse patterns of social stratification along non-economic 
lines, such as the development of ethnic groups with members from diverse socio-
economic standings (Katznelson 1973: 18, see also Barth 1981). Thirdly, by 
emphasising socio-economic and labour market structures these authors 
underestimate the agency of individuals and their capacity to choose how to publicly 
define their group membership along lines different to class. 
 
Institutional and discursive structures 
 
A distinct approach concentrating on structural factors has positioned the politics of 
immigration within its institutional context. Institutions are understood in these 
studies as persistent structures of formal and informal rules and expectations. They 
can be categorised as the following; discursive structures, political frameworks, and 
laws and policies affecting individuals’ status. 
Discursive structures can be understood as commonly-held ideas, political 
cultures, cleavages or public philosophies that influence interpretations of issues 
such as immigration. These ideas have been presented as relatively stable structures 
capable of contributing to a sense of belonging that cuts across class boundaries 
(Barry 1990 [1965], Bleich 2002, Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Gil Araujo 2009, 
Zapata-Barrero 2007). In doing so, discursive structures contribute to the 
construction of the social and cultural boundaries of citizenship and immigrant-
native relations due to the way that they underpin the arguments that are used to 
debate them. 
A central text in this literature has been Adrian Favell’s study of immigrant 
integration and citizenship policies, which claimed that ‘official public theories’ built 
around the cognitive frameworks of citoyennete and intégration in France or race 
relations and multiculturalism in Britain (1998). Favell argued that these frameworks 
were dominant due to being founded on sets of consensual ideas and linguistic terms 
regarding certain normative ‘sacred assumptions’ (Ibid.: 21-7). In doing so, he 
suggested that discussion and debate of immigration may change over time, but the 
outcome in terms of policy is usually the status quo due to the relative stability of 
these normative principles. Similarly, Rogers Brubaker examined how conceptions 
of nationhood influenced citizenship regimes in France and Germany (1992). 
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Brubaker saw debates and policies as marking a distinction between insiders and 
outsiders in line with historic conceptions of who ‘we’ as the national community are 
and who should or should not belong. Gil Araujo has also argued that distinct 
conceptualisations of the Spanish and Catalan nations in Spain’s multi-level polity 
have resulted in contradictory national and regional policy responses to immigrants 
(2009: 233-44). However, these authors have only studied mainstream political 
actors or governments and generalised descriptive categories of ‘immigrants’ and 
‘nation’, neglecting the diverse and stratified identifications and categorisations 
occurring in social relations (Katznelson 1973: 18, see also Ireland 1994, Wimmer 
2007, 2009).  
A greater awareness of the diversity of actors and categories has been 
presented by authors who have analysed patterns of immigrant claims making as part 
of a pluralist political model shaped by dominant political frameworks and modes of 
liberal democratic participation (Katznelson 1973: 192, see also Cinalli and Giugni 
2011, Ireland 1994, 2000, Koopmans and Statham 2000, Schmitter 1980, Waldinger 
1989). In these studies, political responses to immigration and the political 
participation of immigrants themselves have been explained as due to the way that 
legal, political and administrative structures close or open opportunities for different 
claims-making dynamics. 
An early example of this approach was Katznelson’s study of race relations 
in immigration communities in the USA and the UK (1973). Unlike the studies of 
class above, Katznelson was concerned with how race provided an extra dimension 
of stratification to the market and polity within a shared institutional framework. He 
examined the ‘racial linkages’ between black immigrant and white host communities 
across these divisions and argued that the lack of linkages was tied to distributions of 
power, enforced by established liberal democratic forms, rhetoric, and processes, 
which contributed to an institutional expression of racism (1973: 191-5). Thus, even 
when black citizens were given voting rights, these stable institutional arrangements 
ensured that the available choices in, and therefore the outcomes of, bargaining 
processes went unchanged (1973: 199). A similar conclusion was reached, twenty 
years later, by Ireland in his study of immigration in France and Switzerland, arguing 
that in these countries ‘each institutional context has produced its own evolving 
pattern of participatory forms and demands and, consequently, different types and 
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levels of impact’ (1994: 245). For Ireland, policy and administrative frameworks in 
education, housing, the labour market and social assistance, as well as the presence 
and actions of institutional gatekeepers such as trade unions, political parties and 
‘solidarity groups’ (charities, human rights lobbies, etc) helped shape the level and 
form of political participation of immigrant groups (1994: 10). In the EU, 
Guiraudon’s study of a developing supranational immigration policy has also 
illustrated how the opening of opportunities for policy making and lobbying in the 
EU has allowed for interior ministries and security forces to pass restrictive 
immigration controls by ‘venue-shopping’ away from the restrictions of national 
judiciaries and publics (Guiraudon 2000). 
Finally, these macro-level studies of identity discourses and political 
frameworks have been accompanied by micro-level studies of how citizenship 
legislation and immigrant integration policies constitute a system of rules and norms 
that provide the backdrop to the formal inclusion or exclusion of individuals from 
national communities, distinguishing between members and outsiders (Bauböck, 
2006: 15, see also Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, Wiener 2003). In short, as noted by 
Schuck, ‘the law defines individual’s rights to property and economic activity, 
political participation, physical security, religious and cultural identity and family 
relationships’ (2000: 189). In this way, Cachón Rodríguez has argued, for example, 
that in Spain the integration (or lack thereof) of immigrants from less economically 
developed countries has been reliant on the legal conditions of entry and settlement 
that have seen them discriminated against in the labour market (2009). Yasemin 
Soysal has also argued that international rights regimes now assure the status and 
inclusion of immigrants across national borders, declaring the establishment of a 
post-national mode of citizenship (1994, 1996). It has since similarly been suggested 
by others that the political context’s influence on the mobilisation patterns of 
individual immigrants is ‘to be found not primarily in the overall institutionalized 
political system or in elites’ alignments, but rather in the citizenship rights that open 
or close their access to the national community’ (Cinalli and Giugni 2011: 44).  
These pluralist models of political mobilisation in diverse discursive and 
institutional settings offer a more flexible framework for explaining the shape and 
form of the politics of immigration than the aforementioned studies of class. They 
accept that the social, political and cultural boundaries of immigrant inclusion and 
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exclusion are negotiated by a range of actors, and attempt to explain the shape these 
negotiations take by analysing the opportunity structures which enable political 
parties, interest groups or immigrant populations to come together as collective 
actors and effectively influence public debate and policy making processes 
(Koopmans and Statham 2000). Their point is, as noted by Bauböck et al, ‘to identity 
institutional incentives and disincentives that help to explain migrants’ political 
choices and strategies’ (2006: 66). 
Nevertheless, although an analysis of institutional structures provides a 
useful perspective on which contextual factors facilitate mobilisation and, to a 
certain extent, how some actors gain greater leverage than others in public claims 
and decision making, it does not explain the choices made by these actors or the 
content of their claims. As with studies of class, they risk tending towards 
teleological conclusions, such as the assumption that the British philosophy of 
integration ‘is exemplified by the pragmatic concerns of toleration and the 
recognition of autonomy’ growing out of the philosophy of Mill, Locke and Hobbes 
(Favell 1998: 142), or that immigrants cannot ever influence public perceptions of 
their presence because they have less rights (Cachón Rodríguez 2009). Despite 
mentioning argument and debate, they do not show which actors are able to control 
the meaning of issues, nor whether the content of underlying public philosophies can 
change over time, or indeed why some arguments dominate over others (Carragee 
and Roafs 2004, Gillan 2008). They also do not explain the choice of meanings or 
account for how actors with a similar social, legal and political status articulate 
different political positions (Adamson 2011: 900 see also Dembinska 2012). In short, 
by focusing on the institutional structures around actors they do not concern 






Following from the assessment of structural conditions above, this section will 
outline how agency can be brought into the analytical framework. The first part 
summarises studies focusing only on agency, highlighting the weakness of their 
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lacking inclusion of constraints and limitations on actor strategies and negotiation 
outcomes. This will be followed by outlining how actor choices and mobilisations 
can be structurally situated in discursive, political and legal settings. 
 
Agency without limits: symbolic politics 
 
A distinct approach to the study of the politics of identity and ethnic relations has 
grown from the work of communications studies academics who have aspired to 
unveil xenophobic, racist and prejudiced ways of talking and thinking in politics and 
society (Edelman 1967, Riesgl and Wodak 2000, van Dijk 1987, 1991, 2006, van 
Gorp 2005). This has developed from previous studies of symbolic politics which 
were concerned with the ability of interest-motivated individuals to present, define 
and manipulate the symbolic content of messages in front of their audiences 
(Edelman 1964). Such an approach claimed that political leaders enjoyed a great 
degree of freedom in determining the interpretations of their audience due to their 
access to power and knowledge, whilst audiences were essentially incapable of a 
rational understanding of events and issues (Ibid.: 27-8).  
More recently, Teun A. van Dijk has been one of the leading contributors to 
this field, examining how language and discourse can be employed as markers of 
distinction between social in- and out-groups (1987: 47). For van Dijk, elites would 
tell publics how to think about out-groups by employing prejudiced and racist 
discourses; such discourses would emphasise negative out-group characteristics 
compared to positive in-group representations, establishing and maintaining power 
imbalances between them (1987: 61, 1991: 27). He has argued that elites have 
controlled this process because they have been able to reach the widest range of 
people through mass communications whilst benefitting from asymmetrical access to 
political, social, cultural, ideological and economic resources (1987: 367, 1991: 32). 
Such control of public interpretations of social relations constitutes elite power, 
which preserves the in-group’s superiority and reproduces the dominant ethnic 
consensus (1987: 359, 1991: 43). The public representation of social groups such as 
immigrants or racial or ethnic minorities should from this perspective be explained 




The symbolic politics approach provides, nevertheless, a rather simplified 
view of political bargaining and claims-making. Firstly, it presents publics as 
generalised populations of weak and quiescent individuals, accepting blindly what 
they are told by elites. But in reality, elites cannot invent issue representations and 
meanings with absolute freedom; audiences actively interpret them and must find 
them understandable, relevant and recognisable in order to respond in he expected or 
desired way (Manin 1997: 218-230, see also Barth 1969, Goffman 1987 [1959]). 
Also, political elites are not usually the only actors to offer issue representations. 
Instead, a range of actors may compete for the salience of their perspective in public 
debate or in the policy process, from the press to administrative institutions, political 
parties and ‘solidarity groups’ (Freeman 1995, Ireland 1994, see also Chong and 
Druckmann 2007). Secondly, by explaining elites’ motivations as driven by 
maintaining an unbalanced access to all economic, political and symbolic resources, 
the symbolic politics approach does not account for how specific actors may strive 
for specific resources nor how their objectives may be better achieved by directing 
their attention at specific audiences rather than through appealing to a mass public 
(Boswell 2009, Boswell and Geddes 2011, Brunsson 1989). In short, the symbolic 
politics approach effectively describes how and by whom meanings are publicly 
defined, but has weak explanatory power when it comes to asking why choices are 
made. 
 
Agency as structurally situated: symbolic interactionism, fields and networks 
 
A more nuanced approach to the strategic presentation of issues and groups has 
grown out of the symbolic interactionist school, which arose in contrast to the 
objectivist structuralism of the early twentieth century. It was founded on the 
proposition that all meaning is socially negotiated (Baert 1998: 66-75). The self was 
therefore conceived as a social self, constituted through interaction by which it 
would be possible to adopt the attitudes of others and arrive at shared meanings for 
symbols (Ibid.: 68-9). All objects and symbols can have various meanings, but social 
patterns were understood to be reliant on repeated interpretations and reinforced 
references, expectations and actions, which actors could influence by drawing on 
previously reinforced extant frames of interpretation (Ibid.: 72-3). From a symbolic 
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interactionist perspective, the discursive structures outlined above therefore also 
constitute possible resources for mobilisation through interaction. 
Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical understanding of interpersonal relations 
provided some of the early foundations for this approach (1987 [1959], 1986 
[1974]). Goffman posited that individuals in interaction performed to each other and 
controlled their self-presentation according to the impression that they wished to 
give and their audience's expectations of consistency and coherence. He thus argued 
that self identity constituted an interactional, socially-mediated process which would 
be ‘“socialized”, moulded, modified to fit into the understanding and the 
expectations of the society in which it [was] presented’ (1987: 37). From this view, 
an individual can be understood by their audience because there are commonly 
expected meanings attached to signs and symbols, such as certain actions, words or 
expressions. Moreover, for Goffman such expected commonalities and knowledge 
were not prescriptive but rather offered people the opportunity to intentionally create 
false impressions by altering their performance, implying that ‘Self, then, is not an 
entity half concealed behind events, but a changing formula for managing oneself 
during them’ (1986: 573, 1987: 69). The meaning of self identities was thus 
conceptualised as a mediation between what was known and what was presented, 
each conditioned by a performer’s and an audience’s prior knowledge, sources of 
information, and interpretations (1987: 13). As with Barth's interpretation of group 
boundary definition by ethnic entrepreneurs discussed in the previous chapter, 
Goffman’s performers did not therefore have absolute freedom to present themselves 
in any way that they wished. So, strategic manipulation of self-presentation is not 
unidirectional, but a constant and repeated process in which order, continuity and 
predictability are only possible when the tacit rules of the game are accepted by 
performer and audience alike (Giddens 2010 [1984]: 68-70).  
This dramaturgical perspective of self presentation is also valid for groups. In 
this way, Goffman highlighted how it was possible for individuals to act together, 
forming a ‘team’. Teams were understood to be bound together by reciprocal 
dependency, which involved keeping in their roles in order to support each other, 
and reciprocal familiarity, which consisted of acting in a predictable way in order to 
preserve the coherence of the performance (1987: 88). Through such bonds of 
reciprocity, teams could build and maintain a working consensus on the meaning of 
53 
 
situations and identities (1987: 108). The notion of teams is in this way illustrative of 
how power relations can shape meanings and ‘how institutionalised context-setting 
shapes interaction and subjectivity’ (Jenkins 2008: 160). Rules, beliefs and 
expectations occupy a structural role that influences how individuals plan their 
actions, but they can at the same time also be changed by the outcome of actor 
performances. Indeed, it is the very existence of structure-like rules and expectations 
which presupposes and facilitates strategic action, and at the same time these actions 
are also interpreted by other individuals and can influence their expectations of 
future performances. For Goffman and others, changes in identities are therefore the 
result of shifting relationships in institutionalised contexts (Somers 1994: 626-7).  
However, this theoretical framework remains analytically vague. Goffman 
does not explain how some teams impose themselves over others and it remains 
uncertain whether dominance is established through their quantitative (the number of 
members acting reciprocally) or qualitative (the content of their performance) 
characteristics. Also, the source of the meanings granted to symbols and 
performances appears uncertain and the association of meanings to contextual 
performances is often either assumed or given a magical quality. In this way, when 
arguing that ‘everyday activity provides an original against which copies of various 
kinds can be struck [... and] what the individual does in serious life, he does in 
relationship to cultural standards established for the doing and for the social role that 
is built up out of such doings’ (Goffman 1986 [1974]: 562), Goffman describes how 
changes in meaning occur in different contexts but not why some meanings are more 
salient than others in competitive situations. 
The challenge therefore remains to incorporate dominance and power into 
this relational context of teamwork. Some of the most influential academic work in 
this vein has come from Pierre Bourdieu (Baert 1998, Bourdieu 2010 [1990], 
Brubaker 1985, Scholten 2011). For Bourdieu, the meaning of acts was inseparable 
from their practice and the context in which this arises. On the one hand, acts would 
occur because people made choices which could be (but were not necessarily) of a 
strategic or calculating character. On the other hand, moreover, these choices would 
be defined in relation to potentialities and expected outcomes which were in turn 
constituted through the accumulation of previously realised ends (2010: 53-55). 
From this perspective, action is informed and motivated by knowledge and 
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experience, but knowledge and experience are also products of previous actions 
which come to be seen as objective facts or common-sense. Bourdieu conceptualised 
this social practice as a balancing of the expectation of how things should happen 
and the reality of the way that they occur, describing it as ‘the site of the dialectic of 
the opus operatum and the modus operandi’ (2010: 52). The key to this overcoming 
of the structural and the individual is habitus, defined as; 
 
‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends 
of an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’ 
(2010: 53) 
 
Habitus therefore occupies a role between routine and unreflexive custom, offering a 
potential for strategic action, but not requiring it; being enacted by and enacting the 
past, produced by and producing history. It is, in short, ‘an acquired system of 
generative schemes’ (2010: 55) or ‘a generative site of practices’ (Jenkins 2008b: 
58), from which meanings are presented and perceived as objective and common-
sense. This habitus, as with Goffman’s bridging of performance and the rules of the 
game of interaction, is provided for by consensus between actors on meanings and a 
constant reinforcement of these by their actions (Bourdieu 2010 [1990]: 58).  
For Bourdieu, moreover, social practice was also structurally-situated. 
Relations and meanings would be situated in 'fields’, in which actors with different 
access to goods or resources would compete to control situations. Resources are 
necessary for achieving this control and are therefore central to the use of power 
(Jenkins 2008: 159-162). These resources were defined by Bourdieu as capital, and 
included financial capital (money), social capital (who you know and how you are 
related to them), cultural capital (knowledge, education and cultural practices), and 
symbolic capital (social prestige and distinction) (Baert 1998: 31). The distribution 
of capital and the rules of the game manifested in dealings between actors were 
understood to be constitutive of a field as a set of structured social relations that were 
constantly at stake; changes in access to and use of capital within fields could result 
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in a restructuring of power relations and a renegotiation of the nature and boundaries 
of the field. In this sense Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social practice was 
composed of the relations between agents with different access to resources who act 
on and constitute a general, consensual meaning or habitus. Power is therefore 
relational. 
A similar perspective has been provided by Castells' understanding of 
networks which are, as with fields and teams, marked by power relationships 
(Castells 2009, 2010 [1997]). As expressed by Castells, a network society is not 
composed of rigid stable arrangements of resources and opportunities, but constitutes 
itself as a dynamic, shifting structure of interrelations (2009). In this context 
meanings can be constructed by a range of actors who benefit from the social 
relations of networks by  
 
‘using both horizontal communication networks and mainstream media to 
convey their images and messages [... to] increase their chances of enacting 
social and political change – even if they start from a subordinate position in 
institutional power, financial resources or symbolic legitimacy’ (2009: 302).  
 
Networks are sets of interconnected nodes, the functioning and meaning of which 
depend on the general pattern of their relationships with other nodes and the wider 
network (2009: 19-20). Nodes increase their relevance by absorbing information and 
processing it effectively to other nodes. Connections need not be material, but can 
represent agreement on opinions and underlying beliefs and principles held by 
individuals. A high level of connectedness between nodes is representative of a 
working consensus between them (Diani and Bison 2004). However, not all 
connections are effective at establishing consensus and a dominant perspective. In 
this way Sinclair has evidenced how the global economy revolves around specific 
embedded knowledge networks, epitomised by bond-rating agencies (2000). Pilati 
has also shown how certain immigrant organisational affiliations and coalitions 
provide resources for political participation, but that links with autochthonous 
organisations are more relevant than links with immigrant ones for group 
mobilisation (2010, 2012). The spread of material resources, such as financial 
capital, among interconnected actors thus depends on their social capital and their 
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relative position within the wider structure of the network. Power is here, again, a 
relational capacity to influence others via the construction and communication of 
meanings in ways that favour an empowered actor’s will, interests and values 
(Castells 2009: 10). 
So, in summary, the analysis of groups and group identities must enquire as 
to the construction of meaning by individuals who adapt to their structural setting. 
This setting is in turn characterised by frameworks of meaning (discursive 
structures), institutions and the distribution of material, symbolic and social or 
‘network’ resources. Dominant perceptions of groups are premised on a formal or 
informal consensus concerning self-identifications and other-categorisations. 
Changes in meanings can be brought about by actors who adapt to their 
circumstances and by alterations to the balance of structural relations between actors, 
caused by new configurations of resources and/or institutions (Scholten 2011: 54). 
For Goffman, power lay in the reciprocal understandings of the tacit rules of 
interaction in their situation that would enable a team to maintain a working 
consensus in front of others. Bourdieu was more precise and argued that the study of 
collective identity required an empirical analysis of the distribution of types of 
capital, which defined the structural conditions of the field, and the assumptions and 
knowledge which would constitute their habitus. Finally, for Castells the dominance 
of a specific perspective or identity construction is the result of negotiations between 
actors, which are ordered by power relations in networks of communication. In all 
three of these theories, structurally-situated actors employ resources in order to 
control meanings. In this way, inter-actor connections delimit practical opportunities 
for material, social or symbolic exchange, which shape people’s ideas, identities and 
social representations (Diani 2000). In teams, fields and networks the power to 
control interpretations of issues and identities is therefore not a quality of one elite 
actor or a necessary product of structural contexts, but lies in the establishment of 
reciprocal modes of representing social reality in the claims made by actors who rely 







Explaining structurally-situated actor strategies 
 
The approach outlined above provides the groundwork for an analysis of the 
mechanisms and contextual practices of negotiating meanings that can explain the 
perception of groups as bounded, unitary social objects (see also Bourdieu 2010 
[1990], Brubaker 2004, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Loveman 1999, Wacquant 1997, 
Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009, Zimmer 2003). Understood this way, the negotiation of 
groups and the boundaries between them thus constitutes a classificatory struggle in 
which, as noted by Wimmer, actors attempt to make their perspective of who 
belongs and who does not ‘generally accepted and consequential for everyday life’ 
(2007: 11-2). This struggle is driven by ‘ideal and material motivations’ (Loveman 
1999: 896-7) as part of a broader competition for power and prestige (Wimmer 2007: 
11), whilst being at the same time shaped by an actor’s strategic choices and access 
to material, social and cultural resources (Bourdieu 2010 [1990]: 53-55). However, 
to be able to explain the strategies of these actors we require an awareness of what is 
being done by them. This is the topic of this section. 
A body of research that has been concerned specifically with how and why 
actors construct immigration in certain ways comes from the security studies 
literature. These authors have examined the definition of an existential threat in the 
form of immigration and how this has been facilitated by different institutional 
settings and policy making rationales (Angelescu 2008, Buonfino 2004, Buzan et al 
1998, Collyer 2006, Feldman 2012, Huysmans 2000, 2006, Huysmans and Buonfino 
2008). These texts fit into a wider body of security studies which consider that the 
state's military security function has become diversified and dispersed throughout 
society as crime-fighting (for example Andreas and Price 2001, Bigo 2005, Rumford 
2006, 2009).  
In these studies the construction of immigration as an existential threat has 
been due to its discursive representation by political and administration leaders as a 
challenge to ‘the continuation of political identity and the autonomy of the political 
unit to modulate itself as a free space of freedom’ (Huysmans 2006: 61). 
Immigration is thus constructed as a politicised phenomenon that is not a threat for 
what it is, but for what it represents, motivated by an expansion of state control of 
population movements (Buonfino 2004: 28). In this way, Huysmans’ study of the 
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EU claims that immigration has provided an effective meta-narrative, ‘through 
which functionally differentiated policy problems, such as identity control and visa 
policy, asylum applications, integration of immigrants, distribution of social 
entitlements and the management of cultural diversity are connected’ (2000: 770). 
This is facilitated by an institutional framework dominated by Home Affairs 
ministries and transnational police networks, as well as some national governments, 
mass media and far-right political parties which connect these issues and promote 
security responses to them (Ibid.: 758). In the same way, Buonfino has argued that a 
security discourse on immigration in Europe has become hegemonic due to being 
propagated by the mass media which has defined immigration as a contentious issue 
(2004: 29). Finally, Feldman has also stated that a definition of immigrants as a 
threat underpins the actions of ministries and agencies which are all driven towards 
objectifying the immigrant and controlling its movement (2012: 10-20). This 
increased control enables states to provide economic interests with a predictable 
supply of labour whilst satisfying nationalist public opinion that they are restricting 
the access of undesirable outsiders (Ibid.: 9-10).  
However, in focusing only on security responses this approach has been 
criticised for adopting a limited understanding of actor rationality, due to considering 
that the driving motivation of political actors is always to maximise control (Boswell 
2009: 36-40). Yet they may be motivated by other objectives, such as efficiency or 
values such as solidarity and a sense of responsibility towards others. Indeed, this 
narrow rationality means that despite understanding politics as a pluralistic 
negotiation, the securitisation approach cannot explain why migration entry policies 
are sometimes permissive rather than controlling, why states do decide to grant 
foreigners rights or why there may exist a significant gap between declared 
objectives of control and quite distinct policy outputs (Joppke 1998b, Hollifield 
2004, McMahon 2012) This is particularly the case in Italy and Spain where debate 
on immigration seems at times to be quite separate from the policy decisions that are 
taken, defined by other authors as the ambiguity of migration policy making in these 
countries (Andall 2007, Bastien 2009, Geddes 2008b, Zincone 1998). 
A more flexible approach has been presented by studies of interest groups 
(Freeman 1995, 2004, Freeman and Kessler 2008). These understand immigration 
policies as determined by state actors who are vote-maximisers who respond to 
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pressure groups in order to gain their support. According to this view, the politics of 
immigration can therefore be explained by analysing who wins and who loses from 
policy decisions. For Freeman, the likelihood of mobilisation is dependent on the 
spread of costs and benefits; immigration causes concentrated benefits, usually for 
business interests, and diffuse costs that develop over extended periods of time, such 
as pressure on public services (1995: 885-6). On the one hand, these diffuse costs, 
combined with a lack of accurate information, curb the organisation of individual 
voters on the immigration issue (1995: 883). On the other hand, concentrated 
benefits strongly incentivise organised groups, such as business leaders with a 
demand for foreign labour, to pressure governments (1995: 885). At the same time, 
Freeman suggests that a 'strong antipopulist norm' urges politicians not to exploit 
racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes, thus minimising the 
public salience of immigration in public debate (1995: 885). The outcome in this 
context is a tendency towards client politics whereby well organised interest groups 
with close working relationships with state officials negotiate and determine policies 
largely out of public view, explaining why immigration policies are often more 
liberal than public opinion (1995: 886). 
Freeman’s interest group analysis offers a way to bring an understanding of 
how individuals and groups act and engage in collective behaviour into an awareness 
of the structural context of immigration policy making. In this plural model 
combining the preferences of individual voters, organised groups and state actors we 
find a more refined framework than the securitisation literature; rather than assuming 
that control and restriction of immigration are the only possible outcome of policy 
decisions, it is accepted that different actors have varying incentives and 
opportunities to mobilise around immigration issues (Freeman 1995, 2004, Freeman 
and Kessler 2008). This could result in four modes of politics: client, interest group, 
majoritarian or entrepreneurial (see figure 2). Any interest group-based explanation 
of responses and policy decisions in immigration politics must therefore examine the 
issue positions taken by organised groups such as labour unions and employer 
























  Concentrated Diffuse 
  
Spread of perceived costs (or benefits) 
Figure 2. Modes of politics of immigration in an interest group political economy model 




However, despite these benefits, the interest group approach does not provide 
a clear image of the whole process of the politics of immigration. Firstly, it adopts a 
weak range of possible costs and benefits, limited primarily to economic factors (see 
for example Freeman and Kessler 2008). Nevertheless, organised groups may 
mobilise around distinct factors, such as a perceived challenge to national identity 
(as is the case of many right-wing populist politicians, see Betz 1998, Cutts et al 
2011, Golder 2003, Mudde 2000, Rydgren 2008) or a moral claim for universal 
inclusion and equality (as is the case of some NGOs, pro-migrant lobbies and 
charities). Secondly, although the interest group approach has strong explanatory 
power it does not allow for an understanding of how groups organise and mobilise. 
This is because their preferences are taken as given and unchanging and the 
structural context as fixed. In this way, Freeman has highlighted an anti-populist 
norm and outlined different possible modes of politics but not shown how change 
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may occur and result in the introduction of populist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant 
responses to immigration or cause a shift from one mode of politics to another. As 
will be shown in the case studies of this thesis, preferences on immigration are not 
always related to the material costs and benefits of the phenomenon itself, while the 
capacity of different groups to become influential on immigration is often contingent 
on the choices that they make to adapt to their structural context; it is the 
interpretation of the possible costs and benefits of immigration that drive responses. 
Two further approaches offer more nuanced models that specifically focus on 
the specific interactions and choices of actors. These can be summarised as social 
movement studies and institutional-systems theory ones.  
Studies of social movements have strived to understand ‘the interaction 
processes through which actors with different identities and orientations come to 
elaborate a shared system of beliefs and sense of belonging, which exceeds by far the 
boundaries of any single group or organization’ (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 17, see 
also Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Tarrow 1998). They are therefore interested in 
explaining how consensus is reached between actors and for what political purposes. 
This literature has been highly influenced by Goffman’s later work, in particular the 
presentation of identities via a ‘framework’ that constitutes a ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ responsible for ‘rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless 
aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful [... allowing] its user to locate, 
perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences 
defined in its terms’ (1986: 21). Social movements undertake a process of framing or 
frame production in order to bring actors together around similar interpretations of 
the presence, causes and resolutions to social problems (see for example Benford 
1993, Gamson et al 1992, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Snow et al 1986).  
Frame choices can be explained by a combination of strategies, depending on 
the nature of the social movement itself and the audience that they are attempting to 
reach. Koopmans and Statham have in this way argued that the likelihood of success 
of political demands depends not only on the opportunities for gaining visibility but 
on an argument’s resonance in the public sphere and the establishment of an actor’s 
legitimacy through alliances with other actors (2000: 37). These processes have been 
defined by Snow et al in their seminal article as ‘frame alignment’ (1986, see also 
Benford 1993). Frame alignment is vital for developing correspondence between the 
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interpretive orientations of social movement organisations, members and potential 
participants (Benford 1993: 679). On the one hand, actors must establish consensus 
with their allies in order to put forward a shared, cohesive and coherent interpretation 
of the topic. This consensus ensures that different acts and events can be perceived 
as part of a longer lasting, consistent action, establishing networks of solidarity 
(Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16-9, Diani and Bison 2004: 284). It also ensures that 
their potentially conflicting interests, values, beliefs, actions and goals are made 
congruent and complimentary (Benford 1993: 679, Snow et al 1986: 464). The 
establishment of linkages with partners in this way legitimises and empowers actors 
within movements.  
On the other hand, moreover, they must also present their message in such a 
way as to be viewed as legitimate by and achieve consensus with their target 
audience. Yet because audiences are active interpreters of social issues this involves 
choosing frames that resonate with their expectations, beliefs and narratives. In short,  
 
‘claims that are congruent with the personal or everyday experiences of the 
target audience are more likely to attract and hold their attention and to 
resonate [... but] they must also correspond with the target’s cultural 
narrations – the stories, myths and folk tales of their culture’ (Benford 1993: 
693).  
 
Actors thus put forward a symbolic framing of the issue at hand from a ‘cultural 
reservoir’ which allows it to be read and identified by other actors within a wider 
framework of their own values, discourses, and beliefs (Tarrow 1998: 110-2). 
Framing strategies therefore facilitate connections to be made between issue 
alignments and actor orientations that establish consensus with relevant partners and 
audiences (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16, Diani and Bison 2004: 284, see also 
Benford 1993, Gamson et al 1992, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Snow et al 1986). 
In this way framing an issue constitutes a mobilisation strategy that enables actors to 
adapt to the discursive opportunity structure in which they are set.  
A large body of studies has illustrated how movement actors mobilise by 
aligning with, or distinguishing themselves from, prevalent ideas, political cultures 
and dominant cleavages according to their intended partnerships and audiences. For 
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example, Diani has claimed that the relative (in)stability of social cleavages in Italy 
in the early 1990s provided the opportunity for Northern political movements to 
align with an anti-system dominant discourse prevalent at the time (1996), whilst 
Kessler and Freeman’s study of right wing populist political entrepreneurs in Austria 
and Belgium who successfully exploited cleavage structures by tying large‐scale 
immigration and economic hardship to political disaffection to win votes (2005). 
Dembinska has claimed that actors in Poland adapted their mobilisation strategies 
according to state laws and institutional settings such as minority recognition and 
citizenship policies (2012), whilst Diani and Bison have also illustrated how 
connections between actors in local social movements in the UK enabled them to be 
weaved into broader, encompassing narratives and consensual, shared interpretations 
of the world (2004: 284-5). These examples illustrate clearly how actors’ framing 
strategies are aimed at adapting to institutional and discursive opportunities in order 
to gain recognition and support from partners and audiences. In doing so, they 
employ symbolic resources to build the social capital necessary to establish 
consensus and control the meaning of the issue at stake, whilst their choice of frame 
depends on the accessibility and the perceived expectations of the potential partners 
and the audience. 
Similarly, studies of policy making from an institutionalist and systems 
theory perspective have put forward an approach underlining the importance of 
consensus-building between different actors (Boswell 2007, 2009, 2011, Boswell 
and Geddes 2011, Boswell et al 2011, Brunsson 1989, Geddes 2008a, Scholten 2011, 
Zapata-Barrero 2012). According to this approach, states are not unitary actors in 
decision making but are in reality composed of and linked with diverse ministries, 
departments, interest groups, political parties, and so on. The objective of these 
actors is to gain legitimacy by defining the social problem at stake and proposing its 
most appropriate solution, but unlike the securitisation approach above, they operate 
according to diverse logics and rationalities. This is because, as with social 
movements, they represent and gain legitimacy from a range of different audiences 
according to their structural position. In this way, a high ranking civil servant 
motivated by efficiency and meeting targets will not necessarily interpret or present 
issues in the same way as elected representatives who are being held accountable to 
the public. These actors define problems and potential resolutions in varying ways 
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that balance their own objectives with the perceived and real structural opportunities 
for action within their legal, institutional and organisational contexts. In this 
balancing act, traditions of thought and predominant paradigms also influence how 
issues are seen and perceptions of what constitutes an appropriate and legitimate 
response (Boswell et al 2011: 1-2). Discrepancies can therefore arise between 
definitions of the problem and the implementation of responses as actors interpret 
their structural settings in differing ways and adopt varying logics of action, with the 
result that policy measures do not necessarily match the content of the dominant 
discourse on the issue (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 71-5, see also Andall 2007, 
Brunsson 1989, Zincone 1998). 
In particular, Boswell’s work on the expert use of knowledge sets out a 
comprehensive framework to explain why certain perspectives on issues are (or are 
not) given relevance in policy making (2009). She has analysed why politicians and 
civil servants commission research and what influences the way that this knowledge 
is used in the policy process. As with social movements, Boswell argues that 
political organisations use knowledge to develop shared norms and beliefs on certain 
issues and secure legitimacy and support from relevant others (2009: 11). She 
outlines three possible functions of this use of knowledge; an instrumental one in 
which it informs policy measures in order to achieve efficient outputs, a legitimising 
function that is directed at dissemination and the presentation of political 
perspectives as appropriate for the problem at hand, and a substantiating function 
that is employed to justify policy preferences and choices (2009: 86-8). Central to 
each of these is the use of knowledge for strategic purposes; on the one hand, it is 
directed at a search for internal consensus and legitimacy among partners in order to 
establish a shared, consistent approach (2009: 40), which is balanced, on the other 
hand with attempts to garner external legitimacy beyond the organisation in times 
when access to further resources may be required (2009: 43). In this way, political 
actors adapt to the opportunities and expectations in the structural context in order to 
build linkages with relevant others when negotiating issue meanings. 
The way that organisations such as political parties, administrations, trade 
unions, and so on make public claims utilising their knowledge of certain issues is 
therefore dependent to a large degree on its organisational structure and relative 
position of power. For example, a catch-all political party with stable economic 
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resources and strong internal discipline may be concerned with using information as 
a legitimising tool to build support from public opinion and the mass media, whereas 
a smaller party in an unstable coalition with ideologically dissimilar partners is more 
likely to use knowledge in its substantiating function in order to build and maintain 
support from within its own coalition's ranks. In this way, Lahav has noted, for 
example, how party positions on immigration in the European Parliament can be 
influenced by internal ideological variations and beliefs between members of party 
groupings, hinting at variations in the dynamics of unitary parties and fragmentary 
coalitions (2004: 368). As noted by Boswell, this may be achieved by mimicking 
another norm-exporting body or by being coercively pushed into line, such as having 
to follow laws governing public debate (Boswell 2009: 67-8). Similarly, Adamson 
has critically examined the way that the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-
Tahrir have both strategically deployed the category of ‘Muslim’ in order to create ‘a 
constructed constituency that transcends other ethnic, national or sectarian identities’ 
that positions each of them differently in relation to the liberal state: whereas the 
former sees no contradiction between Muslim and British identities and has 
historically close connections to the British political establishment, the latter is a 
global organisation which denounces existing political systems and seeks support 
and legitimacy from young second and third generation Muslims (2011: 901, 908-
11). Thus the politicised category of ‘Muslim’ is constructed with different meanings 
according to the diverse objectives and strategic adaptations of actors to their 
structural setting and intended audience.  
In summary, in explanations of responses to immigration it is important to 
highlight the balancing act of internal and external dimensions of seeking support 
and legitimacy. Identity claims can achieve this in two significant ways; firstly, they 
can define the presence of immigrants as a meta-issue, which apparently causes 
wider social issues or problems. By offering to resolve these problems they establish 
linkages with the concerns of potential audiences. In this way, for example, Rydgren 
has noted that framing immigration and social tensions together creates a perceived 
link that is important in mobilising electoral support for radical right-wing parties, 
employing the category of ‘immigrants’ as a resource for giving other issues saliency 
(2008). Secondly, identity claims can also be part of a process of boundary-making, 
promoting a sense of commonality and unity with partners and difference with 
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outsiders. This involves establishing consensus on a group identification or 
categorisation of different others. In this case, by defining boundaries between 
groups an actor can align themselves positively with the perceived character of their 
intended partners or supporters and distinguish themselves negatively from that of 
outsiders. Both meta-issue and boundary-making strategies are aimed at establishing 
consensus around the meaning of an issue or identity and building linkages with 
specific audiences.  
 
 
A three dimensional de-ethnicized research framework 
 
As noted in the previous chapters, in light of this framework the focus of the analysis 
of this thesis becomes 'the negotiations between immigrants and nationals as well as 
the various corporate actors, including state agencies, that have a stake in the 
outcome of these struggles over the boundaries of belonging' (Wimmer 2007: 19). 
The previous sections have outlined an abstract analytical approach for explaining 
claims to 'who is who' regarding Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. This is 
intended to achieve that proposed by Wimmer when he calls for a 'de-ethnicized' 
research framework for the study of immigration and ethnicity (2007, 2009). The 
remainder of this chapter sets out the specific research methods to be employed in 
this framework. 
In chapter two, quantitative studies of group resources and statuses, on the 
one hand, and surveys of personal attachment to identity categories on the other, 
were summarised and criticised for falling short of being able to adequately uncover 
the negotiation process of claims to groupness and boundary-making. This was 
because they followed a tendency towards groupism and ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Beck 2005: 43-50) by taking for granted the existence, a priori, of 
ethnic groups and national identities (Malesevic 2011: 274, see also Wimmer 2007, 
2009). 
The alternative that has been suggested in this chapter requires a focus on the 
claims making strategies of actors who are situated in discursive and institutional 
structural settings and a certain distribution of resources. A similar framework is 
Scholten’s analysis of the research-policy network in the Netherlands which 
67 
 
employed a combination of a constructivist view on social structures, such as 
scientific knowledge production and policymaking, with a structural perspective on 
the negotiation of the problem of immigrant integration (2011:32). In doing so, 
Scholten used a frame analysis of the way that actors made sense of research-policy 
relations in social practices and an examination of how these practices influenced 
their interpretation of problem situations in specific structural settings (2011: 58). 
The end result was an empirical reconstruction of how actors produced and 
reproduced knowledge fields through their social practices. This took three stages; 
Scholten firstly uncovered the historical emergence and change over time of 
integration frames in Dutch research and policy (discursive structure). Secondly, he 
analysed the individual perspectives of researchers and policy makers (framing 
strategies) and how they defined their relationships to each other (social capital and 
network strategies), asking how actors’ positions provide an explanation for their 
definition of relations. Thirdly, he examined the structural configurations between 
research and policy fields (institutional structures) and how these may have 
contributed to the rise or fall of specific frames (2011: 63-4). The result illustrated 
how problems were framed against the background of structural settings (2011: 65).  
Wimmer has also argued that the study of boundary-making processes must 
combine an analysis of the content of specific discourses through which claims to 
group identification and categorisation are made with an awareness of the wider 
frameworks of meaning in which these claims are embedded. It must also, moreover, 
combine this with an assessment of the strategic objectives of actors and their 
relative structural positioning regarding the distribution of resources and power. He 
suggests a research design covering; firstly, institutional rules and how they ‘provide 
incentives to pursue certain types of boundary-making strategies rather than others’ 
(2007: 19); secondly, the distribution of resources and how this affects the capacity 
of actors ‘to have their mode of categorization respected if not accepted, make their 
strategies of social closure consequential for others, and have their identity be 
recognized as relevant and worthy of recognition’ (Ibid.); and thirdly, the 
arrangement of political networks and strategies of networking within them (Ibid).  
The research framework for this thesis draws on these examples and the 
theoretical studies of this and the previous chapters. It is concerned with how actors 
attempt to build consensus around a framing of Romanian immigration by adapting 
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to and shaping institutional and discursive structures, on the one hand, and the 
distribution of resources, on the other. This can be envisaged as shown in figure 3. 
By institutional and discursive structures, the design refers to political frameworks 
(the relative position of political parties, trade unions, solidarity groups, etc), legal 
and policy frameworks (rights of citizenship), and dominant cleavages and 
discourses on immigration (public philosophies, and so on). By resources the model 
refers to types of capital; financial, social (connections with other actors) and 
symbolic (symbols, prestige and access to communications channels). Finally, actor 
strategies can be delineated as frame alignment and consensus-building through 
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In this model, actors can be described as structurally-situated within open or 
closed institutional and discursive opportunity structures, on one side, and a 
concentrated or diffuse distribution of material, symbolic and network resources 
(financial, cultural and social capital) on the other. Where there are concentrated 
resources of financial and social capital for only autochthonous NGOs and dominant 
catch-all political parties, stable cleavages around each of their political ideologies 
and a lack of funding for forming associations or political parties, a reduced range of 
voices are likely to have access to public debate. In this context, if there are strong 
links between the catch-all parties and well organised interest groups, client politics 
will dominate and immigration will be likely to be taken off the agenda. Where there 
are open institutional structures, such as state-sponsored participatory channels or 
representative boards for immigrants and individual rights to voting and association, 
combined with a diffuse and equal spread of material resources, such as funding, 
access to mass media and connections to other actors in federations, mobilisation is 
more likely to be successful for immigrant associations. However, if there is also 
fragmented competition among many political parties and disagreement on the 
dominant cleavages shaping debate on immigration then these may align their view 
with the interests and concerns of the voting native population in order to attract 
votes and emphasise difference from their competitors. 
The empirical material for this study has been gathered from a range of 
varied sources and examines the period from 1989, following the end of the 
Communist regime, to 2009/10. These include; parliamentary debates from Italy’s 
Camera dei Deputati and Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados between the years 
1989 and 2008, when the latest complete legislature in both Italy and Spain ended (at 
the time of this research being carried out); political party manifestos and electoral 
material; public opinion surveys; press reporting from the national and local editions 
of daily newspapers (El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón in Spain and Il 
Messaggero, Il Giornale, Corriere della Sera, and La Repubblica in Italy); policy 
documents and event archives of local authorities, trade unions and non-
governmental or charity organisations; voter turnout and candidates of native and 
Romanian origin in local elections; content of websites, message boards and public 
conferences of Romanian cultural associations and political parties; and in-depth and 
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semi-structured interviews with local politicians and the leaders of key Romanian 
cultural associations.  
The analysis of this wide range of empirical material ensured that different 
aspects of processes of identification and categorisation were revealed. In this way, 
qualitative analysis of political discourse, policy documents, press reporting, public 
opinion surveys and observations at public events, interviews and analysis of 
association websites reflect how Romanian immigrants are categorised and how 
Romanian actors identify themselves and the population they claim to represent. At 
the same time, quantitative data on references to Romanian representatives in the 
press, the existence of Romanian cultural associations and political parties and 
Romanian voter turnout and candidacies in local elections offer a reflection of the 
structural relations and connectedness among political actors and the wider 
population. The objective has been to collect data enabling an awareness of the 
presence of diverse and varied actors engaged in negotiating what it means to be a 
Romanian immigrant in Italy and Spain as well as their mobilisation strategies, the 
content of their frames and the material and ideological connections between them. 
Romanian identities are thus analysed in relation to varied social and political issues 
as well as shared identifications (Cherti 2008: 57, Diani and Bison 2004: 289-90, 
Weller 2010: 874).  
The textual material has been qualitatively codified using a framing 
methodology. For Goffman interpretive frames are composed of knowledge of an 
event which has happened (a ‘primary framework’), a reflection on and 
interpretation of the event by an individual (a ‘key’), and an end-motivated strategic 
performance which attempts to promote consensus on an interpretation 
(transformative ‘rekeying’ and ‘fabrication’), but the success of which depends on 
the frames' links to others’ beliefs and values (the ‘anchoring’ of meaning). Since 
Goffman’s work, frame analysis has become a ubiquitous methodology across the 
social sciences. In communications studies, researchers have often determined 
explicit and implicit textual meanings through identifying and describing the content 
of frames (Borah 2011, Entman 1993, Matthes and Kohring 2008). In this field, 
Entman has comprehensively delimited the components of a frame and thus provided 
a methodological outline which can produce comparable results between cases 
(Entman 1993, see also Borah 2011, Matthes and Kohring 2008, Nickels 2008, van 
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Gorp 2005). He concisely stated that ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 52). Despite a different vocabulary, this is 
similar to Goffman's original definition. In the analysis that follows, a frame will 
therefore be delimited as four elements: defining a problem, assigning responsibility, 
passing a moral judgement and reaching a possible solution.  
The questions for codifying the data are shown in figure 4 below. These 
questions structured the analysis, meaning that the frames were codified deductively 






Question Frame element 
How are Romanian nationals defined? Problem or issue definition 
What is the issue surrounding Romanian 
nationals? 
 
What are the reasons for this issue arising? Problem diagnosis 
Who is responsible for this issue? 
 
 
What are the social implications of this 
issue? 
What are the legal implications? 
What are the moral implications? 
 
Moral evaluation 
How should the response to this issue be? Treatment recommendation 
 







Once the frames were uncovered, they were grouped into general categories 
of 'threat' or 'victim' frames, according to their portrayal of Romanian immigration. 
Limiting the frame to these two categories has inevitably simplified the complex 
negotiations that occurred in both countries, yet at the same time it has also enabled 
distinct arguments and issue discussions to be compared and general patterns to be 
found within and across the countries, thereby allowing the development of 
responses to be traced and compared over time and across the national, local and 
cross-border dimensions of this study. Within thesetwo broad categories there were 
contained variations regarding the problem diagnosis or proposed resolution, 
reflecting the way that immigration could be employed as a meta-issue, as well as 
providing a clear illustration of how the meaning of Romanian immigration in Italy 
and Spain is inseparable from the wider social context and the pertinent social and 
political concerns of the time. It is hoped that this simplification may also provide an 
opportunity for comparison with other case studies at a later date. 
In each of the three dimensions of this study, the frame analysis will be 
accompanied by an assessment of how linkages and ties have formed around the 
consensual perspectives of different actors. At the same time, this will be situated 
within an examination of the broader structural setting in which the negotiations of 
'who is who' have occurred. This entails an outline of the development over time of 
national, local and cross-border discourses and institutional structures to respond to 
immigration and how these have facilitated or complicated the provision of resources 





The objective of this chapter has been to outline a framework to explain claims to 
group identification and categorisation and illustrate which methods will be used to 
analyse them in this thesis. Reviewing previous studies of the responses to 
immigration and the politics of ethnic relations, it has illustrated how studies have 
frequently concentrated on the structural conditions of class, ideas and conceptions 
of nationhood and institutional channels as drivers of particular forms of political 
relations and outcomes, with relatively little awareness of the role of agency. By 
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defining a framework based on an analysis of the mobilisation strategies that actors 
employ within structural settings characterised by institutional and discursive 
opportunity structures and with a specific distribution of material, symbolic and 
network resources (financial, symbolic and social capital), the chapter has presented 
an approach that views the actor-driven construction of meaning as embedded in 
relations of power. This is aimed at permitting the observation and explanation of 
consensus regarding the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant in contemporary 
Italy and Spain. 
Consequently, the design outlined here has aimed to bring an awareness of 
actor agency into structural analyses. Conceiving of claims as embedded in 
frameworks of meaning and actors as situated in fields or networks has provided an 
opportunity to see how actor strategies adapt to, and are a constitutive part of, social 
and political structures. These actors are essentially understood to be legitimacy-
seekers who select different framing strategies of immigration in accordance with 
their intended audience, from other political parties in a coalition to the possible 
voters or institutional gatekeepers who provide access to symbolic, financial and 
social resources. Strategies of framing immigration as a meta-issue and as a 
mechanism of boundary-definition have been outlined as central elements of this 
process of legitimacy-seeking that follows diverse logics depending on the audience 
and intention of the actor.  
The politics of Romanian immigration is thus understood as a complex field 
in which diverse actors negotiate a range of issues from varying perspectives 
according to their interpretations and their interests. These strategies and structures 












Empirical analysis:  













The previous three chapters have set out, respectively, the research question, 
conceptual background and explanatory framework of this project. It has been asked 
why responses to Romanian immigration have been so different in Italy and Spain 
despite similarities in these two contexts and it has been proposed that the 
explanation lies in an analysis of the political claims-making by which the meaning 
of being a Romanian national is negotiated and defined. The previous chapter 
proposed to bring agency into structural explanations of this process and outlined a 
three-dimensional framework for the analysis, covering the institutional and 
discursive structural setting in which claims are presented, the distribution of 
resources which determines the relative power of each actor, and the strategic 
mobilisation and adaptation of actors to these structural conditions. The objective is 
to uncover how legitimacy-seeking actors speak to different audiences and adapt 
their framing strategies accordingly in order to build consensus around their 
perspective. 
This chapter is concerned with the legal and policy context in which 
Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain has occurred. Laws and policies represent 
a central part of the institutional opportunity structure for immigrants’ social 
integration and political participation; they constitute a system of rules and norms 
which outline the rights of individuals and provide the backdrop to their formal 
inclusion or exclusion in the polity (Bauböck 2006, Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, 
Wiener 2003). As noted by Schuck, ‘the law defines individual’s rights to property 
and economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultural 
identity and family relationships’ (2000:189). Laws and policies achieve this by 
categorising individuals according to criteria such as nationality, employment sector, 
length of residence, gender, economic standing and so on, and grant each category 
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distinct rights. Through these provisions legislation thus also defines who is who and 
what their status is in social, political and economic aspects. Citizenship laws and 
immigrant integration policies therefore constitute a central way of institutionalising 
differences between citizens and aliens or insiders and outsiders, thereby defining the 
social boundaries of citizenship (Bauböck 2006, Brubaker 1992, Borkert and 
Caponio 2010). 
The chapter will outline the historical development of immigration laws and 
policies in Italy and Spain, examining how they have defined the status of Romanian 
nationals and provided opportunities for (or constraints against) social integration 
and political mobilisation. Accordingly, this chapter asks: what is the legal status of 
Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain and what rights do they enjoy? What has 
been the development of policies and institutions for immigrant integration? What 
are the logics and beliefs that underpin these measures? How has the granting of 
rights of citizenship of the European Union affected this status?  
The first section of this chapter will outline the field of study by summarising 
the academic literature on immigrant integration measures and citizenship laws and 
policies, illustrating how these determine the status of immigrants by categorising 
them and granting or denying certain rights. The second section outlines a range of 
commonalities and differences between Italian and Spanish experiences of 
immigration as part of the Southern European model of migration. The third section 
will ask how these laws and policies have influenced the status and incorporation 
dynamics of the Romanian populations in these countries and introduce the EU 
dimension, illustrating how the establishment of a supranational citizenship regime 
for the EU has added an extra layer in the stratification of citizen statuses for these 
‘new Europeans’, but not led directly to a status of equality of membership. This is 




Boundary-defining through laws, policies and institutions 
 
As noted above, immigration laws and policies define the legal and social boundaries 
of citizenship. The contemporary definition of citizenship has typically been 
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understood according to T.H Marshall’s seminal text from 1950, in which he argued 
that ‘there is a kind of basic human equality associated with the concept of full 
membership of a community’ (Marshall 1992 [1950]: 7). For Marshall, the notion of 
citizenship as equality between community members signified the sharing of civil, 
political and social rights, and the expectation that each citizen fulfil certain duties 
and responsibilities. Its expansion to all members of a population corresponded with 
industrialisation and increasing social mobility, during which the rigidities of the 
class system would no longer be able to dictate the role and status of individuals in 
society. Freedom from the class system would imply the formation of a community 
of citizens.  
Emerging from this conceptualisation there are two understandings of 
citizenship. One is a broad, inclusive notion of equality and inclusion between 
members of a political community; the other is a narrow, exclusive definition as a 
formal legal status of membership to a specific polity (Bauböck 2010: 847; 
Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353). The status of immigrants lies at this juncture 
between the exclusive legal category of the citizen and a normative status of 
equality, revealing states to be ‘inclusionary and democratic to the inside [... but] 
necessarily exclusionary and undemocratic to the outside, rocks of facticity that defy 
universal justice and human rights’ (Joppke 1999: 2). By distinguishing between 
individuals who qualify for membership and those that do not, laws and policies 
mark a form of social closure that is premised on distinguishing between members 
and aliens; insiders and outsiders (Brubaker 1992, Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, 
Wiener 2003). Furthermore, by setting out who is eligible for rights to property and 
economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultural 
identity and family relationships, laws and policies also facilitate or restrict 
opportunities for equality and thus outline the social boundaries of membership of 
the polity (Bauböck 2006: 15, see also Borkert and Caponio 2011, Schuck 2000). 
Yet there has been much debate regarding the limits and boundaries of 
citizenship. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the political community is, or 
should be, tied to the cultural idea and political and territorial limits of a nation state 
(Brubaker 1992, Schnapper 1998, Smith 1991). Following this argument, states 
ensure equality for all those defined as citizens whilst marking a distinction with 
noncitizens. This in turn projects a differential mark of identity, tying an idea of 
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national belonging to the legal definition of the citizen (Kivisto and Faist 2007: 16). 
On the other hand, it is argued that international rights regimes, notions of universal 
human rights and the emergence of multi-level polities such as the EU mean that 
states are no longer the exclusive deciders of the status of individuals (Sassen 1996, 
2006, Soysal 1994, 1996). At the same time, sub-state identity groups stake claims to 
self-determination and argue that the boundaries of nations are no longer 
conterminous with those of states (Guibernau 2007), and many regional and local 
administrations increasingly have flexibility over the provision of opportunities for 
political participation and discretion in determining access to social services (Borkert 
and Caponio 2010). These calls for a post-national citizenship suggest that the bond 
between nation and state has been historically contingent and reveal tension between 
citizenship’s role as a formal, bounded legal category of equal membership and its 
value as a normative project of inclusion (Sassen 2006: 290).  
Subsequent studies of the EU have, however, questioned the dichotomy 
between national and post-national models (Bauböck 2010, Bauböck and Guiraudon 
2009, Faist 2001, Keating 2009). Whilst it is clear that for nationals of EU Member 
States some rights, in particular those to free movement and non-discrimination, are 
now defined and protected supranationally by the EU, it is not certain that the state 
has lost control. Indeed, it continues to be the case that Member State governments 
can deport foreigners, restrict enfranchisement and add requirements in education or 
housing that may disadvantage non-native residents. Public discourses of identity 
and belonging also typically continue to be fuelled by historical conceptions of 
nationhood and directed at justifying welfare chauvinism or discrimination, whilst 
political parties at both state and sub-state levels publicly present immigrants as 
unfavourable outsiders or beneficial new community members as a form of leverage 
for their own demands for sovereign control over social policies and population 
movements (Hepburn 2011, Huysmans 2006, Jeram 2012, Keating 2009, Kivisto and 
Faist 2007). It has therefore been suggested that social citizenship in the EU has not 
disappeared but become ‘nested’ or ‘bundled’ at distinct administrative levels 
(Bauböck 2010, Faist 2001, see chapter six). 
In this context, the status of immigrants is outlined in a complex formal 
arrangement in which the terms of membership and opportunities for equality are 
intertwined with legal-institutional and discursive-cultural categorisations across 
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sub-state, state and supranational levels. As noted by Beck (2005), the boundaries of 
state, nation and society are not necessarily conterminous and aligned with each 
other. With this in mind, throughout this thesis the content of, as well as motivations 
for and logics behind, local, national and supranational or cross-border laws and 
policies will be studied; indeed, they are both an element of the process of 
categorisation of Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain, and a formal part of the 
institutional opportunity structure shaping their social integration and political 
participation. The current chapter will be limited to the national laws and policies 
that constitute the classificatory framework for Romanian nationals in Italy and 
Spain and the introduction of the rights of citizenship of the European Union 
following this country’s accession in 2007. The local and cross-border dimensions of 




A history of immigrant integration laws and policies in Italy and Spain 
 
As noted in chapter one of this thesis, there has been a body of research produced 
which has outlined the characteristics of a specific ‘Southern European model’ of 
migratory flows and migration policies (for example, Arango et al 2009, Baldwin-
Edwards 2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, Castles and Miller 2003: 82-85, Danese 2001, 
Hartman 2008, Hepburn 2009, King 2000, 2001, King and Thomson 2008, Schierup 
et al 2008: 102-107). However, whilst the structural context of immigration in Italy 
and Spain is broadly comparable within the characteristics of the Southern European 
model, there are also differences, as will be noted below. 
 
The case of Italy 
 
The development of Italy’s immigration legislation has in general been piecemeal, as 
well as suffering criticism for its ambiguous intentions and methods (Zincone 1998, 
2006). However, some general consistencies can be outlined. Firstly, there has been 
a focus on security and public order in public debate and policy responses. Secondly, 
politicians have interpreted immigrants principally as workers and seen the 
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regulation of labour as a way of controlling immigration. Thirdly, the law itself has 
made legality difficult to obtain and arduous to renew, fuelling illegality and 
informality (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b). Fourthly, the repeated use of amnesties 
has legalised the status of previously undocumented foreigners, propagating a view 
of immigration as a temporary problem to be solved by ad hoc, sporadic measures. 
Fifthly, repeated sanatorie or mass amnesties have also created two categories of 
illegal migrants: irregolari or irregular immigrants that had once been legally 
registered but subsequently lapsed into undocumented status, for example, by 
outstaying a tourist visa or being unable to renew a work contract; and clandestini or 
clandestine immigrants who arrive and enter the country without any documents, and 
have been vilified in public debate and associated with organised crime and public 
order problems. This pattern of public order and labour market-focused attempts to 
restrict undocumented migration and keep the documented migrant presence 
temporary has resulted in fluid and porous boundaries between legality and illegality 
(Schierup et al. 2008). As will be shown, rather than being superimposed over the 
national legal system, European Union citizenship for Romanian nationals has been 
interpreted through these existent perspectives. Awareness of these trends is vital to 
understand the status of Romanian citizens in Italy today. 
The Italian Constitution of 1948 declared that the conditions of aliens were to 
be considered a matter of law (Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana Art. 10). 
However, there was little immigration and even less demand for policies. Early 
regulations were carried over from the Single Text of Public Security Norms in 1931 
and the law 5/1961 on internal migrations (Gazzetta Ufficiale 18/02/1961, n. 43), 
which brought about a complex and bureaucratic process of obtaining residence and 
work permits (Sciortino 1999:235). This meant that the small and medium 
enterprises that provided the backbone of the Italian economy and labour market 
found foreign workers easier to hire if these rules were avoided. Labour market 
incorporation was thus dependent not on legal conditions but on migrant-native 
social relations. The first law on ‘Foreign workers and the control of illegal 
immigration’ was not passed until 1986 (Legge 943/1986, Gazzetta Ufficiale 
12/01/1986, n. 8), and its focus was almost entirely on the legal labour market 
incorporation of immigrants. As reflected in the title, immigrants were conceived as 
workers, and their presence was duly regulated by the Ministry of Labour. As 
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workers they were guaranteed ‘equal treatment and full equality of rights regarding 
Italian workers [... and] also the relative rights for the use of social and health 
services [...] the retention of cultural identity, schooling and housing’ (Legge 
943/1986 Art. 1), and fines were introduced for employers hiring undocumented 
immigrants in an attempt to restrict the informal labour market (Einaudi 2007). 
Indeed, it has been estimated that at the beginning of the 1980s clandestine 
employment accounted for between 25% and 35% of the total Italian workforce 
(Weiss 1987: 222). The right of immigrants to public services was therefore 
dependent on their ability to enter formal employment, in a labour market with high 
indices of informality. 
The 1990s constituted a period of greater policy change. Rising immigration 
rates and the continued incorporation of foreigners in the informal labour market was 
added to by an increasing perception of immigration as an invasion. The most 
vociferous in this respect was the political party the Northern League (Lega Nord, 
LN), which presented a rejection of migrants from Southern Italy and abroad as a 
key element of a strongly regionalist discourse (Albertazzi 2006, Cento Bull 2003, 
2010, Geddes 2008b). The arrival of thousands of Albanian migrants to the port of 
Bari in 1992 was widely presented in subsequent years as photographic evidence of 
the supposed invasion of Italy. Non-EU illegal immigrants (clandestini 
extracomunitari) were frequently referred to in public discourse as bringers of crime 
and insecurity (Sciortino and Colombo 2004), and the indecisive parties of the left 
struggled to find a consistent and cohesive counter argument (Andall 2007, Picker 
2011).  
In this context, attempts to restrict immigration came through the ‘Martelli 
Law’ of 1990 (Legge 39/1990, Gazzetta Ufficiale 28/02/1990, n. 49) and the ‘Dini 
decree’ of 1995 (Decreto-Legge 489/1995, Gazzetta Ufficiale 18/11/1995, n. 270). 
Migration regulation was moved to the Ministry of the Interior (Colombo and 
Sciortino 2004b), and there a worker quota system was introduced which would 
provide residence permits to those meeting the demands for formal labour coming 
from certain sectors of the Italian economy (Calavita 2005: 32). Both of these 
measures were accompanied by expulsion powers in response to ‘socially dangerous’ 
arrested foreigners (Decreto-Legge 489/1995 Art. 7.1). At the same time, amnesty 
procedures also constituted an attempt to lower levels of illegality; in 1990 
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undocumented migrants were offered two years of legal residence regardless of 
presenting a work contract, or four years upon proof of employment, and in 1995 
those who demonstrated having a permanent contract were given residence permits 
for two years with the possibility of later extension, whilst those with fixed-term 
contracts were given residence permits for the length of that particular contract. 
Those with no job but who could demonstrate a previous position lasting for longer 
than four months were able to obtain a permit for one year that could only be 
subsequently extended with proof of having attained a new contract (Carfagna 2002: 
58). The first Romanian immigrants arrived in Italy at this time, following the fall of 
the Romanian Communist Party regime in 1989, although figures remained low until 
the second half of the 1990s, with around 1,000 registered arrivals per year in 1990 
and 1991, falling to 500 in 1992 and 600 in 1993 (Sandu et al 2004: 25, Ban 2009). 
Although legal employment had to be obtained from Romania before travelling to 
Italy, the large underground labour market meant that this population could live and 
work informally until the regularisation amnesty.  
The difficulty of obtaining permanent legal residence in Italy at this time 
should also be viewed in a context of increasing limitations to gaining national 
citizenship. This was outlined in the major reform of Italy’s citizenship law in 1992 
(Legge 91/1992, Gazzetta Ufficiale 15/02/1992, n. 38). From 1912 Italy had a liberal 
regime that recognised the right of foreigners to become Italian citizens if born in the 
country, married to a native or resident in the country for five years or more 
(Colombo and Sciortino 2004b: 60). However, in 1992 more restrictive measures 
were established, adopting the rule of jus sanguinis (inheritance through the family 
line). If a child was born on Italian soil they should reside there for the first 18 years 
of their life in order to qualify for full citizenship. If a foreigner’s marriage to an 
Italian ended, they would lose the rights of Italian citizenship. Today, descendents of 
Italians can regain their nationality by residing in Italy for at least two years, but 
those without Italian blood have to reside uninterrupted for ten years, have sufficient 
income to live and demonstrate having a clean criminal record, whereas citizens of 
the European Community were to be offered access to citizenship after only four 
years of residence in the country. This has drawn sharp dividing lines in a stratified 
citizenship regime between Italians, Europeans and third country nationals, with the 
status of this last group trailing behind that of the previous two. 
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These developments constituted, nevertheless, largely ad hoc approaches to 
what had become a structural presence of immigrants in Italy (Colombo and 
Sciortino 2004b). Amnesties granting temporary legal status reflected a continued 
interpretation of the presence of immigrants as a contingent phenomenon. These 
steps failed in their aims to discourage illegal residence and improve social cohesion 
by integrating migrants (Zincone 2002:352). Instead they reinforced the temporary 
nature of incorporation in Italian society, as undocumented migrants could gain 
formal legality but would continue working in the informal economy and return to 
illegality when their residence permits expired (Reyneri 2004). 
Subsequent political pressure in response to this policy failure was intense 
and brought demand for control of undocumented immigration and establishment of 
integration measures (Andall 2007, Zincone 2002). As a result, 1998 saw a ‘great 
reform’ from the centre-left in the form of the ‘Turco-Napolitano law’, Italy’s first 
systematic immigration law (Geddes 2008b: 348, Legge 40/1998 Gazzetta Ufficiale 
12/03/1998 n. 59). The three principal areas of the law were; a) the control of Italy’s 
borders; b) adherence to European approaches to immigration; and c) an openness to 
citizenship rights and greater integration for migrants (Andall 2007: 140). However, 
although the main drive for the legislation came from within the centre-left 
government, much of its contents were influenced by an immigrants’ rights advocacy 
coalition, consisting of the Catholic charity Caritas, the Italian Workers’ Christian 
Association (ACLI), the inter-fatih group GAIA, the left wing Association àRCI’, 
trade unionists and the Scouts, among others (Zincone 2006: 353-4). This was the 
only major advocacy coalition in the country and despite its members’ heterogeneity 
it broadly favoured expanding immigrants’ rights and integration measures. 
Under the Turco-Napoletano law legal foreign residents were given greater 
permanency and stability. They could renew their permits an indefinite number of 
times, were given the right to equal treatment in the workplace, access to universal 
healthcare, and if resident in Italy for more than five years had the right to reside 
indefinitely once granted a residence card (carta di soggiorno) (Legge 40/1998 Art 
7.1). There was also the possibility of individual Italians or legally resident 
foreigners sponsoring immigrants, claiming responsibility for them whilst they 
looked for employment in Italy (Art. 21) and legal migrants were allowed to open 
small companies and work independently (Art. 24). The link between residence and 
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employment was therefore loosened, and immigrant workers who lost their jobs had 
the possibility of starting their own business or remaining to search for a new 
position, rather than being sent back to their country of origin. In terms of social 
citizenship, all legal or undocumented foreigners were also granted the right to 
emergency healthcare (Art 33.3) and public schooling (Art 36.1). Finally, an 
amnesty offered residence permits to foreigners: by 2001 over 217,000 permits had 
been granted (Carfagna 2002:60). 
However, the Turco-Napolitano law could also be seen as a continuation of 
the same approach of the previous legislation. Access to the labour market was 
regulated further by the quota system being given precise details under which 
employers would have to request either an individual worker by name or a quantity 
of workers required to fill vacant positions (Art. 3.4, Art. 19). Furthermore, the law 
also contained measures for ‘strengthening the control of the border’ (Art. 9) and 
establishing the creation of detention centres for those who could not be repatriated 
immediately (Art. 12), whilst emphasis was put on effective deportations of 
undocumented migrants in an effort to control illegal immigration (Arts. 10-14). 
Thus, whilst legal immigrants had a series of rights extended to them, illegal 
immigration was to be clamped down on strongly. This regulation of the labour 
market and use of powers of detention and deportation emphasised the view that 
foreigners without employment or legal status were not welcome in Italy. 
Subsequently, amid social and inter-party tensions the centre-right returned to 
power in 2001 on a tide of anti-immigration rhetoric (Geddes 2008b: 349). In 2002 
the Turco-Napolitano law was replaced by the ‘Bossi-Fini law’ (Legge 189/2002, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale 26/08/2002, n. 199). Whereas its predecessor was a product of 
compromise between parties and social actors, the Bossi-Fini law was almost 
entirely the work of the parties of the centre-right coalition Casa della Libertà, 
specifically National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Northern League 
(Lega Nord, LN) (Zincone 2006: 361). In particular, the LN held a prominent 
position as the party that had mobilised most strongly against immigration since the 
1990s, as will be seen in the following chapter, and saw a new policy as ‘an electoral 
IOU it had to honour’ (referenced in Zincone 2006: 361). Yet the law has been 
contradictorily described as harsh, repressive and racist but also even moderate 
(Geddes 2008b: 350). This is a result of the need to balance the exclusionary, 
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securitised and legalistic focus of LN with the solidaristic values of a Catholic 
advocacy coalition which had maintained links with conservative and Catholic right 
wing politicians (Zincone 2006: 362-3). The left wing parties of the opposition 
vehemently opposed the legislation as unconstitutional, overly punitive and 
dangerous, reflecting a highly polarised political and ideological context around the 
issue (Zincone 2006: 364). 
But if anything, the Bossi-Fini law represented a return to 1986, reflected by 
the statement from Umberto Bossi, leader of LN, that ‘immigrants are to come to our 
country for one purpose only - work’ (cf. Calavita 2005:35). Legal residence was 
tied closer to employment by restricting the quotas of the Turco-Napolitano law to 
all categories of immigrants (Legge 189/2002 Art. 3.4), reaffirming that all migrants 
have contracts before arriving in Italy (Art. 4.2), stating that employers provide for 
the worker’s return to their country of origin following the end of their contract (Art. 
6.5bis), prohibiting immigrant sponsorship, and declaring all immigrants to be illegal 
residents upon finishing a contract or losing a position of employment (Art. 5.3bis). 
The social rights of foreigners were also reduced significantly, increasing their 
exclusion and thus their distinction with the status of natives whilst ensuring the 
arrival of a cheap, temporary foreign workforce and restricting the number who 
could stay. However, although it was framed by a context of criminalisation of 
undocumented migrants and the association of illegality with public security the 
Bossi-Fini law also provided for the largest amnesty in Italy’s history, legalising the 
status of 646,000 people (ISTAT 2006). This has been seen as contradictory due to 
the way it facilitated the regularisation of immigrants’ status whilst also making it 
more difficult to obtain and renew a residence permit (Geddes 2008b:350). The 
result has been seen to produce illegality, which is a way of excluding migrants from 
membership and access to rights and thus reinforcing the categorisation of many 
migrants as outsiders.  
The Bossi-Fini law has provided the backdrop to the most considerable wave 
of Romanian immigration to Italy (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004). Indeed, since its 
passing the Romanian immigrant population has grown dramatically from 239,426 
registered individuals in 2003 to 555,997 in 2006 and 796,477 in 2009 (Caritas Italia 
2004, 2009). Since the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 this nationality 
population has entered into the category of comunitari or ‘EU Citizens’, and is as 
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such governed largely by Community law. The final section of this chapter will 
outline some of the implications of this development for the Romanian immigrant 
population in Italy. Before that, the following sub-section will examine the case of 
Spain’s immigration and citizenship legislation. 
 
The case of Spain 
 
As with Italy, Spain has rapidly made a transition from a country of emigrants to one 
of the major receivers of immigration in the EU. Also of similarity has been the 
criticism of policy responses for being of an ad hoc nature, with ambiguous 
intentions and implications. 
Some similar general consistencies can be outlined throughout the history of 
immigration policy developments in Spain. Firstly, immigration has been viewed as 
a predominantly temporary phenomenon that has not until recently been seen to 
require extensive legislation or policymaking in response. Secondly, as in Italy the 
law has made legality difficult to obtain and to renew, with a large informal labour 
market fuelling illegality whilst providing a cheap labour workforce for low 
productivity sectors in the Spanish economy. Thirdly, amnesties have been 
repeatedly used to legalise the status of previously undocumented foreigners, 
emphasising the understanding of immigration as a temporary problem to be solved 
by sporadic measures. Fourthly, immigration has predominantly been taken off the 
political agenda and perceived as a potentially divisive issue, aside from a period 
during 1999-2001, explaining the relative lack of policy developments until this 
time. Fifthly, when comprehensive immigration laws have been passed they have 
been concerned with the separate tasks of granting a relatively extensive range of 
social rights to immigrants whilst increasing security measures and opportunities for 
deportation in order to prevent further arrivals. In sum, the overall impact of the 
Spanish approach to immigration has been to maintain a large proportion of the 
immigrant population in an undocumented status, making permanent residence a 
distant possibility despite the range of rights afforded it and with little impact on the 
structural pull of the informal economy.  
Since the 1980s Spain has constituted one of the ‘new countries’ of 
immigration in Europe by making the shift from net-exporter to net-importer of 
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flows. However, this recent intensification of the phenomenon does not mean that 
population movements to and from Spain were previously unknown (McMillion 
1981, Ringrose 1998, Silvestre 2007, Zapata-Barrero 2009). Indeed, by 1970 some 
38% of the population of Catalonia, and 47% of the population of Barcelona, were 
born outside the region (Calavita 1998:534, see also King 2001). Yet the relatively 
low level of flows and the fact that large-scale immigration was apparently not 
expected by decision makers meant that immigration during the 1970s and 1980s 
was not considered a major political issue (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 310-2, see also 
Davis 2009, González-Enriquez 2009). Migrations were relatively unregulated and 
early Spanish definitions of ‘immigrants’ were influenced by perceptions of class: 
prior to 1971, emigrants and immigrants were simply those travelling from or to any 
Spanish port in Third Class, and from 1972 onwards this was changed to include 
those financially assisted by the Instituto Español de Emigración (Bover and Velilla 
2001: 4). Throughout the 1980s immigrants arrived predominantly from Britain, 
Germany and France and settled in coastal areas of tourism, and they were welcomed 
by the opening of Spain to mass package tourism and the expansion of low cost 
travel (O’Reilly 2002).  
At this time the Spanish Constitution of 1978 had already placed 
responsibility for immigration policy with the Spanish State (Art. 149). This was 
complemented by the possibility of competences being delegated to the regional 
level of autonomous communities (comunidades autonomas) when deemed relevant 
(Art. 150), which would go on to provide the basis for a decentralisation of 
immigrant integration policies. The local dimension of this multi-level arrangement 
will be examined in more detail in chapter six. 
Spain’s first comprehensive law on immigration, known as the Law of 
Foreigners (Ley de Extranjeria, Ley Orgánica 7/1985), came in 1985. Its declared 
objective, and that of subsequent Spanish legislation, was to recognise the greatest 
possible level of rights and freedoms to foreigners, ‘practically equal’ to those of 
Spaniards, and to establish controls on the legality of residence and conditions of 
entrance to and deportation from Spain (Preámbulo, Boletín Oficial del Estado 158, 
03/07/1985). The right to residence and movement (Art. 6), association (Art. 8), 
education (Art. 9) and strike action (Art. 10) were all made dependent on legal 
residence, whilst the right to participate in municipal elections was granted in cases 
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of reciprocity between Spain and the immigrant’s country of origin (Art. 5). The law 
was also clearly influenced by the terms and conditions of accession to the European 
Community, which Spain would join in the same year, as it sought to define a 
common southern border to Europe and protect the free movement rights of nationals 
of Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC). In this sense the 
law set out distinctions between migrants from the EEC and those from beyond, with 
the first being included in the communitary grouping or Regimen Comunitario and 
the second in the general grouping, or Regimen General. Whereas nationals of EEC 
Member States enjoyed rights to free circulation, residence and work in Spain, other 
foreigners had to apply for these before arriving. In order to enter Spain, these non-
EEC citizens were required to present a visa, and for stays of over 90 days residence 
and/or work permits were required (Art. 12). Finally, permanent residence, family 
reunification, and integration measures were entirely absent from the law.  
Aside from the law of foreigners, the long-term incorporation of immigrants 
in Spain was, and has continued to be, outlined instead by nationality law, laying out 
the requirements and conditions of citizenship in Spain. Nationality has been defined 
in the Constitution of 1978 and the Spanish Civil Code (updated in Law 36/2002, 
Boletín Oficial del Estado 242, 09/10/2002). This grants nationality to individuals of 
Spanish birth (jus sanguinis), defined as those who are children of a Spanish mother 
or father, whose parents have no nationality or their identity is unknown, or who are 
adopted by Spaniards. Furthermore, opportunities for foreigners to adopt the Spanish 
nationality (jus solis) are founded on a cultural understanding of Spanish culture and 
heritage, establishing a stratification of the statuses of non-Spanish born people: 
members of the Iberian Peninsula and the ex-colonies of Spain are given preferential 
access to citizenship over other nationalities and for nationals of Latin America, 
Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal, as well as descendents of 
Spanish Sephardic Jews a period of two years legal residence applies before 
nationality will be granted. The anomaly here is Moroccan nationals, who are 
categorised with other non-members of the European Community and must be 
legally resident in Spain for ten uninterrupted years and hold a clean criminal record 
before being eligible for the Spanish nationality. In light of this, full citizenship in 




As in Italy, immigration to Spain was interpreted in the law of 1985 as a 
temporary, labour market-based phenomenon. Residence and work permits were 
awarded in the migrant’s country of origin and work permits were dependent on the 
demand for labour in specific sectors of the Spanish economy, for which quotas were 
published annually. Also, for the decade following 1985 only a small minority of 
permits granted were for longer than one year (Watts 1998: 135). The complicated 
bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining these meant that it was easier for many 
migrants to enter the country on a tourist visa and stay after its expiry, or to enter the 
country clandestinely (González-Enriquez 2009). Also, the majority of immigrants 
were employed in small and medium sized enterprises with a high degree of 
informality (Watts 1998: 131-2). Thus, one criticism has stated that ‘while the dual 
rationale of the 1985 law and its successors has been to control the borders while 
ensuring immigrants’ rights, they do neither’ (Calavita 1998: 530).  
Attempts to diminish the level of this undocumented residence and 
underground labour have taken the form of repeated amnesties for the legalisation of 
immigrants’ status, carried out in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000/1 and 2005. However, the 
restrictive granting of visas has meant that it has been difficult for many foreigners to 
maintain their legal status because renewals have depended also on holding a valid 
employment contract. Indeed, in 1992, following the amnesty of the previous year, 
39,937 foreign workers were registered as contributing to social security payments, 
but by 1993 this figure had fallen to 11,808 as one-year work permits expired and 
foreigners returned to the underground economy (OPI 1999). In this context of 
predominantly short-term legal or undocumented long-term residence and restrictive 
conditions for the granting of nationality, access to permanent residence and rights of 
citizenship was particularly difficult. 
The subsequent developments in Spanish immigration law would not come 
about until 2000, in a vastly different context to that of 1985. Between the first 
immigration law and the first proposals of a new law, in 1998, the immigrant 
population had increased by 500,000 (González-Enriquez 2009: 141). During these 
years there were only piecemeal developments in response to this changing context, 
despite the fact that in 1990 a government report on the situation of foreigners in 
Spain had already declared that ‘in the 1990s, Spain will become a country of 
immigration’ and called for a coherent immigration policy that would guarantee ‘in 
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accordance with our values, the complete integration of the foreign residents who 
have chosen our country as a place to live and work’ (Comunicación del Gobierno al 
Congreso de Diputados, Informe 15/90, December 1990). This was followed by the 
first Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants in 1994 and the establishment of 
space for dialogue and collaboration between the public administration, social 
organisations and immigrant associations in the Forum for the Social Integration of 
Immigrants, in 1995 (Real Decreto 155/1995). Also, regulation of the undocumented 
foreign population was aided in 1996 by the inclusion of all residents, regardless of 
legal status, on the Municipal Register (Ley 4/1996 de 10 de enero, Art. 18.2). In 
order to be included on the register the person would only need to present a 
document of identity, not a residence or work permit, enabling counting of the 
foreign population (legal and illegal) in order to plan services more efficiently. 
Together, these steps demonstrated an acknowledgement of the increasing presence 
of immigrants in Spain and move towards granting them rights and opportunities for 
integration, whilst contradictorily maintaining a wider legal structure which 
continued to make entry and long-term legality, along with the wider rights to 
residence and welfare that this would bring, difficult to achieve. 
The reforms to Law 7/1985 in 2000 were inspired to a large degree by the 
increasing salience of immigration as a concern in national politics and public 
opinion during the period surrounding 1999 and 2001 (Montijano 2008, Zapata-
Barrero 2003, 2004: 93-162). In Catalonia in 1999, residents of the municipality of 
Terrassa protested against the Moroccan presence there, and between 2000 and 2001 
there was the rejection of a mosque in Premià de Mar (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés 
Mascareñas 2011: 21). Tensions also surfaced elsewhere, at El Ejido in Almería, 
when a high profile violent revolt in 2000 saw the burning of immigrant houses in 
reaction to the murder of a Spaniard by a Moroccan citizen. This hit national 
headlines and in the national elections of March 2000, immigration was ‘discovered’ 
by the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) as an electoral issue 
(Zapata-Barrero 2004: 94, see also Zapata-Barrero 2003). Nevertheless, the 
proposals for reform had originally come from the conservative Catalan formation 
Convergence and Union (Convergencia I Unió, CIU) in 1998. They were concerned 
about a lack of integration of immigrants in Catalonia and called for increased social 
rights to facilitate this (González-Enriquez 2009: 141-2). In doing so, they also 
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highlighted a concern for the cultural impact of immigration on the Catalan national 
identity (Gil Araujo 2009). 
In 2000, Law 7/1985 was in fact reformed twice, firstly in January through 
Law 4/2000 and subsequently in December through Law 8/2000. The Law 4/2000 
had been rejected by some members of the incumbent PP and amendments were 
suggested by members of the Senate, before being accepted with the support of the 
opposition. In contrast to this, the latter reform came under the auspices of a PP 
majority government that had been elected in March of the same year and was no 
longer in need of cross-party consensus.  
Early in 2000, the first reform (Law 4/2000, Boletín Oficial del Estado 10, 
12/01/2000) resulted in a favourable outcome for immigrants in terms of residence 
and rights. On the one hand, regarding residence, a category of resident permit was 
introduced that would not require a work permit, but would also not allow the holder 
to enter employment if they held sufficient resources (Art. 29) and a category of 
permanent resident was introduced, which would be granted to individuals who had 
already legally resided in Spain for five years (Art. 30). For those wealthy enough, 
these terms separated the terms of temporary residence from an immigrant’s 
involvement in the labour market, and for all legal immigrants it separated 
permanent residence from the cultural criteria of the nationality laws outlined above. 
Finally, the reform also introduced the opportunity for undocumented migrants to 
gain legal status if they could demonstrate at least two years of residence and 
employment in Spain. The establishment of this measure alongside the continued 
link between legal entry to Spain and the holding of a visa granted at the country of 
origin (Arts. 33-5) amounted to an acceptance of undocumented migration as a 
structural presence that would not be stopped. 
On the other hand, Law 4/2000 offered a significant expansion of the rights 
and freedoms of immigrants in Spain. It continued to offer the right to residence and 
movement (Art. 5), association (Art. 8), education (Art. 9) and strike action (Art.11) 
and maintained the right to participation in municipal elections in cases of 
reciprocity in international law (Art.6). However, the law also went beyond these 
and declared that legal immigrants would also have the right to social security 
payments (Art. 14) and family reunification (Art.17), whilst all those on the 
municipal register, regardless of legal status, would also have access to healthcare as 
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well as the right to join associations run by legal residents (Art. 8) and be granted the 
right to form immigrant associations and vote for their own representatives (Art. 
6.2). For the first time, this offered social protection and a channel for political 
participation that were not dependent on legal residence or labour market status. In 
this way, Law 4/2000 therefore represented a significant shift in Spain’s immigration 
legislation in terms of the range of social and political rights made available and the 
categories of individuals eligible for them. 
However, the reform of the same year would prove to be more restrictive, 
offering a distinct approach which emphasised controls on entry to and residence in 
Spain in order to ‘incentivise foreigners to enter and reside in a legal way’ in Spain 
(Exposición de Motivos V, Ley Orgánica 8/2000, 22/12/2000). On the one hand, 
there were checks made against illegality. It was clarified that immigrants could be 
deported from Spain if they were found guilty of undocumented residence, working 
without a relevant permit or leaving Spain without having relevant documentation 
(Art. 53), whilst the legalisation of those with undocumented status would be granted 
after five years, rather than two, and only in cases of a demonstrable rooting of the 
immigrant in local society or family ties. In 2004 this would be reduced again to 
three years under the newly-elected Socialist government. In this way, the reform of 
2000 ambiguously criminalised and rewarded undocumented residence. On the other 
hand, Law 8/2000 also conditioned or removed a range of the rights and freedoms 
outlined above. Limitations were placed on the freedom to reside and move within 
Spain, in ‘exceptional situations’ of public security, resulting in removal of 
individuals from specific populations or the demand that they periodically present 
themselves to the relevant authorities (Art. 5). Rights of association, protest and 
strike action were also imited to individuals with legal residence or work permits 
(Arts. 7-8), whilst family reunification would be dependent not only on residence, 
but also on presenting ‘reasons which justify’ its ‘necessity’ (Art. 17). Political rights 
were therefore once again tied to legal residence in Spain, which was in turn a result 
of having sufficient means of subsistence and a visa granted in the country of origin, 
whilst employment also required a work permit in addition to a residence visa (Art. 
36). In this way the political and social rights and freedoms of immigrants were 
restricted to those with legal status as part of a move from rights to control and 
security in order to ‘fight against illegal immigration’ (Title III).  
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The Law 8/2000 has provided the principal framework for the arrival of 
Romanian immigrants in Spain because the majority of the Romanian population 
movements have come after this moment. Indeed, in 2000 there were only 10, 983 
Romanians registered in Spain, but by 2009 this had risen suddenly to 718,844 (data 
from Observatorio Nacional de la Inmigracion). Although subsequent reforms have 
occurred to Spain’s immigration law in 2009 (Ley Orgánica 2/2009, Boletín Oficial 
del Estado 299, 12/12/2009), by this time the Romanian population was already 
governed by the regimen comunitario and therefore by Community law. The 
following section will outline the implications of these developments for the status 
of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain. 
 
 
The status of Romanians in Italy and Spain 
 
Migration from Romania to Italy and Spain has grown consistently since the end of 
the Communist Party Regime in 1989, although the principal arrivals have occurred 
in the 2000s. Indeed, although the first Romanian migrants arrived in these countries 
in the early 1990s, numbers were negligible and it was only after 1996 that Italy 
became a significant destination and the same for Spain after 2002 (Ban 2009, Sandu 
et al 2004, Viruela Martinez 2002, see figure 5). 
The first wave of contemporary migratory flows from Romania followed the 
fall of the Communist Party regime in 1989, and was mostly directed to Germany 
and a small population to Italy (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004: 3). A second wave of 
emigration came after 1996, when the Romanian government’s economic policies 
resulted in a period of ‘transition shock’ (Crowther 2010). This was primarily 
directed to Italy, although arrivals were also recorded in Spain. More recently a third 
wave of emigration from 2002 to the present day has been characterised by the 
dominance of Italy and Spain as the principal destinations (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 
2004). The subsequent growth in migratory flows has meant that, despite 
constituting a small population in Italy and Spain in 2000, by 2009 Romanians were 











1995 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Italy 14,212 28,796 69,000 239,426 555,997 796,477 




Figure 5: Growth of legally resident Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain 





The dramatic growth of Romanian migration has come at the same time as a 
shift in the legal conditions regulating their entry to Italy and Spain. On 1
st
 January 
2002 visa requirements for Romanian citizens visiting EU Member States for up to 
three months were lifted and entry was made dependent on demonstrating possession 
of economic resources, an invitation from a European citizen or institution willing to 
vouch for them or a hotel reservation and return ticket in order (Elrick and Ciobanu 
2009:105). Whereas Romanian migrants previously had to either spend around 2,000 
euros to obtain a Schengen visa or cross borders illegally to enter the EU, after the 
lifting of visa requirements for Romanian citizens the journey was much cheaper 
(Gabriel Anghel 2008, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008), and although visa-free entry 
was conditional upon not undertaking employment many found informal 
opportunities. For example, for seasonal harvest work or a specific building contract 
three months was sufficient time to complete a period of employment before 
returning to Romania (Hartman 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008). The Romanian 
government established the Office for Labour Migration (Oficiul pentru Migratia 
Fortei de Munca) in 2001, but despite this and attempts in Italian and Spanish law to 
set immigration quotas and promote the hiring of foreign workers in the country of 
origin, many Romanians emigrated without a work contract and thus without 
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following the formal, official channels, due to a degree to the Office for Labour 
Migration being perceived as understaffed, inefficient and either distrusted or 
unknown among potential emigrants (Ban 2009, Pajares 2007). In 2004, the 
Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family also established a 
Department for Labour Abroad with the objectives of improving the social and 
economic conditions and protecting the rights of emigrants, but its impact has 
similarly been minimal (Sandu et al 2004). In this way a shift in the legal framework 
in 2002 gave Romanian nationals the opportunity to legally enter Italy and Spain, but 
also reinforced the temporary nature of their stay and the informality of their labour 
market opportunities. For the majority of the Romanian migrant population, visa-free 
travel therefore took them only a little closer to being citizens by opening 
opportunities for economic activities, largely in informal, short-term precarious 
employment. 
As noted above, for the majority of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain, 
their legal status, rights and freedoms have been outlined respectively in the Turco-
Napolitano and Bossi-Fini law, and the Law of Foreigners 8/2000. In Italy this has 
resulted in a context in which initial rights to schools and emergency healthcare for 
undocumented migrants have been removed, and the opportunity for permanent 
residence which was originally tied to legal residence has been lost. Romanians in 
Italy have also not had a right to vote or participate politically and have faced 
deportation for undocumented residence and work. Whereas the Turco-Napolitano 
regime promoted permanence of legal migrants, the Bossi-Fini one emphasised the 
temporary nature of immigrants defined simply as a labour force. In Spain, the ad 
hoc context in which Romanian pioneers arrived was replaced in 2000 by a regime 
which granted access to healthcare and education for all, but tied the political rights 
of voting, association and protest to legal residence whilst facilitating the deportation 
of undocumented migrants.  
In both countries, employment has been prevalent in low productivity sectors 
and high informality sectors and a general casualisation of the labour force has taken 
place, making stable employment and permanent residence difficult to obtain. As a 
result, challenges have arisen to the social and political integration of Romanians in 
Italy and Spain. It has been noted that the general level of education and 
qualification of Romanian emigrants is high (Pajares 2007: 210, Ricci 2008: 84) and 
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that the Romanian emigrant population has been varied, combining educated 
individuals leaving Romania to bridge the education-income gap of their homeland 
with poorer unskilled rural workers in the cheaper post-2002 period (Uccellini 2010, 
Viruela Martinez 2002). Despite this, the dominant employment roles in Italy and 
Spain have been in domestic care, construction and agriculture, sectors with a 
predominance of precarious short-term or informal employment and in which legal 
residence and work permits have not been absolutely necessary in order to enter the 
labour market (Birsan and Cucuruzan 2007, Caritas Italia 2010, Gabriel Anghel 
2008, Hartman 2008, Marcu 2009a, Pajares 2007, Perrotta 2006, Uccellini 2010, 
Viruela Martínez 2008). Consequently, Italy and Spain have been attractive 
destinations for short-term settlement, and circular migration patterns have 
developed to enable workers to make the most of temporary and seasonal labour 
opportunities (Gabriel Anghel 2008, Hartman 2008, Sandu 2005). However, this 
informal employment comes without worker’s rights, giving individuals less 
bargaining power with their bosses and within trade unions and in politics (Perrotta 
2006). 
The precarious and undocumented status of Romanians has been confirmed 
in data from the latest amnesties in both countries: in Italy, the process of 2002 
granted legal residence to 147,947 Romanians which equated to 60% of the 
population of 239,426 registered in 2003 (Ricci 2008: 86), and in Spain 97,941 
Romanian nationals were granted legal residence permits in 2005, which equalled 
51% of the total at the time of 192,134 (OPI 2006). Finally, from 2002 to 2006, 
Romanians were the nationality with the greatest deportations from Italy, overtaking 
Albanians and reaching a total of 29,825 in 2006 (Ministero dell’Interno 2006). In 
Spain, the number deported annually rose from 1,607 in 2001 to 59,386 in 2004, 
before lowering to 42,292 in 2006, many of whom were sent for not having regular 
residence permits (Baillo Ruiz 2008). 
Since the joining of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, nationals from 
these countries have no longer been required to hold visas for residing in the 
countries of the Schengen space. In theory, the process of EU expansion and 
integration to the East should have played a key role in outlining the rights to be 
granted in order to uphold equality of status between Romanians and Italians or 
Spaniards, particularly regarding rights to free movement, non-discrimination and 
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the removal of restrictions on involvement in previously closed areas such as self-
employment and employment in agriculture, tourism, domestic work and care, 
construction, engineering, management, highly-skilled work, and seasonal work.  
The category of Citizen of the European Union and its definition as a specific 
legal status has developed out of the rights of free movement. The free movement of 
persons across national borders was established as a fundamental objective of the 
European project in 1951 (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community Article 69). At Rome in 1957, this would be summarised in the 
collection of free movement rights, made up of the right to move freely within 
Community territory in order to accept employment, to reside in another Member 
State for the purpose of employment, and to continue residing in a Member State 
after having been employed (Treaty on European Community 1957, see also Maas 
2007). The evolution of these free movement rights into an institutionalised form of 
citizenship was driven by the goal of economic integration and the development of 
the Single European Market. In 1985 the European Commission's proposal for 
completing the single market by 1992 put forward the same deadline for the removal 
of ‘the obstacles which still exist in the Community to free movement for the self-
employed and employees’ (European Commission 1985, referenced in Maas 
2007:37). The Single European Act of 1987 was also pivotal by defining the 
freedom of movement of goods, services, people and capital at the heart of the single 
market project, and the intergovernmental Schengen Accord of 1985 constituted the 
first step forward in the formal elimination of border controls. By aiming to abolish 
physical borders between them, the signatories of the Accord moved closer to a 
double objective of facilitating the liberalisation of the Community labour market 
while also outlining a unified concept of European citizenship (Ibid. :37). 
The concept of Union citizenship was institutionalised in 1992 with the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which ‘every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’ (TEU 1992 Art. 9). 
This represented a step beyond the free circulation of labour across the European 
Economic Community by declaring that all citizens had the right to be considered as 
a national in any EU Member State and to not be discriminated against on grounds of 
nationality. Specifically, article 8 of the Treaty outlines European citizens’ right to 
free movement and residence in any Member State, the right to vote and stand as a 
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candidate in municipal elections and elections for the European Parliament in the 
Member State of their residence and the right to petition the European Parliament 
and the European Ombudsman. As EU citizens, any discrimination against an 
individual residing in a Member State is strictly against Community law. The adding 
of this right of non-discrimination to that of free movement marked the expansion of 
economic rights into limited political and social provisions, which was further 
contributed to through the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Arts. 20–23). In doing so, it has outlined a thin 
conceptualisation of social citizenship at the EU level which remains subject to the 
conditions governing welfare at the national level. The provision of rights and 
integration measures to TCNs through EU level policies has therefore been described 
as outlining only a quasi-social citizenship for migrants (Konsta and Laziridis 2010: 
370). 
For Romanian nationals legally working with a work permit or authorised 
residence in Italy or Spain on 1
st
 January 2007, accession to the EU therefore implied 
continued access to the labour market of these countries without the need to renew 
work permits every two years, removing to a certain extent the impermanence 
experienced by previous migrants. However, the accession of Romania to the EU did 
not directly result in a shift in the legal status of Romanian migrants in these 
countries, for the following main reasons.  
Firstly, in Italy and Spain the rules on labour market access did not come into 
force directly upon accession. Instead, transitional measures were put in place 
designed to balance the possibly negative effects of large amounts of workers 
arriving. These could be in place for two years, before a review and the possibility of 
maintaining them for another three. After that limits could only be applied in 
exceptional circumstances of damage to the host labour market. Complete freedom 
of movement, work and residence was to be guaranteed no more than seven years 
after accession, which is to say at the beginning of 2014 (COM(2002) 694). So, in 
this way for the first two years of EU membership, Romanian migrants were subject 
to restrictions regarding access to the labour market of Italy and Spain except for in 
self-employment or roles in agriculture, tourism, domestic work and care, 
construction, engineering, management and highly-skilled work, and seasonal work. 
In Spain this was lifted in 2009, but the economic crisis resulted in rising 
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unemployment from this year. This has particularly affected the construction sector, 
where the greatest destruction of jobs for immigrant workers has been seen. The 
implications are an increasing unemployment rate of Romanian nationals, from 
60,826 in 2007 to 137,756 in 2009 and a 15% decrease in the activity rate of this 
nationality, although data for informal activity cannot be so easily measured (Pajares 
2009b: 43-114). Limits were re-established in 2011 due to the ‘serious disturbance’ 
on the Spanish labour market (COM 2011/503/EU).  
Secondly, according to the free movement directive of 2004, EU citizens can 
be refused entry or removed from a Member State if they are deemed to pose a threat 
to public policy, public security or public health (Directive 2004/38/EC). Residence 
is only guaranteed for periods up to three months of duration, beyond which point 
residents have to acquire a permit from the police and to demonstrate having 
‘sufficient resources’ to provide for themselves and not be a weight on the national 
social security system (Art. 8). In line with these rules, Member States can therefore 
restrict the free movement and residence of citizens of the EU from other Member 
States (Art. 27). In Italy, this was transposed into national law in 2007 (Decreto 
Legislativo 30/2007, Art 20.1-3), which was modified in 2008 to introduce the 
requirement of all EU citizens to declare their presence to the local police and obtain 
residence permits for stays of longer than 3 months (Decreto Legislativo 32/2008). 
Failure to hold a permit would result in being categorised as an undocumented 
immigrant, with the possibility of being detained and deported. These deportations 
are decided on a case by case basis, such as the case of a Romanian criminal 
considered a danger to public security by a Prefect in 2009 (Libero, Epulso romeno 
scarcerato dai magistrate, 1
st
 March 2009), and a resident of ten years being 
deported for participating in confrontations during a protest in Rome in 2011 (La 
Repubblica Roma, , Maroni dispone l’espulsione del giovane romeno fermato, 19th 
October 2011). In Spain the free movement directive was transposed to national law 
in Decree 240/2007 (Real Decreto 240/2007, Boletín Oficial del Estado 51, 
28/02/2007), which conditioned deportation orders for EU citizens on there being 
‘serious public order or public security concerns’ and following consideration of the 
individual’s length of time in Spain, social and cultural integration, age, health, 
family and economic situations and the strength of their ties to the country of origin 
(Art. 15). However, deportations of EU citizens are not included in official statistics. 
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Nevertheless, when the very rare cases have been reported in the press this has 
occurred been as part of an extradition request from the Romanian government, or as 
part of an informal agreement rather than in line with the free movement directive, as 
seen with the town council that bought fifteen bus tickets to Romania for a group of 
gypsy families (El Público, Motril expulsa a 15 rumanos y les paga el autobús a su 
país, 17
th
 November 2010). 
Thirdly, as with all EU citizens in foreign Member States, Romanians cannot 
vote in national elections and only have political rights on the municipal and 
supranational levels. As will be examined in the following two chapters, this has 
resulted in a lack of a Romanian voice in national and, to a lesser degree, local 
politics in Italy and Spain, reflecting a certain disconnection between these two 
levels of politics. Yet at the same time, Romanian nationals in these countries have 
retained their enfranchisement in the national and presidential elections in Romania, 
with their votes being added to the Bucharest constituency until the establishment 
from 2008 of a specific constituency in Europe, with its own member of the 
Romanian parliament. This illustrates clearly how citizenship of the EU does not 
represent a unified status of equality across nationalities, but rather a varied 
collection of bundles of rights that are provided by different governments and 
institutions. Nevertheless, despite the maintenance of enfranchisement at local (in 
Italy and Spain), national (in Romania) and supranational (the European Parliament) 
levels, there has not followed a high level of participation from Romanian nationals, 
for reasons that will be discussed later. Instead, the move to EU citizenship has 
provided an opportunity structure for the participation of Romanian migrants to Italy 
and Spain that local autochthonous actors have adapted to in differing ways, 
depending on their context. In this way, in Italy there has been little interest in the 
local voting patterns of Romanian nationals, whereas in Spain concern over their 
vote preferences and favourable public events were held in anticipation of capturing 
their support since 2005. In this way the formal categorisation of Romanian 
immigrants as citizens of the EU has not directly resulted in a shift to equal status 
and a redefinition of ‘who is who’ on positive terms, but rather provided a backdrop 
against which actor negotiations could play out in new ways. The social impact of 
the cross-border citizenship of the EU therefore depends on political interests and 





This chapter has aimed to outline the legal and policy frameworks which have 
governed the incorporation of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. By 
analysing the development of these laws and policies in period of increasing 
Romanian immigration, it has illustrated how they have influenced the political and 
social status of Romanian immigrants in these countries within a stratified hierarchy 
of citizen categories. 
The analysis of legal and policy measures above has shown that there are 
broad commonalities between Italy and Spain as regards their responses to 
immigration. In both countries, the presence of immigrants was initially considered 
to be a temporary phenomenon and few measures for permanent incorporation were 
established. The characteristics of the labour market contributed to a high level of 
undocumented immigration but also, in addition to social and personal networks 
between immigrants, acted as the principal route for integration. Long-term 
residence has been tied to legal employment in both countries, which has proven 
problematic in contexts of high levels of casual, short-term, precarious or informal 
labour. Accordingly, and as noted above, data from amnesties on immigrants’ 
undocumented status have shown the Romanian immigrant population to be 
characterised by a high degree of informality in both countries. As non-EU citizens, 
access to citizenship and long-term stability through naturalisation was also 
restricted and there were few, if any, opportunities or channels for the political 
participation of Romanian immigrants on a national scale. It should be noted, 
though, that integration measures and political participation have been on the 
Spanish agenda for longer than that of Italy. 
The logic and modes of policy making in these countries have also been 
broadly similar. The general logic of developments has been one of attempting to 
restrict undocumented immigration whilst establishing a reliable supply of legal 
foreign workers. Regarding this distinction between the rights granted to legal 
residents and the security and control measures passed in reference to illegal ones 
there is a certain convergence across party political divides in both countries. In this 
way, the centre-left in Italy tightened the laws on deportation in 1998 and, despite 
their rhetoric, the centre-right passed a law in 2002 that allowed for the largest 
102 
 
regularisation in the country’s history. In Spain, moreover, the centre-left criticised 
the centre-right’s second reform of 2000 but did not subsequently repeal it when they 
entered into power from 2004. In both countries, policy making has incorporated 
certain demands of a limited group of social actors such as the Catholic Church, in 
particular the Catholic charity Caritas, which has been significant in shaping policy. 
In this context, despite the supranational development of European Union 
citizenship meaning that the formal status of Romanian immigrants in Italian and 
Spanish has changed, the perspective of actors and institutions in Italy and Spain 
have not been easily moved. Indeed, a continued distinction between native and EU 
citizens in an increasingly stratified hierarchy of legal statuses has been epitomised 
by restrictions to the labour market and the capacity to deport those considered to be 
a threat. Thus a certain 'stickiness' has been visible in national responses to mobility 
from within the EU meaning that Romanians have not directly become legal insiders 






The National Dimension of the Politics of Romanian immigration in 




This chapter examines the categorisation of Romanian immigrants in national 
political debates. It asks how national politicians in Italy and Spain categorise 
Romanian immigrants in their countries. Whereas the previous chapter concentrated 
on the structural definition of categories of immigrants in laws and policies, here the 
focus shifts to the negotiations between political actors in the specific context of 
national party politics. The following chapter will further add to this by analysing 
local negotiations and mobilisations of political and social actors of autochthonous 
and Romanian origin in the two principal cities of Romanian immigration: Rome and 
Madrid, before the final chapter will examine the role of cross-border structures, 
networks and actors. 
As already seen in the legal context in which Romanian immigration has 
occurred in Italy and Spain, legal residence and the rights that are associated with it 
have been tied to employment (although in Spain this association was somewhat 
looser in terms of healthcare and education). Romanians have been predominantly 
defined as ‘outsiders’ due to their short-term, precarious or informal labour market 
roles accompanied with undocumented residence, resulting in few opportunities for 
long-term residence, stability or political participation and representation. The 
granting of EU citizenship has not brought a direct change and shift to equality but 
rather established an additional level of stratification among citizenship statuses: 
Romanians are no longer undocumented third country nationals, but are also not 
equal members of a common polity. In this chapter, however, a political discourse 
will be highlighted that includes few explicit associations with the labour market and 
frames Romanian immigrants as a ‘threat’ in Italy tied to public order issues, and as 
‘victims’ in Spain due to their disadvantaged position in society and politics. These 
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follow distinct logics of coalition-building in a fragmented political context in Italy 
and consensus-maintenance around the importance of rights and democracy in Spain 
following the country’s relatively recent transition to democracy. In this way, in both 
countries there have been processes of negotiation of what it means to be a 
Romanian immigrant which have developed against the backdrop of quite distinct 
institutional and discursive contexts. 
The textual evidence to be qualitatively analysed in this chapter is primarily 
composed of records from the acts, proposals and initiatives from Italy’s Camera dei 
Deputati and Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados along with policy documents, 
electoral manifestos, press reporting and public opinion surveys. The material was 
collected from the period between 1989, corresponding to the beginning of 
contemporary emigration from Romania, and 2008, when the last complete 
legislature in each country ended at the time of analysis.  
In national parliamentary debates, political actors are situated within a 
controlled institutional environment of the parliament itself, in which 
communication is regulated according to specific rules and conventions (Chilton 
2004: 92-5). The rules and containment of actors within the same time and space 
enables a direct comparison between diverse perspectives on the same issue. The 
debates in parliament are significant to politics in two ways: on the one hand, they 
are a site of negotiation of the laws and public policies that respond to issues, and 
therefore form part of the wider process of determining ‘who is who’ that has been 
outlined in this thesis (Olmos Alcaraz 2007: 130, Zapata-Barrero 2007: 319). On the 
other hand, parliamentary debates are also ‘weapons in the party battle’ and are the 
site of differentiation and calls for action across party lines (Chilton 2004: 92). In 
this way the debates in parliament offer an opportunity to see how actors not only 
refer to the characteristics and implications of Romanian immigration but also 
mobilise around their view in competition with opposing perspectives. However, the 
parliament does not exist in a vacuum. Thus, although their immediate audience may 
be an opposition representative in the parliamentary chamber, politicians can choose 
to align their debates with the discourses, beliefs and norms of the voting public 
outside. In this way, the actors studied in this chapter do not only speak inside the 
Camera and the Congreso, and the issues that are discussed inside are also present in 
press reports and public opinion beyond the formal sessions. For this reason in this 
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chapter the parliamentary debates are also assessed in relation to an examination of 
press reporting, party documents, electoral manifestos and public opinion surveys in 
each country.  
The chapter is divided into two principal sections, one on each country. 
Within each case study there is an outline of the national dimension of party politics, 
concentrating on the evolution of actor relations in their respective institutional and 
discursive contexts. This is followed by an examination of the way in which 
responses to immigration have developed over time, illustrating the evolution over 
time of political debate, press reporting and public opinion in response to the 
Romanian immigrant population in particular. Some general conclusions are 





The national dimension of politics in Italy 
 
The politics of immigration in Italy have developed during a time of political and 
social upheaval. During the 1980s and 1990s, social change and political corruption 
scandals heralded a shift in the balance of party competition, the strength of 
traditional cleavages and the structures and institutional rules of electoral politics. At 
the same time, immigration flows rapidly increased and territorial identity came to 
the fore as a regional political party, the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) made 
calls firstly for the independence, and later federal autonomy, of the northern regions 
of the country.  
In general from the 1950s through to the 1980s the political offer in Italy had 
been stable, divided between Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) and 
Communists (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI). The post-World War II political 
landscape of 1948 was polarised along lines of working-class communism and 
conservative individualism. In 1945 Alcide de Gasperi narrowly won the popular 
vote for the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) to lead post-war Italy 
and the party would go on to provide every Prime Minister from 1947 to 1981 
(Agnew 2002: 90). Yet during this time of consistency in party politics, Italian 
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society underwent great change. In the 1960s industrial productivity grew annually at 
13.6%, and GDP at 6%, bringing with it wealth but also structural inequalities that 
reinforced economic imbalances along the lines of rural-urban and north-south 
territorial divides and fuelled mass migration from rural areas to urban centres 
(Ginsborg 1990: 219, Mammarella 2008: 273). The urbanisation of the workforce 
urged the centre right to reconsolidate its place in power, which had previously been 
strengthened by popular support from the rural peasantry. It did so through a process 
defined by Christopher Duggan as ‘the colonization of the state’ (2007: 563), or by 
Hopkin and Mastropaolo as ‘clientelist generosity’ (2001: 158), by which the 
Christian Democrats established a restrictive political hegemony that drew its 
support from networks of clientelism and state patronage (see also Golden 2000). 
These patron-client networks between politicians and business became ever more 
explicitly corrupt during the 1980s, culminating in the uncovering of the 
tangentopoli (Bribe City) corruption scandal in 1992, which implicated some 6,000 
businessmen and politicians, including the Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, in 
the popularly-known Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) trials of 1994. 
Tangentopoli may have sparked an institutional crisis, but significant 
pressure for change in Italian politics had already been building (Agnew 1995, 
Duggan 2007, Patriarca 2001, Ventresca 2006, Woods 1995). A combination of the 
social upheaval of modernisation and deindustrialisation, the fear of right and left 
wing terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s and the end of the Cold War contributed to an 
ideological distancing of the public from the dominant political blocs of the 
Christian Democrats and the Communists as the 1980s progressed (Agnew 2002: 90, 
Mammarella 2008: 273, for an overview see also Ginsborg 1990). In the early 1990s 
this was accompanied by a revision of memories of fascism as part of a ‘say 
anything’, uprooted and de-historicised political culture (Ventresca 2006: 101-3), 
and a wider public debate on Italian national identity and the many vices of the 
‘Italian character’ (Patriarca 2001: 23-8). In short, traditional political alignments 
had already been crumbling, the dominant right-left cleavage was losing relevance 
and less people were identifying themselves with the main parties than before (Diani 
1996, Zincone 1998). Indeed, there was widespread public distrust of the country’s 
political elites, illustrated by fifty percent of the population the beginning of the 
1990s feeling that ‘all parties are the same’ and a declining share of the population 
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thinking that political parties were essential for democracy (Diani 1996: 1059). This 
confirmed an underlying distrust present since the 1970s (Cento Bull 2008, Diani 
1996: 1061). Indeed, the Italian State has been described by Foot as ‘rarely [...] an 
institution that represented all Italians, but appeared to reflect the needs of only 
certain Italians at certain times’ (2003:51). 
Between 1991 and the elections of 1994, the political landscape altered both 
in terms of the actors and the structural rules of party politics. The Communists held 
their last Congress in 1991, dissolving into the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito 
Democratico di Sinistra, PDS, later Democratici di Sinistra, DS, later Partito 
Democratico, PD in 2008) and Communist Reformation (Rifondazione Comunista, 
RC). In 1993 the Socialists and Christian Democrats were also dissolved. In short, 
the political supply was unpopular, untrusted and unsustainable, and this in turn 
opened the door for parties professing anti‐system and anti-immigration attitudes to 
gain support. Furthermore, this decline of Italy’s mass parties was accompanied by 
electoral reform in 1993 that would further push the dramatically changing balance 
towards a geographically fragmented, coalition-based arrangement by introducing 
uninominal electoral districts and a combination of majoritarian (75%) and 
proportional (25%) voting. The intention was to produce a more bipolar political 
structure that would give increased alternation between ruling parties and prevent the 
prolonged dominance of one party, but in 1994 no single party had enough coverage 
to put forward uninominal candidate lists in every province and thereby to stand a 
chance of winning on a national scale. All parties were obliged to compete through 
coalitions, which would come together for elections but remain ideologically and 
territorially separate in reality (Chiaramonte and Di Virgilio 2006, Geddes 2008b). 
The political groups to come out of this period were those that successfully 
distinguished themselves from the political past. On the political right, a coalition 
formed of Go Italy! (Forza Italia!, FI), Italian Social Movement-National Alliance 
(Movimento Sociale Italiano-Alleanza Nazionale, later only Alleanza Nazionale, 
AN) and the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN). In particular, the LN achieved 
significant and sudden electoral success in the north of the country. Some academics 
have attempted to explain this as due to identification between the electorate and 
their symbolic construction of a regional identity that ‘rediscovered’ a Padanian 
nation (Albertazzi 2006, Fremeaux and Albertazzi 2002, Tambini 2001). However, 
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this process should not be taken out of the institutional and social contexts described 
above, characterised by a changing stability of dominant cleavages, shifting rules on 
electoral politics and a general political crisis for the Italian State (Cento Bull 2003, 
Diani 1996). In this context, LN successfully directed an anti-system and anti-elite 
discourse against corrupt politicians in Rome who were defined as having lost all 
contact with ‘ordinary people’, combined with a rejection of political parties and 
individuals with ‘unconventional lifestyles’ such as immigrants, Muslims, gypsies, 
or homosexuals (Diani 1996: 1054-8, see also Cento Bull 2003: 46, Saint-Blancat 
and Friedberg 2005, Sigona 2005). In this way, Diani has illustrated how LN 
discourses managed to position the party within a wider collapse of traditional 
cleavages and principles, differentiating it from the de-legitimised political leaders of 
the past and portraying itself as the owner of issues relating to public grievances 
(Diani 1996). The success of the LN in the general elections of 1994, taking 8.4% of 
the national vote, gave it a vital role in the victory of the national coalition of the 
centre-right (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). However, its inability to balance anti-
system populism with participation in the government also led to tensions and was 
responsible for the fall of the government in the same year (Ibid.). This was not 
repeated during its second term in a centre-right coalition government, from 2001 to 
2006, when its role as an ‘opposition within government’ responsible for 
‘reproducing fear’ of EU integration, immigration, free trade, big business, 
secularism and multiculturalism was accepted as necessary to gain coverage of the 
political supply in the north (Ibid.: 961). 
The same argument applies to the League’s coalition partners. At the head of 
Go Italy! (Forza Italia, FI), Silvio Berlusconi also represented a break with the past, 
using his charisma and media empire to project an attractive and populist image to 
voters, promising to lower taxes, to create employment, to establish a new Italian 
miracle, to oust the Communists from Italian institutions and to lower illegal 
immigration whilst welcoming legal workers (Foot 2003, Geddes 2008b). Berlusconi 
capitalised on the political context by running in two coalitions; the ‘Pole of 
Freedoms’ (Polo delle Libertà, with the Lega Nord and Lista Pannella in the North) 
and the ‘Pole of Good Government’ (Il Polo del Buongoverno, with Alleanza 
Nazionale in the South), assuring a national coverage of their political offer. 
Although his first government collapsed following the exit of the LN from 
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government in 1994, in this phase Berlusconi effectively constructed the 
contemporary centre-right in Italy (Diamanti 2007: 735). 
Finally, AN grew out of the anti-system and ex-fascist Italian Social 
Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) in 1993 and also pursued ‘an anti-
immigration strategy motivated by the desire to win votes that is woven into a larger 
critique of the existing order’ (Geddes 2008b: 354). However, this would later be 
replaced by a shift towards the centre, aimed at a post-Berlusconi future and 
reflected by the claim in 1998 that immigration was ‘inevitable’, and in 2001 that it 
was ‘necessary’ for Italy’s future (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005: 963). In 2007, FI 
and AN joined forces to form the People of Freedom party (Popolo della Libertà, 
PdL), an umbrella party on the centre-right which would enter into coalition with the 
Lega in the North and the Movement for Autonomy (Movimento per le autonomie) 
in the South from 2008. 
The contemporary Italian Left has been forged out of a combination of its 
Communist inheritance and a desire to reform and reinvent itself on the political 
centre ground (Andall 2007). Having been the biggest Communist party in Cold War 
Europe, in 1991 the PCI split into the PDS and RC, along with a number of other 
small parties ‘re-born from Christian Democratic ashes’ (Zincone 1998: 56). The 
PDS aspired to create a post-socialist political centre, whilst RC occupied a more 
marginal position further to the left but maintaining the Communist values of 
equality, rights and social inclusion (Foot 2003). A Catholic-centrist party The Daisy 
(Margherita) was also present from 2001 and ran in coalitions with the PDS. 
However, the coalitions of these parties suffered something of an identity crisis 
during these years. They were not publicly seen as ‘new’ and as a result they have 
struggled to win votes from the traditional anti-communist opposition and the 
working class (Diamanti 2007: 737). Emblematic of the confusion was an alliance 
made with the LN for the administrative elections of 1995, recognised at the time by 
the DS leader Massimo D’Alema as the leading party of the Northern working class 
(Andall 2007:137). A degree of unity came through the Olive Tree (Ulivo) coalition 
of Romano Prodi, a technocrat from outside the parties, which governed from 1996 
to 2001. In this way, Prodi adopted a role akin to that of Berlusconi by being a 
charismatic leader capable of mediating between fragmented actors, although 
without such significant economic resources or the support of his own party 
110 
 
(Diamanti 2007). However, at elections this coalition has frequently presented 
separate lists for the constituent parties and in power they have formed weak 
governments, with the Olive Tree collapsing and requiring new leadership in 1998, 
2000 and at the elections in 2001. 
The fragmented and polarised political context in Italy has been described as 
a ‘never-ending transition’ following the collapse of the party system in the 1990s 
(Cento Bull 2008). High political fragmentation and instability, distrust, a lack of 
accountability and anti-elitist, anti-political populism have been put in place rather 
than a stable and moderate democratic system in a situation defined scathingly by 
Perry Anderson as ‘not a party, or a class, but an entire order converted into what it 
was intended to end’ (2009). As the dominant Left-Right, Communist-Christian 
Democrat cleavage has declined there was a rise in regional conflict in the 1990s, 
and a return to ideological confrontation in more recent years (Cento Bull 2008, 
Patriarca 2001, Ventresca 2006). Moreover, this has also been influenced by further 
institutional change, with electoral reform in 2005 sealing the presence of small 
parties in coalition politics by reintroducing proportional representation with a 
threshold of 4% that must be reached by parties outside of any coalition, and only 
2% within one, in order to gain representation (Pasquino 2007: 279). This has 
severely limited the introduction of new political actors without coalition support 
and confirmed the fragmented, bi-polar coalition politics that was born in the early 
1990s (Diamanti 2007). 
 
The national dimension of the politics of immigration in Italy 
 
Such fragmentation and polarisation has directly influenced the politics of 
immigration in Italy since the 1990s, as a negative, exclusionary perspective has 
gained dominance under the influence of the parties of the right, but also not denied 
by PDS members on the left. 
In their comprehensive review of public discourse and journalistic articles on 
immigration in Italy, Sciortino and Colombo have shown how, prior to the 1980s 
immigration was of minor public interest, although a distinction was made between 
the upper class Arab millionaires, Scandinavian actors, and CIA agents, highlighted 
for their fascinating and exotic nature, and the unskilled, lower class workers defined 
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according to administrative and class categories, as workers or components of the 
labour market or as perpetrators or victims of crimes (2004: 98-9). At this time 
public opinion showed only a small minority of Italians to be concerned with 
immigration (Zincone 1998: 48), and in politics the tendency of the dominant DC 
was to keep immigration off the national agenda (Andall 2007: 135). When 
immigration was referred to during the 1980s, expressions of solidarity cut across 
party political lines, coming from a range of parties such as MSI, the Communists 
and the Socialists. In this way, for example, the Italian Communists and left-wing 
social movements of the 1980s, conceived immigrants as ‘disadvantaged subjects’ 
pushed into moving by the ‘exploitative capitalist system’ (Picker 2011: 610). 
However, the dominant image of immigration would change during the 
1990s. Over this time, some individual nationalities such as Moroccans and 
Albanians and a generalised perception of extracomunitari or immigrants from 
beyond the European Community were increasingly associated with acts of 
criminality and threats to public order in the press (Sciortino and Colombo 2004: 
107). In press reporting, immigration became a politically salient topic: it was 
presented as a source of social conflict and distinctions were made separating 
acceptable legal immigrants from dangerous and problematic clandestine or irregular 
ones (Sciortino and Colombo 2004: 106-7). The fire was stoked when some 25,700 
undocumented Albanian migrants arrived in Italy in only four days in March 1991, 
and on the 8
th
 of August 1991 the arrival in the port of Bari of a ship loaded with 
another 17,000 caught the headlines in shocking fashion. An emergency was 
declared and the arrivals were transported to the city’s football stadium, before being 
deported back to Albania, but the photographs and television pictures were dramatic 
and stayed around for longer in the nation’s headlines and the propaganda of the 
Northern League.  
Consequently, it has been said that throughout the 1990s Eastern Europeans, 
and Albanians in particular, provided a ‘lightning rod’ for a negative discursive 
framing of immigration (King and Mai 2009: 119). Moreover, this must be seen 
within a wider rejection of ‘extracomunitarian’ immigration from beyond the 
European Union, and ‘clandestine’ migrants arriving without documents. This 
rejection of immigration was built on the construction of a category of unacceptable, 
non-EU, illegal migrants. A review of poster archives illustrates how this was 
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particularly the case for the Lega and AN in the two years prior to the elections of 
2001 and again in 2008.
3
 Indeed, examples of LN posters at this time are simple 
declarations in bold letters of ‘STOP! Clandestine Immigration’; ‘Clandestine 
Migrants Halt!’; and ‘No Amnesty Deport Clandestine Migrants’.4 An explicit 
association between crime and undocumented immigration was also clear in calls for 
‘Clandestine Migrants and Delinquency STOP!’ and ‘Enough clandestine migration 
- solidarity in their home, yes, crime in our home, no’.5 The same category was 
employed in AN material in 2008, claiming that ‘Clandestine immigration is bad for 
women’ and ‘Never more clandestine immigrants at home’.6 
The political response towards the end of the 1990s shifted in a way defined 
by Zincone as from under-evaluation to over-evaluation (1998: 44). It has been 
increasingly dominated by the centre-right, in particular the Northern Leagues and 
National Alliance. For the LN, immigration was presented as an invasion posing a 
threat to the economic, cultural and political unity of the North in a similar way that 
previous migration from the southern Mezzogiorno had been in the 1980s, whilst AN 
has been defined as opportunistically adopting the same approach (Geddes 2008b: 
354).  
This coalition has had contradictory objectives and strategies. On the one 
hand, they have been supported by many small and medium businesses that benefit 
from a cheap foreign labour force, such as the northern business leaders who called 
for increases in immigration quotas in 2001 (La Repubblica, Lavoro, botta e risposta, 
12
th
 January 2001) and the representative body of Italian business, Confindustria, 
which claimed in 2009 that ‘Italian businesses are demanding an ever-increasing 
number of immigrant workers’ (Ansa, Confindustria, cresce la domanda aziende per 
immigrati, 18
th
 November 2009). On the other hand, however, they also aligned with 
the concerns of working class and conservative voters by defining immigration as a 
                                                             
3 Two archives were examined for this project. The first was of the Northern Leagues, available at 
http://leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti.asp, accessed 10th November 2011. The second was the 
‘Manifesti Politici’ project by the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci in Emilia Romagna, which consists of 
an online collection of over 10,000 political and social posters, available at 
http://manifestipolitici.sebina.it/SebinaOpacGramsci/Opac, accessed 10th November 2011 
4 In the original Italia these were: ‘STOP! Immigrazione Clandestina’, ‘Clandestini Alt!’, and 
‘Nessuna Sanatoria Espellere I Clandestini’ 
5 ‘Clandestini + Delinquenza STOP!’ and ‘Basta clandestini – solidarieta a casa loro, si, criminalita a 
casa nostra, no’ 
6 ‘L’immigrazione clandestine fa male alle donne’ and ‘Mai piu clandestini sotto casa’ 
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threat to Italian jobs and a cause of insecurity and criminality (Cento Bull 2010). 
This simultaneous securitisation and liberalisation of immigration has been built on a 
strong distinction between legal and undocumented migrants, welcoming the former 
only if they are ‘willing’ to work, and claiming to fight the entry of the latter at all 
costs. In this sense, it is undocumented clandestine migrants who have usually been 
equated with criminality, whilst legal foreign workers have not, although in practice 
the distinction between the two is fuzzy and often conflated. In this way, the 
fragmented Italian politics of immigration has become a combination of client 
politics in decision making and populist, majoritarian patterns in public debate, 
resulting in a clear gap between policy and discourse (Geddes 2008b). The influence 
of these actors on the perception of immigration is illustrated by data showing that at 
the time of the 2001 election an average of 65% of the Italian electorate saw 
immigration as an important problem, and a quarter of these also saw immigration 
specifically as a threat to security and public order (ITANES, referenced in Geddes 
2008b). As will be shown below, the high degree of informality in the Romanian 
immigrant population noted in previous chapters would contribute to their being 
categorised in this way. 
The left’s approach to immigration during the 1990s must be viewed within 
the wider struggles in ideology and identity outlined above. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the left’s immigration policy making has followed a typical model of client 
politics through collaboration with specific interest groups such as trade unions, 
NGOs and the Caritas. However, when confronted with the majoritarian and populist 
approach of the parties on the right, the lack of a shared understanding or public 
philosophy of immigration and national citizenship led to contradictions and a weak 
counter-argument. On the one hand, the leaders of the left have been described as 
‘fearing’ the right wing discourse and loss of votes if they did not attempt to restrict 
immigration (Andall 2007: 138). On the other hand, the emphasis of cultural 
differences between positively-viewed immigrants and negatively-viewed natives 
was, often confusingly, incorporated into changeable arguments depending on the 
audience and context (Andall 2007, Picker 2011). This is because, as noted by 
Picker, ‘the shift from the socialist to the post-socialist Left was accompanied by the 
rise of identity politics, namely the struggle around “gender”, “ethnicity” and other 
cultural manifestations, which replaced the accent that the Left traditionally put on 
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class’ (Picker 2011: 610-1). Thus, the transformation of the post-communist left in 
Italy was accompanied by a replacement of class concerns with ones of ethno-
cultural identity (Però 2005: 835). Consequently, measures by left wing groups in 
places such as Bologna and Florence were aimed at protecting the cultural specificity 
of immigrants and ethnic groups as different to Italian society, resulting in 
segregation (Però 2005, Picker 2011). In this way the PDS, whilst in opposition, 
contradictorily supported both a regularisation process and increased deportation 
procedures for undocumented migrants, before passing the Turco-Napolitano law 
which saw an expansion of immigrants’ social rights combined with increasing 
security and deportation measures. At times, the left similarly adopted the language 
and rhetoric of the right in debates on Romanian immigrants, particularly in response 
to acts of criminality in 2007.  
Regarding voices from outside these coalitions, in the early 1990s a number 
of politicians from distinct parties stood for election under the banner of an Alliance 
for an Anti-racist Parliament (Patto per un parlamento antirazzista), with 90 
individuals elected successfully in 1994 (Zincone 1998: 74). However, the 
experience was short-lived and with the establishment of polarised coalition politics 
opportunities for such cross-party initiatives diminished significantly (Ibid.). This 
failure illustrates the difficulty of establishing and maintaining consensus on issues 
of racism and ethnic relations across Italy’s fragmented and polarised political 
parties. 
The politics of immigration in contemporary Italy have thus been shaped by a 
fragmented and non-consensual political context with a combination of client and 
majoritarian modes of politics. In public, negative responses to immigration over this 
period have had two principal functions. Firstly, with the establishment of coalition 
politics in which internal harmonisation across partners has been less relevant than 
external differentiation from the opposition, the symbolic construction of 
immigration as a threat has constituted a useful dividing issue between right and left 
(Baldassarri and Schadee 2004), providing a boundary-defining mechanism to 
denote who is who in the coalitions on left and right. However, whereas the right 
enjoyed a degree of consensus among its coalition partners regarding the public 
order challenges posed by immigration, the left was unable to do so. Secondly, it has 
constituted a meta-issue, being presented as a cause of a range of social issues that 
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have gone without resolution. Indeed, since 2003 Eurobarometer surveys asking 
citizens for the most serious concerns facing their country have foundeconomic 
conditions, crime and security to be consistently higher ranking than immigration 
(see figure 6). The discourse of the political right blames these highest ranking 
concerns on the presence of immigrants, facilitating the claim that they can be solved 
through measures against immigration. Both of these patterns will be seen in the 

























The national dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy 
 
This section will illustrate how Romanian immigration has been incorporated into 
this wider pattern of differentiation between categories perceived as welcome and 
others causing problems of public order and crime.  
As noted above, early references to Romanian nationals in Italy emphasised 
solidarity and their need for asylum. A ‘victim frame’ also acted as a way for 
members of AN and LN to criticise decisions to not allow certain individuals to enter 
from Romania, such as ‘a daughter who is only asking for the chance to lovingly live 
with her mother during the last years of her life’ (Falvo, AN, 31/01/1995) and Mr 
Gheorghe Sinka who wishes to ‘hug his sister, who has lived for years in Italy and is 
married with an honest Italian worker’ (Dozzo, LN, 02/02/1995). Although these 
comments may be surprising in light of the views that would later be expressed by 
these parties, the victim frame here sits within the same broader criticism of the 
Italian State employed by them at the beginning of the 1990s in favour of ‘normal 
people’ such as families and honest workers. 
Subsequent developments were, however, influenced by a negative turn in 
the early 1990s in reference to ‘Eastern European migrants’ who were seen as a 
problem, particularly those of Albanian and later Romanian, origin (King and Mai 
2009). This built over the decade, with journalists writing on the ‘boom’ in the 
presence of foreigners and in particular ‘those coming from Eastern Europe, who 
roam around Europe’ (La Repubblica, Questa Milano non è piú da bere, 5th October 
1995). Press representations of the Romanian population have been noted for having 
misrepresentations and scandal as their central factors at this time (Uccellini 2010). 
For example, Uccellini’s study finds that the majority of articles from 1989 to 2009 
showed concern for Italy’s internal security when confronted with Romanians, 
usually related to drug dealing, prostitution, and human trafficking. Also, even when 
not openly criticising Romanians, these stories portrayed them as victims involved in 
criminal processes, reinforcing the association between Romanian identity and crime 
and insecurity (Uccellini 2010: 80). 
Accordingly, from 1996 onwards parliamentary debates on Romanian 
immigration also shifted, which would culminate in the pre-election periods of 1999 
to 2001 and 2006 to 2008. Such a shift was both quantitative, as reflected by the 
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increasing number of debates on Romanians in the Chamber of Deputies (see figure 
7), and qualitative, as will be illustrated below. The results illustrate how, as the 
Romanian population in Italy has grown, so too has its presence in political debate. 
They also reflect a consistent increase in debate on Romanian migrants across 
parliamentary mandates regardless of the governing coalition. 
 
 
Mandate period Total frames Frames per year 
1987-1994 18 2.6 
1994-1996 9 4.5 
1996-2001 41 8.4 
2001-2006 49 9.8 
2006-2008 41 20.5 
 





The qualitative shift saw an increasing ‘threat’ frame in relation to Romanian 
immigration. In the period of 1999 to 2001, this came predominantly from 
representatives of the right-wing parties FI, AN and the LN. Framing a threat from 
Romanian criminality and insecurity occurred in two ways; firstly, through 
association with clandestine residence, and secondly, referring to Romanians in 
conjunction with other national identities which were also seen as problematic or 
criminal:  
 
‘the situation of public security in Padova is made more difficult every day 
[...] due to extensive traffic of prostitutes spread around many streets in the 
city and managed by Nigerians, Albanians and Romanians’ 
Rodeghiero, LN, 15/09/1999 
                                                             
7 The term ‘frames’ refers to occurrences by a single actor in parliamentary debates in which there is a 





 ‘the streets of the large metropoles of the North are ever day and every night 
a theatre for a spectacle as sad and dramatic as it is discomforting: the sale of 
human flesh, prostitution and child trafficking [...] from Albania, Romania 
and ex-Yugoslavia in particular’  
Chincarini, LN, 19/07/2000  
 
This generalising strategy emphasises the significance of cases of criminality by 
defining a threat frame associated with many problems and a large population of 
multiple immigrant nationalities. Doing so aligned the problem of Romanian 
immigration with other questions of public order as a meta-issue to be solved 
through security measures. A similar presentation was found in the press, such as 
comments by the head of AN, Gianfranco Fini, in an interview in 2001, regarding his 
fears of Romanian migrants ‘who come here without work and live off crime and 
benefits’ (La Stampa, Scegliamo i nomi con rigore, 20th February 2001). This also 
aligned debates on Romanian immigration with the previous securitising trends in 
press reporting from the 1990s, as noted above, and was directed at winning votes 
from an electorate concerned with public order and crime, as measured in public 
opinion surveys. 
Through the threat frame the centre-right also engaged in boundary-making 
by classifying certain nationalities (Romanians, Albanians and Nigerians), and 
categories (clandestine migrants and extracomunitarians) as different to the majority 
society due to undertaking activities that were unfavourable and illegal. In the period 
following the passing of the centre-left’s Turco-Napolitano law in 1998 and 
preceding the election of 2001, the reciprocal framing of this threat was shared 
among the members of the centre-right coalition in criticism of the centre-left 
incumbent. All of the analysed examples complained about uncivilised behaviour 
and made calls for tighter security and checks on the ‘legality’ of the relevant 
individuals. In doing so, they provided a symbolic resource for the establishment of 
consensus between members of the centre-right coalition, marking a difference 
between them and the governing parties. The generalised threat frame thus employed 
symbolic capital in the form of negatively-perceived nationalities and generalised 
categories (extracomunitarian and clandestine migrants) to build ties around shared 
119 
 
interpretations of the immigration issue, which would be important for mobilising 
cohesively in the elections. In this way, immigration was a unifying issue for the 
centre-right in an institutional context of fragmented coalitional politics that was at 
the same time strategically directed at criticising and weakening their opposition. 
During this period there was little debate from the centre-left on Romanian 
immigration. Furthermore, they followed very different framing patterns to those 
outlined above. The most common frame for the centre-left was a ‘victim’ frame 
which called for allowing entry of Romanian immigrants, usually referencing single 
cases as a specific, technical issue rather than a wider social concern. This 
technocratic approach contrasted the populist logic of the right wing’s threat frame, 
which was directed at the wider public. It also reflects the aforementioned tendency 
of the centre-left to not engage with public debate in order to not lose ground to the 
centre-right (Andall 2007), as well as the uncertainty surrounding the shift from class 
to culturally-based interpretations of immigration (Però 2005, Picker 2011). Indeed, 
Romanian nationals were ambiguously presented in the left’s discussions on gender 
and children’s rights. In these a victim frame defined women and children whilst the 
threat was a Romanian aggressor. For example, in 2000 it was claimed that 
Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans and Albanians were responsible for 
enslaving women as prostitutes, and that they did not belong in a ‘civil country’ such 
as Italy (Pozza Tasca, PDS, 15/03/2000). Similarly, the murder of a child by a 
Romanian clandestino was said to have been avoidable if he had been previously 
deportation: 
 
‘the murderer has been, after a short while, identified as Vasile Donciu, a 
clandestine Romanian immigrant of 20 years of age, who had worked as a 
barman but had also carried out theft [...] he had already been arrested and 
put forward for deportation. Unfortunately, like so many others, he remained 
in Italy’ 
Pozza Tasca, PDS, 28/09/2000 
 
The definition of the Romanian immigrant here employs the same language as the 
threat frames described above, from the category of ‘clandestino’ to the 
generalisation of ‘like so many others’. The implication is that this aligns the 
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speaker’s perspective with that of their centre-right opposition, despite their focus 
being on the safety of children rather than immigration per se. This continued in 
subsequent years, when members of The Daisy criticised an act of violence towards 
an Italian homosexual man (Giacchetti, Margherita, 25/11/2004) and a violent sexual 
assault on a Romanian girl by a Romanian gang (Bianchi, Margherita, 29/11/2005). 
Such ambiguity contributed to a lack of consensus across the coalition of the centre-
left, as well as indirectly increasing cross-party consensus concerning the threat 
status of Romanian immigrants, accompanied by proposals for their deportation from 
Italy.  
So, in summary, the ‘Romanian threat frame’ provided a resource for actors 
in both right and left wing coalitions, albeit with different intentions: one to provide 
apparent solutions to problems of public order and crime and the other to define a 
post-socialist consensus around issues such as gender and sexual equality. In this 
way, underlying the use of the same categories and frames in reference to Romanian 
immigration we find different motivations and logics. 
The most significant period of debate on Romanian immigration came in the 
years approaching and following the elections of 2008. At this time there was a 
prevalent equating of Romanian national identity with Roma ethnicity, and both of 
these with acts of crime. For the parties of the right, particularly LN and AN, the 
categories of extracomunitarian and clandestine migrant were replaced by definitions 
of ‘Rom’ or ‘nomads’. In the parliament, the calls against discrimination of 
Romanian gypsies met shocking, dramatic accounts of violence, lawlessness and 
criminality from LN and AN representatives. The threat frame defined a ‘Rom 
emergency’, a ‘security emergency’, ‘hygiene emergency’ and a ‘nomad emergency’ 
as well as complaining about the ‘social danger’ of nomad camps. Crime, violence 
and a lack of hygiene were posited as cultural characteristics and a way of life for 
this population, as boundary-making discourses categorised Romanians and Roma 
gypsies as one group, living in ‘nomad camps’ and ‘baraccopoli’ (shanty towns): 
 
‘[Romanians are] proliferating phenomena tied to clandestine lives and 
criminality, also caused by an unseemly and undignified modus Vivendi 




respect for basic hygienic and sanitary norms are compelled to adopt’ 
Gibelli, LN, 08/07/2002 
 
‘From the twenty or thirty clandestini initially camped it has reached, day 
after day, an increasingly crowded settlement of clandestini: first 100, then 
200 [...] an embarrassing ‘baraccopoli’ with 100 or so children, women, and 
old people who sleep in their cars and live in their own excrement’ 
Pezzella, AN, 15/05/2003 
 
These follow the same meta-issue strategy of the previous period to present a 
generalised, homogeneous population causing a vast array of problems. They also 
employ the same symbolic resources in the form of the ‘clandestine’ and 
‘extracomunitarian’ categories, whilst aligning their perspective with the already-
present dominant view of immigrants as a threat to public order. The resolution 
proposed by these speakers was for greater security and effective implementation of 
the Bossi-Fini law. There were few attempts to reinterpret and appropriate this frame 
by the centre-left, such as the criticism of the destruction of a camp near Rome as 
destroying the homes of ‘not traditional nomads, but Romanians who were escaping 
from poverty and fear’ (Ciani, Margherita, 11/02/2003). 
Yet this definition of Roma gypsies as culturally and ethnically different 
from the majority Italian population was not an original association. It should also be 
viewed in a wider context in which the Roma population in Italy had been 
problematised by right and left wing governments in political discourse and public 
policy, accompanied by their segregation in temporary camps (Però 2005, Picker 
2011, Sigona 2005). On one hand, right wing actors have emphasised a sense of 
emergency and siege in their responses in an attempt to resolve ‘the gypsy problem’ 
without granting the ethnic Roma the full benefits of equal citizenship (Sigona 
2005). On the other hand, in places such as Tuscany, left wing administrations had 
established camps for nomads to be temporarily housed in, supposedly practicing 
their ‘nomadism’, since the 1980s (Picker 2011). In the parliamentary debates 
studied here, the Communists also employed a victim frame in parliamentary debates 
to highlight exclusion of and discrimination against Romanian gypsies and their 
distinct way of life. During the 2000s RC members also presented discrimination as 
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a sort of ethnic cleansing and fascist intolerance at the hands of Italian institutions, 
organisations and individuals, blaming the rhetoric of the centre-right parties for an 
escalation of tensions. As an outsider from coalitions, RC did not aspire to build ties 
with other parties but defined a boundary between themselves, on the side of the 
victims, and the centre-right coalition and Italian State as the aggressors. 
Across all of the parties of left and right there was, nevertheless, a general 
consensus on the categorisation of Romanians and Roma gypsies as a specific, 
culturally different and separate social group to mainstream Italian society. In this 
way, they shared an understanding of the policy problem to be addressed and its 
causes, but not the implications or solutions. This conflation of Romanian and Roma 
identities resulted in the incorporation of an ethno-cultural definition of Romanian 
immigration into an already publicly salient emphasis of security and public order. 
All of this also disregarded the fact that, although within the Romanian emigrant 
population there has been an ethnic Roma contingent, it has been estimated that this 
represents only a very small minority of the total (Cova 2009). Indeed in 2007 the 
population of Roma and other ethnicity gypsies in Italy was estimated to be 150,000 
individuals (although accurate surveys or official figures are not available), of which 
only 50,000 were of Romanian origin (Motta and Geraci 2007). Nevertheless, 
confusion reigned in the press and public discourse on Romanians and Romani, 
emphasising the categorisation of both as outsiders (Harja and Melis 2010). 
The crescendo of the use of the threat frame rose in 2007 when an Italian 
woman was murdered by two Romanian women in April and the dead body of 
Giovanna Reggiani was found in a ditch in a northern suburb of the city of Rome in 
October, killed by the Romanian national Nicolae Romulus Mailat who was living at 
the time in a camp on the outskirts of the city. The press was outraged, stating that 
Romanians had become ‘crime tourists’ and that consequently ‘everywhere Roma 
camps have become centres for criminality and violence’ (Il Giornale, I turisti del 
crimine, 4
th
 November 2007). A criminal nature to Romanian nationals was 
emphasised in public and continued the generalisation of the whole population as a 
threat (Cajvaneanu 2008, Harja and Melis 2010, Devole and Pittau 2010). An angry 
mob burned down the camp in which Mailat lived, and security became the greatest 
concern in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (see figure 7, above). Political 
responses followed, with Berlusconi speaking in public of ‘the Romanian problem’ 
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(Il Giornale, Berlusconi: spero che l’Italia non diventi come Roma, 4th November 
2007), whilst the AN representative Daniela Santanchè declared that Rome was now 
a place ‘where women are killed and raped in front of everyone’s eyes’ (Il Sole 24 
Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e Veltroni: interventi tardivi, 1st November 
2007). The Lega Nord representative Paolo Grimoldi made perfectly clear his 
opinion that the Romanian community was made up of thieves and rapists that had 
invaded northern Italian cities (Movimento Giovani Padani, La Romania non ci 
faccia ramanzine e si riprenda i suoi delinquenti, 6
th
 November 2007). Completing 
the cross-party consensus view of Romanian immigration and Roma ethnicity as a 
security and public order threat, the left wing Democratic Party Mayor of Rome, 
Walter Veltroni declared that there was a specific problem with this population 
whilst the Prime Minister of the same party, Romano Prodi, passed security 
legislation enabling the deportation of EU citizens for motives of State security, 
public security and ‘other motives of public order’ when their presence is 
‘incompatible with civil and safe co-existence’ (Decreto Legislativo 30/2007, Art 
20.1-3). 
In this context the accession of Romania to the European Union resulted in 
little change. Indeed, the threat of Romanian immigration was blamed on the EU as a 
source of criminal populations. For example, in 2007 Fugatti of LN mentioned the 
problem of ‘the consistent arrival of a number of nomads’ linked with the entry of 
Romania to the EU, and Ascierto of AN stated that  
 
‘the recent entry of Romania to the European Community has caused an 
uncontrolled flow of Romanian citizens to our country. Although the 
majority of Romanian citizens legally resident in Italy is made up of good 
people who contribute to our country’s growth thanks to their work, there are 
also more and more numerous episodes of dark stories, among them also 
murder, perpetrated by criminals from Romania. The illegal prostitution 
market is now in the hands of Romanians [...] also there is the presence of the 
nomad community [...] and with this also the concentration of beggars and 
so-called ‘window cleaners’ now presiding over the majority of the traffic 
lights in our cities. These beggars and window cleaners in the majority of 
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cases belong to a system of abuse at the tip of an organised crime system 
managed by Romanian citizens’ 
Ascierto, AN, 10/09/2007 
 
Also, the terms ‘extracomunitari’ and ‘clandestini’ were absent, as European 
citizenship meant that these were no longer relevant for Romanian nationals, but the 
tendency of framing Romanian immigration as a social danger was continued. This 
involved the simple replacement of the extracomunitarian categorisation with that of 
‘neocomunitarians’ by members of LN in parliamentary debates and public speeches 
(Il Sole 24 Ore, Maroni: introdurre il reato di immigrazione clandestina, 10
th
 May 
2008), which was contrasted from the left with a definition of Romanians as 
‘comunitarians’ with rights under EU law, with the PD describing them as citizens 
with voting rights. For members of RC, Romanians were Europeans with a right to 
be protected from discrimination, continuing the victim frame that they had 
employed since the early 1990s. 
So, the political responses to Romanian immigration in Italy can be 
summarised as influenced by the following:  
Firstly, the establishment of unstable coalition politics at the beginning of the 
1990s meant that no single party was able to dominate or form majority 
governments. Consensus with potential coalition partners was therefore important. 
The parties on the right, Go Italy!, National Alliance and the Northern League were 
able to consistently adopt an interpretation of immigration as a threat to public order, 
whereas no similar consistency was visible amongst their opposition. By establishing 
consensus in this way, the parties were able to appeal to the Italian voters who were 
concerned about crime and insecurity. Immigration, by acting as a meta-issue related 
to other concerns and a source of consensus therefore had a unifying character for 
the right. 
Secondly, the declining stability of cleavages at the beginning of the 1990s 
provided an opportunity for regionalist and populist politicians to appeal to the 
voters. The LN took the opportunity to frame immigration as a threat to the north, as 
part of a broad regionalist argument against all outsiders. At the same time, AN and 
FI representatives aligned with the public order and security content of this argument 
in order to establish a common approach for their coalition and to provide an 
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apparent answer to the principal concerns of the Italian public at the time. The switch 
to a post-socialist politics for the main parties of the left, however, led to a focus on 
ethnicity and gender equality which would ambiguously relate immigration to 
cultural differences, violence against women, or prostitution and human trafficking, 
which were central tenets to the security and public order view of their opposition.  
Thus, parties of the right and left have acted as vote-maximisers that were 
embedded in specific contexts. In the political context of unstable coalitions, the 
social capital represented by consensus with other actors through frame alignment 
contributed to an empowering of the parties of the right and their control of the 
dominant interpretation of specific policy issues regarding crime, public order, 
insecurity, etc. At the same time, in the social context characterised by a lack of 
stable cleavages the actors of the right aligned not with wider values but with ‘the 
people’ and their concerns regarding crime and insecurity, which contributed to 
gaining a popular legitimacy that the left could not. The construction of ‘who is who’ 
in reference to Romanian immigrants in Italy was therefore very rarely concerned 
with Romanian immigration as a policy issue in and of itself, but instead included it 






The national dimension of politics in Spain 
 
Contemporary politics in Spain, and particularly the politics of immigration, have 
developed against the backdrop of wider narratives and memories of the transition to 
democracy following the fascist regime of General Franco and competing forms of 
nationalism. This section will outline the development of institutions and dominant 
cleavages in the country and illustrate how they have contributed to forming a bi-
polar, moderate and stable pattern of contemporary party politics.  
The institutional structures of today’s Spanish State and political parties can 
be seen as the product of both the transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s, and the continued relevance of cleavages that have shaped 
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the interpretation of issues over a much longer history. At the end of the 1970s and 
in the early 1980s the principal concern in Spanish politics was the consolidation of 
democracy following the end of the regime of General Franco (Gunther and Montero 
2009, Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004, Hopkin 2001, Montero Gibert 2008, 
Salom 2008, Torcal and Chhibber 1995). The government was considered the key to 
the stability of this new democracy, established as a presidential system chosen 
under proportional representation every four years (Salom 2008: 359-361). Yet, 
Spanish society had also undergone great social and economic upheaval and change. 
In the economy, a cumulative GDP growth rate of 7% from 1961 to 1974 fell to 
2.3% by 1978 and 1.1% from 1979 to 1983, accompanied by shortening business 
cycles, more frequent recessions and sustained inflation (Barquero and Hebbert 
1985: 285-7). By 1981 unemployment had risen to 14.6% (Barquero and Hebbert 
1985: 287), up from only 2.6% in 1974 (Zaldivar and Castells 1992: 77). 
Nevertheless, it was found that, across all parties, ‘leaving the social and economic 
problems for more stable times constituted part of the general “consensus” that 
characterised the change in regime’ (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 12). The result was 
a pattern of moderate political competition that would persist through much of the 
1980s and 1990s. Indeed, since the first democratic elections in 1977 the national 
Congress of Deputies has seen an alternation of power between dominant catch-all 
parties of the left and right holding around 80% of the available seats (Gunther and 
Montero 2009: 99). 
Parties in contemporary Spain can be roughly divided according to their 
focus at national or regional levels. On the national level, there are the dominant 
parties of the Socialists Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrera Español, PSOE), 
the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) and the more minor federation of small 
parties United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU). On the regional level, there is a wider 
range of parties, the strongest of which are found in the autonomous communities of 
the Basque Country (the Basque Nationalist Party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, 
PNV) and Catalonia (principally the conservative Convergence and Union, 
Convergencia i Unió, CIU, and the Catalan Republican Left, Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya, ERC). In reality, the distinction between national and regional politics 
is not as clear-cut as suggested here, as the PSOE and PP have regional formations 
such as PNV and CIU have had representatives in the Spanish parliament. However, 
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this chapter will focus predominantly on the ‘Spanish’ national level parties as they 
are the dominant voices in national politics. 
During the 1980s, the left wing Socialists (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol, PSOE) were barely challenged in Spanish national elections. At this time, 
the PSOE successfully employed vague discourses of modernisation, rather than a 
specific economic or social platform, to position itself as a catch-all party governing 
for all Spaniards (Torcal and Chhibber 1995). In contrast, the conservative 
opposition, Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular, AP) was led by an ex-member of the 
Francoist regime, Manuel Fraga, and repeatedly put forward a platform based on 
Catholic and family values (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 20). In doing so, they 
remained tied to the hegemonic view of the previous regime, which had equated 
Catholicism with a unitary Spanish nationalism (National-Catholicism) (Balfour and 
Quiroga 2007, Molina 2010, Núñez Seixas 2001). The conservative right only 
managed to provide an electoral challenge to the PSOE from 1989, when the party 
would be renamed as the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) and re-directed away 
from religious and moral issues and towards specific economic problems by the new 
leader José María Aznar (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 22). In 1992 the PSOE could 
only form a minority government and in 1996 electoral victory for the PP, albeit in a 
minority government formed with CIU in Catalonia and PNV in the Basque Country, 
represented the confirmation of Spain’s transition to a legitimate parliamentary 
democracy with a stable alternation of power.  
The establishment of a two-party bi-polar democracy was made possible 
through a combination of cross-party consensus on the importance of state unity and 
an avoidance of engagement with the ideology, symbols and memories of fascist 
nationalism. At this time, explicit affirmations of allegiance to the nation were 
associated with the regime and delegitimised as an ‘indelible Francoist stigma’ 
(Núñez Seixas 2005: 122, see also Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004, Núñez 
Seixas 2001). Only sub-state nationalist movements in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia made use of the term ‘nationalism’, which referred to their specific sub-
state regional movements rather than a sense of nationwide Spanish identity. Indeed, 
as noted in chapter two, throughout the history of Spain numerous claims to regional 
identity and nationhood can be found, and the country’s history has often been 
shaped according to interpretations of politics and society along the lines of 
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dichotomic myths of ‘Two Spains’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Núñez Seixas 1999, 
Ringrose 1998). One myth heralded the enduring memory of a unified, eternal Spain 
derived from the periods of the Reconquista and monarchic absolutism, promoted 
and preserved by conservative Catholic intellectuals and elites (de la Granja et al 
2001, Nadal Oller 1975). The other, moreover, emphasised a history of convivencia 
or pluralism and cooperation amongst regional, provincial communities, as promoted 
by liberal groups critical of their centralist, absolutist monarchical opponents 
(Ringrose 1998: 4). The Constitution of 1978 epitomised the ambiguity surrounding 
perceptions of Spain, defining it as a sovereign ‘nation of nations’ and an ‘indivisible 
unity’ made up of different peoples, regions and nationalities (Martínez-Herrera and 
Miley 2010). 
Although the end of the regime of General Franco resulted in strict avoidance 
of centralist nationalist discourse, it did not eradicate this nationalist cleavage, 
despite it no longer taking an explicit ‘Two Spains’ form (Hopkin 2005: 6). On the 
left, shared experiences of resistance and exile to the Franco regime were posited as 
foundational myths for the two principal actors, the Socialist Worker’s Party and 
United Left (Núñez Seixas 2005: 125). For these the nineteenth century Republican 
ideal of a free and voluntary union of citizens across linguistic and ethnic 
distinctions continued in the understanding of Spain as a nation of equal citizens, 
with equality between individuals being worth more important than the autonomy of 
certain regions (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 74, Molina 2010: 243). Spain has in this 
way been conceived as a democratic, modern and tolerant nation of nations united by 
a post-transition civic consensus. On the right, moreover, the conservative Popular 
Party was formed from a varied range of Christian Democrats, liberals, populists and 
ex-Francoists (Balfour 2005: 148, Valles and Diaz 2000: 134). Moreover, in the 
1990s the PP also emphasised its democratic and modern credentials, governed by 
consensus and avoided references to the Civil War or nationalism, albeit whilst 
underlining the unity of Spain in the face of regional movements, being reluctant to 
remove Francoist symbols from public spaces and refusing until 2002 to condemn 
the fascist coup d’etat of 1936 (Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta 2006: 400-5, Núñez 
Seixas 2001, 2005: 124). Thus the PP also recognised the value of publicly accepting 
post-transition values.  
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Nevertheless, the 2000s represented a period of change in Spain’s party 
politics. The period has been defined as a crisis for the PSOE who received the 
lowest number of seats since 1979 in the elections of 2000, following corruption 
scandals at the end of the 1990s (Kennedy 2003: 100, 103, Valles and Diaz 2000: 
136). On the other hand, for the PP the election victory and majority parliament of 
2000 resulted in a shift in focus away from the previously dominant trend of 
consensus and moderation, placing ‘valence issues’ such as security, cultural identity 
and ‘the unity of Spain’ in centre stage in an attempt to show them to be strong on 
issues of national importance (Gunther and Montero 2009: 136-9). The politics of 
consensus shifted to a politics of polarisation on questions such as immigration, 
terrorism, regionalism and religion, which became divisive rather than uniting, 
questions of state and were accompanied by an increasing ‘disdain for public 
opinion’ (Blakeley 2006: 332, see also Gunther and Montero 2009, Itcaina 2006, 
Zapata-Barrero 2003). This came during a period of tension in Spain, with violent 
clashes between immigrants and natives. However, punishment by the electorate for 
this period’s shift away from the post-transition value consensus came with a 
surprise victory of the Socialists in 2004 and heralded a return to moderation 
(Blakeley 2006). 
As in Italy, the dominant post-transition cleavage thus provided opportunities 
and limitations for actors. It enabled actors to legitimise themselves as different to 
the Francoist past, but as will be illustrated below also raised the possibility of the 
politicisation of the regime’s continuation in contemporary views and actions. In 
response, a ‘guilty conscience’ pushed all actors to emphasise their modern, 
democratic and tolerant traits in the public sphere. 
 
The national dimension of the politics of immigration in Spain 
 
Political and social responses to immigration in Spain have been interpreted in 
diverse ways. Many have been concerned principally with the ‘switch’ from country 
of emigration in the 1970s to one of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. In this 
sense, Patricia Griñán noted in 1997 that ‘the problem of foreigners [in Spain] is, in 
reality [...] a phenomenon that is uncomfortably perceived and lived by Spaniards as 
an altering of the ‘normal’ situation’ (my translation, Griñán 1997: 179). Much 
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academic work, whilst undertaking the socially important task of underlining cases 
of discrimination, has also tended to generalise and spot racism and xenophobia at 
every turn in Spain’s political and social responses to immigration (see for example 
Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 2008, Pajares 1998, Santamaria 2002). Public 
opinion has also been somewhat confusingly defined as moderate and permissive as 
well as a form of ‘worried tolerance’ (Ayerdi and de Rada 2008). 
However, to claim that migration is a new, abnormal and generally rejected 
phenomenon is to oversimplify the reality. Historical emigration flows meant that in 
the 1950s Spaniards could be found in intercontinental networks to the Americas, 
and during the 1960s and 1970s 11.5% of the labour force emigrated, primarily to 
join the guest worker populations of northern Europe (Barquero and Hebbert 1985: 
287). At the same time, there have been historical immigration flows which have not 
solicited major political responses, illustrated by the fact that policy measures were 
deemed unnecessary until 1985, and even then went unreformed until 2000. In this 
context, Catalonia provided an anomaly from the rest of Spain as intellectuals and 
elites at different moments throughout the twentieth century considered the presence 
of immigrants and their cultural assimilation as a concern, but also potentially a 
positive contribution to the Catalan national project (for examples see Cardás i Ros 
2007, Pujol 1976, Vandellós 1935).  
Despite this, the general trend has been a lack of concern for the implications 
of immigration in Spain’s national politics. During the 1990s, politicians interpreted 
immigration as a potentially divisive issue, particularly when tied to questions of 
nationhood, identity and ethnicity, and so viewed it as ground for cooperation rather 
than conflict across party lines (Kleiner-Liebau 2009). Parties of the left and right 
aspired to minimise potentially controversial responses to immigration, such as the 
expulsion of 103 undocumented migrants in 1996 (Rojo and van Dijk 1997). The 
immigration debate in Spain prior to the end of the 1990s was thus described as a 
technical political issue that was kept off the mainstream agenda (Zapata-Barrero 
2003).  
The turning point came during the period of 1999 to 2001, when immigration 
became a significant political and social issue (González-Enriquez 2009, Zapata-
Barrero 2003). In 1999, residents of the municipality of Terrassa protested against 
the Moroccan presence there, and between 2000 and 2001 there was the rejection of 
131 
 
a mosque in Premià de Mar, both in Catalonia (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés 
Mascareñas 2011: 21). Tensions also surfaced at El Ejido in Almería, where a high 
profile violent revolt in 2000 saw the burning of immigrant houses in reaction to the 
murder of a Spaniard by a Moroccan citizen. El Ejido hit national headlines in 
dramatic fashion and forced politicians to ‘discover’ the immigration issue and 
present resolutions (Zapata-Barrero 2003). At the same time, as noted above, the 
government of the PP underwent a swing to the right and revived cleavages in 
Spanish society that had traditionally been played down (Gunther and Montero 2009: 
139). The politics of consensus on immigration were thus changed to a politics of 
polarisation: immigration became a divisive, rather than uniting, question of state, 
giving the impression that it was per se a conflictive topic (Retis 2009). At this time 
there was also increased political debate and activity regarding the reform of the 
immigration law, firstly in January 2000 and then, after the electoral victory of the 
PP and the establishment of a majority parliament, in December of the same year. 
  
 















Public opinion towards immigration since 2000 has developed in tandem 
with this increasing political salience. From the early 2000s until the outbreak of the 
economic crisis and rising unemployment in 2007, immigration was consistently 
ranked among the three greatest concerns for the Spanish population in 
Eurobarometer surveys (see figure 8). Yet the content of these concerns has been 
ambiguous. For example, González Enríquez has analysed data from the regular 
series of Barómetro opinion surveys from the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) and found that national attitudes to immigration actually 
underwent a shift from largely negative to positive perceptions between 1990 and 
2004, but that this was accompanied by an increasing tendency to associate 
immigration and crime and the fact that by 2003 half of the Spanish population 
thought there were too many immigrants in the country (2004). Greater clarity is 
offered by Zapata-Barrero’s study of the same data, which notes that social attitudes 
are dependent on interpretations of immigration more than on the facts of migrant 
numbers (2009). Peaks in negative public opinion towards immigration are thus 
linked to periods of politicisation, such as that during the period of 1999 to 2001 in 
which the Law of Foreigners was reformed twice, rather than being caused simply by 
an increasing presence of immigrants. In this way ‘negative attitudes are orientated 
towards policies and the government’s actions rather than towards immigrants’ 
(Ibid.: 1107). 
When Spain’s political parties have discussed immigration there have been 
limited differences in approach, with a more recent move to consensus. Since 2000, 
the PP’s electoral manifestos have dedicated increasing space to the issue, and in 
2000 and 2004 they sought to balance calls for Spain to be ‘an open society’ with 
equality of rights and obligations for all, on the one hand, and an expectation of 
immigrants to ‘integrate’ through assimilation to Spain’s traditions and culture, on 
the other (Partido Popular 2000: 152, 2004: 202-3). Proposals for points systems and 
integration contracts along these lines were also presented by CIU in Catalonia in 
2006 and by the PP in 2008 (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 2008: 12-13). As 
illustrated by these examples, immigration has been approached by the conservative 
centre-right as an issue of rights and equality combined with an expectation of 
cultural assimilation (Gest 2010, Zapata-Barrero 2007). In contrast, the Socialists’ 
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manifestos from these years have viewed integration of the immigrant population as 
the sharing of rights and duties guaranteed by state institutions, rather than a one-
directional process of assimilation. For PSOE, in 2000 and 2004 immigration 
constituted one element of a wider pattern of social exclusion of workers, pensioners 
and other groups of people (PSOE 2000: 73, 2004: 124-5). This provided an 
understanding of immigration as a problem of class and labour market exclusion to 
be resolved through granting and protecting their rights and promoting tolerance.  
However, by 2008 such a difference across parties was no longer present, due 
to adaptations from both. In the PP’s manifesto for the elections in 2008, the chapter 
on immigration emphasised the preference of legal over illegal immigration and 
pledged to establish ‘an integration model’ based on ‘our principles and 
constitutional values’ (PP 2008: 20). In the PSOE manifesto of the same year there 
was a similar stance against illegal immigration and a push for integration ‘starting 
from the recognition of our constitutional values and our rights and obligations, as 
well as those that correspond to immigrants’ (PSOE 2008: 13-4). This highlights a 
return to consensus on immigration across the two dominant parties. It has similarly 
been suggested by others such as the Secretary of State for Immigration and 
Emigration that there has been a certain shared approach to the issue as political 
actors have strived to keep immigration off the agenda (Zapata-Barrero et al 2008: 
7). Such a perspective has been noted in a previous analysis of parliamentary debates 
on immigration in Spain which suggested that there existed a similar understanding 
of ‘cultural difference’ between the PSOE and the PP in reference to immigration 
(Olmos Alcaraz 2007: 118-9). In fact, when tensions have subsequently arisen in 
political discourse these have come primarily from local municipal wings of national 
parties or fringe regional parties and have not translated into widely voiced opinions, 
as noted in the town of Badalona, near Barcelona (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés 
Mascareñas 2011). 
This consensus has been formed of three key elements. Firstly, there has been 
an alignment with the perspective of Spain’s economic interests. The Spanish 
business sector has consistently emphasised a need to open the country to legal 
immigration and introducing greater control on undocumented flows. In 2001 a 
representative body of the Spanish business elite, the Circulo de Empresarios, 
claimed that immigration provided important solutions to the country’s problems of 
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little demographic growth and an aging population that should be taken advantage of 
through a combination of open national borders to trade and migration flows and 
controlled regulation of hiring from the country of origin (Círculo de Empresarios 
2001). In 2007, these business leaders repeated that immigration constituted a 
needed source of wellbeing and balance to cover the scarcity of ‘manual labour, 
human capital and talent’ in Spain (Circulo de Empresarios 2006, see also ABC, 
Inmigración, control y cualificación, 18
th
 April 2007). The Spanish business press 
also argued in 2007 that immigration had ‘allowed the lifespan of our growth model 
to expand’ and that ‘Spain needs migrants to continue growing and to confront the 
demanding challenges that arise in increasingly competitive global markets’ 
(Expansión, Inmigración y política, 10
th
 February 2007). As these references clearly 
show, the Spanish business sector has demanded a stable provision of foreign labour, 
to be regulated through an immigration policy built on the three factors of openness, 
control and integration. As outlined above, the PP has repeatedly called for almost 
exactly these measures since the year 2000, and the PSOE has adopted them in its 
2008 manifesto. 
Secondly there has also been an alignment with the interests of labour 
representatives. The trade union Worker’s Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, 
CCOO) was the first of these to show an interest in immigration and immigrant 
workers, in Catalonia in 1986, according to the vision that ‘the Catalan working class 
is a diverse working class’ (Interview 01/12/2011). Since then, CCOO has argued 
that immigration should be regulated to ensure the rights of foreign workers within 
the Spanish working class, whilst promoting intercultural programmes against 
xenophobia and discrimination in the work place. Since 2000, the General Worker’s 
Union (Union General de Trabajadores, UGT) has also run a permanent campaign 
against racism and xenophobia called vive y convive (‘live and live together’) whilst 
calling for a reduction in the underground economy in order to strengthen the 
employment conditions of immigrants, exemplified in 2005 by the General 
Secretary’s declaration that ‘just immigration policies’ should ‘contribute to the 
respect of workers’ rights, the promotion of decent work and the wider objective of 
an equitable distribution of wealth’ (UGT 2005). In this way, the cross-party 
consensus on the need to emphasis regulate migration flows and reduce 
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undocumented immigration can be interpreted as a combination of the interests and 
concerns of representative of Spanish business and labour. 
These two elements fit Freeman’s model of client politics in which decisions 
are made according to the costs and benefits affecting concentrated interest groups, 
in this case business and labour, who keep immigration largely off the public agenda 
(1995). Nevertheless, there is also a third factor of consensus that has been most 
visible in the parliamentary debates and determines how responses to immigration 
have been shaped in Spain. This is a cross-party alignment on the values of post-
transition Spanish society and politics, as outlined above. The post-transition 
cleavage consists of an emphasis of rights in a democratic and tolerant Spain, in 
contrast to the Francoist period of the past. In the analysis that follows in this and the 
following chapter, it will be illustrated how in a context of general consensus, it is 
this post-transition cleavage that has provided the principal point of contention and 
shaped the framing processes employed by political actors debating Romanian 
immigration. 
 
The national dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Spain 
 
In Spain, the Romanian immigrant population has arrived in a very short space of 
time and showed rapid signs of demographic growth, as illustrated in the previous 
chapter. Yet as noted above, this has occurred in a political context in which 
immigration has usually been taken off the agenda, with the principal national parties 
emphasising a combination of a rights-based discourse of inclusion and an 
assimilationist expectation of adherence to Spain’s constitutional and legal norms 
and values. Public opinion has been concerned about immigration, but in an 
ambivalent way, viewing the expansion of social rights positively but the arrival of 
more foreigners as concerning. These views follow the politicisation of immigration 
by the political parties at the time. 
This section will outline and explain the response to Romanian immigration 
in this context, in particular the construction of the Romanian population as an 
immigrant group by the main national political parties. Academic studies of 
Romanians in Spain have presented generalised observations that ‘[in Spain] the 
worst images of Romania have been projected: criminals specialised in stealing, 
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hold-ups, falsification of documents, begging and prostitution’ (González Aldea 
2007: 132). The reference paints an image of a Spanish society that sees Romanian 
immigrants as bringers of problems, social tensions and criminal activities. Yet this 
is simply an anecdotal piece of evidence and, as this section will illustrate, it does 
not accurately reflect the way that the Romanian population is represented in 
national political debate. 
As with the case of Italian politics, there has been an increase in the presence 
of Romanian immigration in Spanish political debate (see figure 9). However, it is 
clear that in Spain there has been considerably less debate on Romanians in than in 
Italy, despite the similar population sizes and patterns of integration in these 
countries. Indeed, until the PP government of 1996-2000, Romanian immigration 
had not been registered at all in Spanish parliamentary debates. This follows a 
pattern noted in public opinion surveys: throughout the 1990s the majority of 
Spaniards considered ‘immigrant’ to be synonymous with individuals from Morocco 
and North Africa, Romanians did not occur as a category at all and only one to two 
percent of interviewees thought of the broader category of ‘Eastern Europeans’ when 
they spoke of immigrants (data from CIS Barómetro Surveys, 1993-2000). 
Romanian immigration did not, therefore, elicit significant responses in political 




Mandate Total Frames Frames per year 
1989-1993 0 0 
1993-1996 0 0 
1996-2000 32 8 
2000-2004 6 1.5 
2004-2008 14 6.5 
 





Furthermore, the difference with the Italian case was not only quantitative. In 
Spain, the most common frame used in debates on Romanian nationals presents them 
as victims, against the dominant threat frame in Italy. Spanish politicians have not 
engaged at all in discussion of the specific content of Romanian identity or character 
and the general trend in debate has been to minimise the significance of issues 
referring to Romanian immigrants and keep them off the agenda. In this process, 
instead of referring to the immigrants themselves, the victim frame has been 
employed as a way of underlining the speaker’s commitment to rights, democracy 
and an understanding of Spain as a modern, tolerant country. These are the values 
that all actors must agree on in order to position themselves on the right side of the 
post-transition cleavage outlined above. 
During the PP mandate from 1996 to 2000, questions to the government from 
the opposition parties of Nueva Izquierda (NI, an offshoot of IU that had joined a 
parliamentary mixed group), IU and PSOE were principally in reference to the 
clearing of a settlement of Romanian nationals in Malmea, on the outskirts of Madrid 
in 1999. The camp was considered to be inhabited by families of Roma ethnicity.  
The PP government at this time employed generalised categorisations of 
Romanian immigrants as Eastern European gypsies or nomadic people. They also 
described them as poor and disadvantaged and showed concern for their living 
conditions and health in the camp. Defining the problem to resolve as the poverty of 
the residents, due to their ‘singular’ cultural characteristics, the clearing of the camp 
was presented as a charitable resolution to modernise and improve their standards of 
living: 
 
‘the administration should [...] be capable of minimising the situations of 
necessity that certain layers of our social structure suffer and that affect 
groups that try to find an opportunity to live with dignity in our country [...] 
as long as the characteristics of these specific groups are favourable and they 
are willing to integrate’ 




Integration was presented as a process developing in one-direction as the immigrants 
should ‘be willing’ to adapt to the host society, although at the same time the 
situation of the camp was associated with broader structures of necessity and 
inequality that should have been improved. By justifying the destruction of the camp 
in these terms, the PP’s minority government could have aspired to build consensus 
with coalition partners regarding the need for an improvement for the camp 
residents, as well as reducing disagreement with the opposition and thus taking the 
issue off the agenda. 
A similar victim frame was presented throughout this period by the parties on 
the left. Again, the problem was presented as the disadvantaged situation of 
Romanian nationals, but the cause was instead the actions of the Spanish 
government, with the PSOE representative asking whether ‘the minimum conditions 
of respect for the human dignity of these people was taken into account by the 
Government’. Other comments were more explicit: 
 
‘they [the Spanish police] threw the people out of their houses, out from 
where they lived [... which] has nothing to do with personal dignity, because 
the least dignified treatment there is, is to say to people that they have to 
leave their houses and find another life’ 
López Garrido, NI, 21/07/1999 
 
Yet, despite this frame being similar to that of the PP, due to being based on a victim 
status of Romanian nationals, the logic with which it was used by the parties of the 
left was quite different. Firstly, these parties directly criticised the incumbent PP 
government, blaming it for limiting the possibility of the camp population to lead a 
life with a minimum level of human dignity. This relation of the PP to social 
exclusion presented the camp residents as victims of the incumbent government. 
Secondly, by stating that the incumbent government had denied citizens their rights 
and employed force to remove them, these parties aligned their argument with the 
wider post-transition cleavage by associating the PP with undemocratic practices. 
This is evidenced, for example, by the likening of the denial of the camp residents’ 
basic rights to an episode of ethnic cleansing by members of NI and PNV and the use 
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of the image of innocent individuals disappearing in the night to hark back vividly to 
fascist state repression: 
 
‘somebody who was there before, now is not, there are people who have gone 
and nobody knows where they are’ 
López Garrido, NI, 21/07/1999 
 
The frame alignment choice of the PP towards the ideas and beliefs of the left was 
clearly not reciprocated: instead, the parties of the left employed the symbolic capital 
of fascist acts to mark a boundary between themselves and the incumbent. 
The same dynamic was found during the following legislature from 2000 to 
2004. As noted above, this was a period of polarisation of the politics of immigration 
between left and right and a lack of consensus. The central debate during this 
legislature came in response to the burning of a Romanian Evangelical Christian 
church in the town of Arganda del Rey, on the outskirts of Madrid, and it was 
suggested that the attack was carried out by members of neo-fascist youth groups. 
Again, the Romanian immigrant population was framed as a victim by all parties.  
On the one hand, the members of the PP argued that although immigration 
constituted a topic that could create ‘problems’ for society, the Romanian immigrant 
population in question was one that was well integrated and that there was no issue 
in Arganda del Rey: 
 
‘I have it on good authority that the mayor of Arganda has on different 
occasions expressed the positive relations that exist between the Romanian 
population and the rest of the population’ 
Secretary of State for Security, Morenés Eulate, PP, 13/06/2002 
 
‘In Arganda del Rey, where around 7,500 Romanian citizens live, there exists 
a magnificent atmosphere of social relations between the natives of Arganda 
del Rey and these Romanian citizens’ 




In their contributions these speakers’ classification of Romanian immigration in such 
positive terms distinguished them from other immigrants that were viewed as 
problematic, as well as dividing between the PP, who claimed there was no problem 
to discuss, and the opposition.  
On the other hand, the left argued that the living conditions of Romanian 
immigrants were again impaired by the actions, or lack thereof, of the PP 
government. The event was a strategic dividing issue. Ruiz López of IU complained 
that ‘there are no protective measures for the colony of Romanian immigrants [in 
Arganda del Rey], [... who are] threatened weekly’, a situation compounded by the 
political positioning of the PP, which aspired ‘to escape from their responsibilities by 
blaming immigrants for security problems or for the informal economy’ (Ruiz 
López, IU, 13/06/2002). The PSOE similarly suggested that the cause of social 
tensions was not the Romanian population itself but a government discourse in 
which ‘immigration is the same as delinquency’ (Mayoral Cortes, PSOE, 
13/06/2002).  
These criticisms were again aligned with the post-transition cleavage, 
epitomised by the statement that, by not sending a clear message to the public, the 
government risked provoking a widespread kristallnacht: 
 
‘it gives the impression that a type of kristallnacht is being diffusely 
generalised, a ‘night of the crystals’ but generalised, in such a way that what 
was just one episode in one specific country of sad memories, it seems like it 
could continuously arise’ 
Mayoral Cortes, PSOE, 13/06/2002 
 
The symbolic linking of the PP to Nazi fascism through this terminology is clear. In 
this sense, rather than competition over the meaning of Romanian immigration, the 
parties on the left both used a victim frame as a way of dividing between themselves 
and the PP on opposite sides the post-transition cleavage, associating the latter with 
xenophobic and fascist acts in Spanish society. 
Distinct logics therefore lay behind the framing of Romanian immigrants as 
victims in this case. For the parties of the left the victim status of the Romanian 
immigrants divided between themselves and the PP incumbent. Thus, whilst there 
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may have been cross-party agreement on the victim status of Romanians as a socially 
excluded population, the wider structural values and beliefs of Spain as a modern, 
democratic country shaped the strategies of left wing actors. But with a majority 
government, the PP no longer required the support of other members of the 
parliament and by minimising the significance of tensions these speakers claimed to 
have a good record in terms of migrant integration, vindicating their policies and 
aligning with the press and local public opinion whilst separating themselves from 
the accusations. Indeed, their arguments precisely reflected press reporting from the 
week after the burning of the church, in which the Socialist mayor of Arganda was 
quoted as saying that it was ‘a tolerant city, not a racist one’ in which there was no 
problem of xenophobia (El Pais, Un grupo neonazi actua desde hace meses en 
Arganda,s egun el alcalde, 7
th
 May 2002, ABC, Arde en Arganda una iglesia 
evangelica de rumanos que habia recibido amenazas xenofobas, 6
th
 May 2002) and 
local residents declared that they had ‘never heard any type of comment against the 
Romanians’ (El Pais, Un municipio donde residen muchos rumanos con profesiones 
cualificadas, 7
th
 Mayo 2002).  
The final period of 2004-2008 saw a return to government for the PSOE. 
Questions referring to Romanian nationals in Spain raised the issue of international 
organised crime networks and the accession of this country to the EU. As noted 
above, electoral manifestos at this time reflected convergence between party 
perspectives on immigration. There was little debate and both the PP and the PSOE 
made a clear distinction between legal and illegal (between law-abiding or criminal) 
Romanian immigrants. However, despite attempting to limit social tensions when in 
power the PP adopted a threat frame of Romanian nationals portrayed as belonging 
to organised crime groups or as individuals without legal status in Spain. In this way, 
in 2005 members of the PP asked what police measures were going to be put in place 
to stop ‘the new mafias’ coming from Romania, complained about ‘the government’s 
incapacity to combat organised crime and human trafficking [from Romania]’ and 
made reference to the ‘invasion’ of Zaragoza by Romanian nationals. These were, 
however, the only comments from the PP and the response of the PSOE government 
to these questions was to minimise the specificity of the Romanian population. By 
speaking of ‘investigating and combating the networks and organised groups that 
profit from the illegal immigration of Romanian citizens’ [my italics], Romanians 
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were defined as immigrants who came into contact with criminal networks out of 
necessity. Organised crime was viewed as a structural problem not to be associated 
with individuals or a certain social group. As noted above, there was also consensus 
between the PSOE and the PP on the boundary between legal and illegal 
immigration and on the need to reduce the latter. Indeed, in the first year of the 
PSOE’s return to government a record of 59,386 Romanian nationals were deported, 
falling to 37,241 in 2005 and 42,292 in 2006 but remaining higher than the previous 
years (see figure 10). The only difference was to not signal Romanian immigrants as 




Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 1,607 20,089 32,433 59,386 37,241 42,292 
 
Figure 10. Romanian deportations from Spain (Data from Ministerio del Interior de Espana, 




Finally, IU stood out since 2004 by emphasising positive links between 
Romania and Spain. Romanians were defined as European citizens, as part of ‘the 
European family’. This was interpreted through a continuation of the same rights 
frame seen previously: the Spanish government’s two-year delay on the granting of 
full access to the labour market was an act of discrimination and the nationals of 
Romania, Bulgaria and future new-EU Member States ‘should not have to exhibit 
their new Europeanism in conditions of inferiority as second-class citizens’. As in 
the Italian case, the new European identity of Romania was presented within an 
already existing interpretive framework, this time through a rights-based discourse. 
In summary, in Spain Romanian immigration has largely been kept off the 
national political agenda despite the increasing size of this population. Romanians 
have occasionally been referred to specifically, but there has not been the same 
reporting of criminal activity seen in Italy. However, neither have they been 
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accurately represented or granted a voice in political debate. Consensus around the 
values underpinning post-transition Spanish values and expectations has ensured a 
different tone to frames of Romanian immigrants and stable catch-all parties on left 
and right have minimised the need for a balancing of opinions with volatile coalition 
partners, concentrating power within their internal structures. Two powerful catch-all 
parties and a stable post-transition cleavage in Spain have therefore contributed to 
emphasising the victim status of Romanians, while division referred to the state’s 
actions rather than the immigrants themselves. This has encouraged moderation as 
all actors have distinguished themselves from elements of fascism either by 
emphasising the importance of rights and freedom or by minimising the importance 
of the issue being discussed. 
However, this minimising of debate on Romanian immigration has occurred 
despite the fact that public perceptions have increasingly signalled Romanian 
immigrants as a specific population with negative characteristics. Quantitative and 
qualitative studies have found that many residents in Spain increasingly associate 
Romanians with crime and insecurity, providing evidence from rumours they had 
heard and events they had seen in the street (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 
2008: 91). Indeed, Romanians were classified in 2008 and 2009 as the most 
‘frightening and untrustworthy’ migrant population (31% of respondents), 
considerably more so than ‘Muslims’ (19%) and ‘gangs’ (8%) (Ibid.). They were 
thought of as the most likely to form ghettos (19% of respondents), and the second 
most segregated group due to differences of culture and traditions, behind Muslims 
(Ibid. :105, see also figure 11). It can therefore be assumed that the political parties 
in Spain position themselves in relation to each other, rather than public opinion. 
This illustrates the effectiveness of strong, stable and moderate catch-all parties 
concerned with reflecting the norms and values of post-transition Spain in keeping 







Figure 11. Spanish data for which immigrant groups interviewees feel least kindness (menos 





The dynamics of political responses to Romanian immigration in Spain can 
be summarised under the following two factors: 
Firstly, a pattern has emerged where stable, opposing catch-all parties on 
right and left have been situated in an institutional arrangement favouring 
ideologically moderate, majority governments. The absence of the fragmented, 
dissenting parties found in Italy has further contributed to this stability. So, in this 
political context the coalition-building required by Italy’s coalition parties was less 
important in Spain because consensus is internally determined within parties, which 






































logic of action of PP was therefore to limit disagreement through a moderate framing 
of immigration and convergence between left and right which would effectively take 
the issue off the agenda. 
Secondly, in the democratic era a post-transition cleavage has provided the 
backdrop to cross-party consensus on the importance of rights and democracy. This 
has meant that the PP and the PSOE have usually searched for the centre ground on 
potentially divisive questions of identity, religion and immigration. Indeed, 
particularly on immigration there has been convergence between the parties that 
emphasise the importance of social inclusion and rights whilst distinguishing 
between legal and illegal immigration. Similarly, there has been convergence on the 
victim frame for Romanian immigrants, although the actor strategies have followed 
different logics in relation to this. On the one hand, the parties of the left have 
emphasised the actions of the PP as being against the post-transition values and thus 
associating them with the past regime, at times with explicitly clear rhetoric and 
metaphors providing the relevant symbolic capital. On the other hand, the PP itself 
emphasised its post-transition values which aligning with actors from beyond the 
parliament, such as the press and town mayors, emphasising their aim of social 
inclusion and protecting immigrants’ equality of rights through consensus with them 
rather than the opposition in the parliament. In neither case did Romanian 
immigration constitute a policy issue itself, as debates instead constituted a 





This chapter set itself the task of analysing responses to Romanian immigration in 
the national politics of Italy and Spain. In particular, it has been concerned with how 
Romanians, Italians and Spaniards have been categorised in national political debate, 
by whom and why some categorisations have dominated over others. An analysis of 
parliamentary debates in these two countries combined with empirical material from 
press reporting, electoral manifestos, public opinion surveys and secondary literature 
has provided an opportunity to outline how actor choices in debates on Romanian 
146 
 
immigration have been tied to their structural situation and motivated by achieving 
consensus with or differentiation from relevant actors around them. 
In both Italy and Spain, a relatively reduced group of actors has had a role in 
the debates on Romanian immigration and in neither country was there any reference 
made to representatives of Romanian organisations. In Italy, there was mention of 
the Italian charities of Sant’Egidio and Caritas in only two parliamentary debates, 
and only one mention of a charity supporting Roma populations, whilst in Spain 
there was only one mention of Caritas and the Red Cross. No Romanian 
representatives, associations or politicians were referenced either. Italian and 
Spanish politicians have also not engaged in discussion of Romanian national 
identities or character, but rather criticised or defended them in vague, generalised 
terms. Indeed, the representation of Romanians that occurs in the debates tells more 
about the actors in discussion and the contexts in which they are based than the 
Romanian population itself. 
The implication of this has been to give distinct meanings to being Romanian 
in these countries. In Italy a threat frame has dominated as part of a public order 
approach established principally by the parties of the right. In a fragmented political 
context, these parties have built greater ties between each other than on the left, in 
particular around consensus on the threat posed by immigration. Romanians have 
been presented as ‘outsiders’ due to posing a security threat, a danger to women and 
children, or as having reified cultural differences which render their coexistence and 
integration in Italy difficult (or impossible). In the absence of stable cleavages and 
anchors for the discussion of issues within wider frameworks of meanings, the 
Italian political parties have been particularly concerned with the perceptions of the 
electorate and negative views towards immigrants. In Spain, moreover, the restricted 
range of actors, as well as their value consensus and policy convergence on 
immigration produced an equal division of power. This meant that dissenting voices 
were not able to be presented or mobilise an argument in contrast to the dominant 
tolerant consensus. Romanians have consequently been defined as victims and as 
‘insiders’ by all parties, with the PP aligning their problems with wider questions of 
social inclusion and emphasising their otherwise magnificent integration, whilst the 
PSOE and IU associated their problems with the broader perception of continued 
fascism in contemporary Spain, in criticism of the PP. The stable, moderate party 
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system in Spain ensured that these parties could in this way position themselves in 
relation to each other and a stable post-transition cleavage rather than the electorate. 
In this sense, debates on Romanian immigration tell us more about the 
values, strategies and power differentials of Italian and Spanish political elites than 
about the Romanian populations in these countries. The structure of party politics 
has not only influenced who has had a voice in debates, but shaped how actors have 
formulated their strategies. At the same time, actors in both countries have 
positioned themselves in different ways according to the presence or absence of 
stable cleavages and a wider value consensus. The negotiation of who is who has, in 
this way, been tied to the decisions and choices of actors who have been situated in 
quite different structural contexts in Italy and Spain. The following chapter will 
broaden the range of voices engaged in this classification of Romanian immigration 












The previous chapters have examined responses to Romanian immigration in the 
national laws, policies and political debates of Italy and Spain. They have shown 
how these responses do not expose ‘real’ cultural practices and characteristics but 
rather reflect a balance of power in the negotiation what it means to be a Romanian 
immigrant in these countries. This chapter takes the analysis further by examining 
the dynamics in the local dimension of politics in the two main cities of Romanian 
immigration in these countries, namely Rome and Madrid.  
As will be illustrated below, in these cities there is a wider range of actors 
and interests than that found in the previous chapter, including the mobilisation of 
individuals and organisations claiming to represent a Romanian voice. In the local 
dimensions there is therefore an opportunity for the categorisation of Romanian 
immigration to be dialectically negotiated through processes of identification of the 
immigrants themselves. However, this expression of an immigrant voice does not 
necessarily result in a shift the empowerment of Romanians to control how their 
presence is defined in public debate. Furthermore, neither does it reflect a unified 
expression of identity by all Romanian immigrants in the cities studied, but rather a 
series of claims from specific actors who have been able to mobilise in public. View 
this way, the Romanian voice in Rome and Madrid is constructed only by a minority 
of Romanian populations which are in reality fragmented and divided. In this way, 
this chapter illustrates how a common national origin does not necessarily result in 
the construction of a community united through shared opinions, political 
preferences, cultural practices or social networks. This chapter will illustrate how 
specific social and political actors make a claim to being legitimate representatives 
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of the Romanian population, the success of which depends on their ability to respond 
to the different structural contexts of the cities studied. 
The empirical material for this analysis comes from a range of varied 
sources. Data on political participation in local elections was available in both Rome 
and Madrid, as well as material for a qualitative framing analysis from archives of 
local editions of daily newspapers, local administration policy and press 
announcements, websites and announcements from local branches of political parties 
and Romanian cultural associations and political parties, observations of public 
events, conferences and seminars, and interview material with key stakeholders in 
both cities from local political parties and Romanian associations. The Romanian 
associations could be found on a register available through the Romanian Embassy 
in both Italy and Spain, and further information could be obtained through a 
‘snowballing’ technique of passing through contacts with representatives. This range 
of data has been employed to provide an awareness of the plural and multi-faceted 
negotiations of the meaning of being Romanian in Rome and Madrid. 
The chapter is structured in three main sections. The first defines and 
highlights the importance for this study of the local dimension through a brief review 
of the contemporary literature. The two subsequent sections address the case studies 
of Rome and Madrid, respectively. The presentation of each case study is shaped 
around an outline of local immigration policies in the studied country and city, 
concentrating on the evolution over time of actor relations, distributions of resources 
and institutional and discursive structures that have underpinned them, followed by 
an examination of the Romanian population in these settings. Finally, an analysis of 
how local actors have adapted to this structural context and influenced the politics of 
Romanian immigration will be presented in each specific context. Some conclusions 
follow at the end. 
 
 
The local dimension of politics 
 
It has often been claimed that the state is no longer the sole decision maker in 
national politics and that local and regional contexts are increasingly significant 
decision making arenas (for example, Alexander 2003, 2007, Bauböck 2010, Borkert 
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and Caponio 2010, Davis 2009, Keating 1998, 2009, Marks et al 1996, Sassen 1996, 
2005, 2009, Uitermark et al 2012). This section will outline how the local dimension 
of political and social relations matter and merit being studied. 
Firstly, regional and local administrations have had an increasingly 
significant role to play in structures of governance. On the one hand, regional 
administrations in EU Member States have had access to funds, decision making 
powers and policy competences in the development of a system of multi-level 
governance (Marks et al 1996). In this way, regional administrations from EU 
Member States have set up numerous regional offices and interregional associations 
in Brussels (Ibid.: 358-9), the partnership principle of European regional policy has 
given regions a say in the spending of EU structural funds that has questioned their 
hierarchical relationship to states (Thielemann 2002: 48), and the principal of 
subsidiarity in EU Treaties has promoted the centrifugal allocation of competences 
according to the rule that any decisions must be made as close as possible to those 
most likely to feel their impacts (Vignali 2009). On the other hand, cities have also 
recently received great interest amidst calls for new forms of local urban governance 
(Amin and Thrift 2002, Sassen 1994, 2005, 2009, Tops and Hartman 2009). This can 
be seen in part as recognition of the importance of patterns of implementation in the 
policy process (Tops and Hartman 2009: 191, see also Borkert and Caponio 2010, 
Triandafyllidou 2003). However, what is also significant, as noted by Saskia Sassen, 
is the changing nature of the city itself which is argued to have become ‘the space 
where the great social crises develop’, where social, political and economic 
equalities are largest, democratic representation is insufficient and invisible borders 
increasingly divide residents (La Nación, La ciudad es hoy un espacio de combate 
abierto, 17 August 2012, see also Duyvendak et al 2009). For Sassen, local urban 
responses to these crises constitute part of a wider transformation of the state and 
weakening of the national as a spatial unit in the current phase of globalisation 
(Sassen 2005, 2009). In this way, the local dimension is important due to wider 
structural developments in politics and the economy. 
Secondly, social movements, interest groups and identity-based political 
formations have been able to mobilise politically in local and regional settings by 
capitalising on the opportunities available for vertical and horizontal connections 




‘in a world marked by the rise of mass self-communication, social 
movements and insurgent politics have the chance to enter the public space 
from multiple sources. By using both horizontal communication networks 
and mainstream media to convey their images and messages, they increase 
their chances of enacting social and political change – even if they start from 
a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources or symbolic 
legitimacy’ (italics in original, 2009: 302) 
 
In this way sub-state nationalist movements in places such as Scotland and Catalonia 
have made regional claims to autonomy within a wider ‘Europe of the Regions’ 
whilst questioning the perceived unity of the nation state (Guibernau 2004, 2007; 
Keating 1998, 2009). In doing so, they have proposed that regional identities 
constitute the basis for control of social policies, welfare and administrative 
competencies (Hepburn 2009, 2011). This is a process which has seen a 
diversification of local and transnational sites and forms of contentious politics and 
claims to identity. In cities it has too been noted how specific vernaculars and 
vocabularies can emerge in response to the urban challenges that play out in them 
(Uitermark et al 2005, Uitermark and Gielen 2010). Indeed, cities are where a dense 
population concentration facilitates the development of formal and informal social 
networks and shared local experiences and grievances can enable common identities 
to be formed; they are where social and symbolic capital are concentrated (Uitermark 
et al 2005, Uitermark et al 2012). Thus the local dimension is also significant as the 
site where the political and social actors can exercise agency through the 
mobilisation of social and symbolic capital. 
Immigration studies research has mirrored these interests, with expanding 
literatures being produced on structures of local governance and the way that these 
promote or restrict integration and political participation (for example, Ambrosini 
2012, Borkert and Caponio 2010, Caponio 2005, Davis 2009, Fauser 2008, Helbling 
2010, Ireland 1994, 2000, Triandafyllidou 2003, Zapata-Barrero 2004), as well as on 
the formation and actions of immigrant associations as political actors and channels 
for integration through forming civic communities (for example, Caselli 2009, 
Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, Jacobs and Tillie 2004, Però and Solomos 2010, 
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Pilati 2012). These developments imply that the social, cultural and political 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of foreigners are increasingly being articulated 
in distinct ways at new territorial and political levels, emphasising the importance of 
the regional and local dimensions of politics in drawing the social boundaries of 
citizenship (Bauböck 2010, Faist 2001, Hepburn 2011, Keating 1998, 2009, Zapata-
Barrero 2004). In this way, Faist (2001) has suggested that social citizenship in the 
EU has not disappeared but become ‘nested’ at distinct administrative levels, whilst 
Bauböck (2010) has argued that citizen rights should no longer be associated with 
only one national community, but rather seen as bundles of rights or ‘citizenship 
constellations’ granted by various political entities. As will be illustrated in the 
following chapter, national and supranational political processes are thus often 
embedded in local settings (Vertovec 2004, 2009). This challenges the assumption 
that immigration and citizenship are purely questions of national identity and state 
sovereignty (see Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Marshall 1992 [1950], Diehl and 
Schnell 2006, Joppke 1998a).  
This chapter will bring these perspectives on the local dimensions of the 
politics of immigration together through two case studies in Italy and Spain, namely 
Rome and Madrid. In line with the literature outlined above and the wider research 
design and theoretical framework of this thesis, it will be concerned with addressing 
the formal and informal institutional rules and discursive structures for immigrant 
integration and political participation and the distribution of resources in the cities 
studied. In this context, it examines the adoption of mobilisation strategies by actors, 
particularly those claiming to stand for the Romanian immigrant population, 
contributing towards an awareness of how the social and political boundaries of 





The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Italy 
 
This section outlines how the local dimension of politics and society (understood as 
sub-state administrations such as regions and cities) has become significant for the 
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politics of immigration in Italy. In doing so, it will illustrate the level of autonomy of 
regional and city administrations, before concentrating specifically on the Italian 
case study of this chapter: Rome. As will be highlighted below, despite variations in 
economic, political and social structures across the cities, regions and provinces of 
the country, national legislation has created channels for immigrant participation. 
However, this has not resulted in widespread participation or created an open 
institutional structure because access to material resources and opportunities to build 
ties with political parties and decision making institutions have been granted first 
and foremost to Italian organisations. The trend across Italy has thus been for local 
opportunity structures for immigrant political participation through institutional 
channels to be largely closed and the availability of the material resources and social 
capital necessary for mobilisation to be low. 
As has already been noted in this thesis, throughout its history Italy has been 
characterised by fragmentation along territorial lines and the perseverance of strong 
local and regional allegiances. Local dynamics have played a significant role. In the 
second half of the twentieth century informal agreements and behind-the-scenes 
decision making gave territorial interests a voice in the distribution of resources even 
when their regions did not have explicit roles in the political process (Amoretti 2002: 
132). 
The principal distinction between localities in Italy has often been 
summarised as following a ‘fundamental’ and ‘indelible’ territorial divide between 
the north and south of the country (King and Mai 2004: 457, see also Daly 2001). 
Although the division is not uncontroversial and the processes and implications of 
the construction of the ‘southern question’ has been the topic of academic research 
and popular culture (see for example Gonzalez 2011, Petraccone 2005), there are 
some general regional differences to be noted in the economic, political and social 
structures that influence local experiences of immigration. Regarding economic 
differences, the centre-north region is generally more prosperous due to an effective 
combination of intensive farming and dynamic, efficient small and medium-sized 
enterprises, whilst the south has typically had a poorer economy based on 
agriculture, low productivity industry, low grade services, and although the informal 
economy is found throughout Italy it has been found to be larger in the south (King 
and Mai 2004: 461-2). This means that undocumented migrants may find 
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employment opportunities in southern contexts but less stability and wealth than in 
northern ones. Institutional responses to immigration have too been broadly 
different, summarised as a general acceptance of immigration as a structural 
phenomenon in many northern towns and cities, which have incorporated migrants’ 
needs within wider frameworks for responding to social exclusion, whilst in the 
south support structures for immigrants have typically come from the third sector, 
are largely uncoordinated and concern reception rather than long-term integration 
(King and Mai 2004: 468). However, higher costs of living and housing have made 
these frameworks for inclusion more important for immigrants in the north than in 
the south (Ibid.). Finally, regional political subcultures have sparked differing 
responses to immigrants, as epitomised by the political rise of the Northern Leagues 
amidst a growing emphasis on the cultural, political and economic unity of the north 
(Agnew 1995, Bull and Milner 1997, Woods 1995). The implication of this, as noted 
in previous chapters, has been a rejection of immigrants in public debate in the north, 
which some claim has been responsible for ruling out cooperation between local 
administrations and migrants’ associations in cities such as Milan (Camozzi 2011: 
474, Caponio 2005: 948).  
However, it has also been suggested that certain common characteristics can 
be found in the local politics of Italian regions and cities which shape the opportunity 
structure for immigrants in them. This principally concerns the tendency to not 
include immigrant political actors in decision making or policy implementation 
processes (Camozzi 2011, Caponio 2005, Caselli 2009). In this way, Caponio has 
noted that in Milan, Bologna and Naples there is little difference in the level of 
inclusion of immigrant associations in city politics, despite the distinct ideological 
backgrounds of their administrations (2005). Instead, Italian pro-immigrant 
organisations such as trade unions and Catholic organisations have been favoured by 
each local administration regardless of their ideological position, leading to the 
conclusion that: 
 
‘the consolidation of immigrants’ associations seems to pass through some 
kind of informal collaboration with Italian organisations … [and] the Italian 
case seems to indicate that public intervention can have an indirect crowding-
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out effect when delegation to traditional welfare organisations prevails’ 
(2005: 948). 
 
The logic of this engagement with traditional Italian organisations rather than 
immigrant associations is one of pragmatism: the Italian organisations are known, 
have significant financial and organisational resources and are already networked 
with political actors, whereas immigrant associations are often small, underfunded 
and have little experience of the political process. Indeed, it has been noted that 
immigrant associations across Italy are largely unstructured and have little influence 
in society and politics (Caselli 2009: 60). In this way an imbalance in resources has 
established autochthonous organisations as institutional gatekeepers to a closed 
opportunity structure in Italian cities. 
This tendency to favour Italian organisations such as trade unions, local 
NGOs and charities of the Catholic Church is also noticeable in regional, provincial 
and local participatory channels for immigrants. Immigrants from non-EU countries 
do not have local or national voting rights in Italy and remain disenfranchised, 
despite a range of proposed reforms on the matter, but Italian policymakers have 
provided consultative forums and channels for representation outside of electoral 
politics (see for example, Associazione Studi Giurdici sull’Immigrazione 2005). 
These forums began in 1986 with the National Consultation for the Problems of non-
EEC Workers and Their Families (Consulta nazionale per i problemi dei lavoratori 
non comunitari e delle loro famiglie) and additional channels were established at the 
provincial level in 1998 with the National Organism for Coordination of Integration 
Policies (Organismo Nazionale di Coordinamento per le Politiche di Integrazione 
Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri a Livello Locale, ONC) and the Territorial 
Immigration Councils (Consigli Territoriali per l’Immigrazione, CTI). The ONCs 
and CTIs have had similar functions, primarily encouraging dialogue between 
regional, provincial and communal levels of government as well as bringing local 
employment officers, health workers, trade unions and employer’s associations 
together with the immigrant associations representing the country’s most numerous 
nationality populations. But there has often been ambiguity concerning the selection 
of immigrant representatives for these initiatives: of the 103 CTIs established by 
2003, 45 still had no immigrant associations on them, 25 had two and only 15 had 
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more than three (Ardovino and Ferraris 2005: 65). Immigrant associations have 
therefore usually been in a minority in participatory processes, putting them at a 
disadvantage in decision making processes that favour the majority (Ardovino and 
Ferraris 2005: 64). They have also been criticised for the uncertainty regarding how 
immigrant associations are selected (when this occurs), for the frequent overlap in 
their consulting and advisory tasks, and for a scarce capacity to influence policy 
making (Attanasio 2005).  
In addition to these developments, since the Martelli law of 1990 (39/1990) 
city councils have also been able to modify their statutes to allow immigrant 
participation by creating the roles of regional consultant and adjunct councillors for 
immigration. By 2005 there were 40 local councils across Italy with adjunct 
councillors and the objective of these has been to give immigrants a greater voice in 
local politics, encourage participation and improve native-immigrant relationships 
(Ardovino and Ferraris 2005: 64). They are directly elected by immigrants and thus 
represent the first direct participatory channels in Italy, although this has been of 
primarily symbolic value because the impact of the consultants and councillors on 
policy making is dubious and levels of participation are not particularly high, as will 
be discussed below in reference to Romanian immigrants (Ibid.: 68-9).  
So, in summary, differences in local responses to immigration and patterns of 
political participation for immigrants are noticeable across Italy. Cities, regions and 
provinces have diverse economic, political and cultural structural settings, which in 
turn influence the stability and social status of immigrants. However, similarities are 
also to be found. The trend across the country has been for local opportunity 
structures for immigrant participation through institutional channels to be largely 
closed. Immigrant representatives are selected, rather than elected, and Italian 
organisations, in particular the charity Caritas, are usually favoured by policy makers 
for informing decisions and contributing to implementation (Caponio 2005, Danese 
2001). These organisations thus act as institutional gatekeepers with greater material 
resources and ties with political parties and institutions than immigrant associations. 
In contrast, the lower levels of financial and social capital provided to immigrant 
actors in this institutional context puts them at a disadvantage in terms of the 
resources and opportunities for mobilisation available to them. Such a pattern 
follows the national dynamic of client politics in local decision making regarding 
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immigration. However, as will be noted below, in Rome this has also been combined 
with what Freeman (1995) defined as majoritarian tendencies, as directly elected 
Mayors have followed a vote-maximising logic of voicing the concerns of the public 
in response to the presence of immigrants.  
 
The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Rome 
 
With the movements towards decentralisation outlined above there has been an 
expansion of the opportunities for political participation in Rome, based in the Lazio 
Region of Italy. Since 1993 the Mayor of the city has been directly elected, with 
elections enjoying a relatively high turnout level (see figure 12). Since 1993 there 
have been left-wing Mayors, with Francesco Rutelli between 1993 and 2001, 
followed by Walter Veltroni from 2001 to 2008, and a right-wing period since 2008 
when the AN candidate Gianni Alemanno won the elections. However, in the Rome 
provincial elections the greatest share of the vote went to the right wing AN in 1998, 
2003 and PdL in 2008, whilst in the Lazio Regional elections of 2005 the centre-left 
dominated. This illustrates a layered structure of parties involved in the government 
of the area of Rome, although the most visible public figure has been the Mayor.  
The Mayors of Rome have been influential in the development of the politics 
of immigration in the city. It has been noted that a ‘non-policy’ approach existed 
regarding immigration prior to 1990, but that this underwent a dramatic switch in 
that year following a crisis in which 2,000 immigrants took over a vacant building 
(Alexander 2007: 55). Known as ‘the Pantanella crisis’ due to the name of the 
building in which they settled, the situation brought a lack of housing and precarious 
living conditions for a large immigrant population into public view, resulting in calls 
for policy change (terWal 1996, see also La Repubblica, Chiude la ‘fabbrica degli 
immigrati’ Pantanella a giorni lo sgombero, 7th November 1990). The Rutelli 
administrations of 1993 to 2001 responded by establishing a Special Office for 
Immigration (Ufficio Speciale per l’Immigrazione) in the Council’s Department of 
Social Services. Despite calls from Rutelli and the subsequent mayor Veltroni to 
develop immigrant integration measures further and the changing quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics of immigration in the city, this has remained in place as the 





Figure 12. Elections for Mayor of Rome Council, 1993-2008 (data from Comune di Roma, total 
turnout not recorded in available data for 1993, http://www.elezioni.comune.roma.it/default.asp, 




However, in reality work on immigration has not been implemented by the 
city Council itself but instead been out-sourced to non-governmental agencies 
according to a strategy of delegation which has characterised much social service 
provision in Italy since the 1980s (Alexander 2007: 70). During the 1990s there were 
few organisations that directly represented immigrants, and these were largely 
unable to meet the formal requirements for funding from the Council (Alexander 
2007: 72). The result was, as noted in other cities across Italy, that government 
money went to autochthonous organisations such as Caritas with the reputation, 
resources and networks to act in this area. NGOs and Catholic organisations for 
social assistance have thus dominated the relationship between city administrations 
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The focus of the Special Office for Immigration can be broadly divided into 
two areas; social assistance and integration. The former refers to immigrants’ access 
to welfare and legal representation, whereas the latter concerns their reception in the 
city, access to housing and insertion in the labour market. In the Lazio region 
specific funding schemes and research programmes have sporadically been carried 
out in reference to healthcare services since 2002 and Italian language courses have 
been promoted.
8
 At the level of the city council in Rome measures have continued to 
be directed at the reception of immigrants and their insertion in the labour market, 
seeing them primarily as disadvantaged workers. The council Immigration Office, 
based within the Department for Promotion of Social and Health Services, is 
responsible for managing twenty two ‘reception centres’ around the city and twenty 
two ‘intercultural centres for children’ as well as holding a register of cultural 
intermediators. A social cooperative called ‘Programma Integra’ has also been 
responsible since 2005 for the ‘formulation and management of integrated courses of 
Italian language, socio-legal orientation, professional qualification and support for 
labour market incorporation’ for the Rome city council.9 The objective of 
Programma Integra has been defined as ‘the promotion of integration in the territory 
of vulnerable people, convinced that support and care can contribute to wellbeing 
and territorial development’. This has been carried out through a range of projects 
that have been individually funded on an ad hoc basis, for example by private 
business or EU grants.
10
  
Both the Immigration Office and Programma Integra have concentrated 
measures for integration on the labour market and the capacity of the immigrants 
themselves to find employment. There are no long-term goals or an overarching 
philosophy of integration, although it has been accompanied by a rhetoric of 
pluralism, encouraging immigrant cultures to be expressed and promoting the 
teaching of Italian history and language (Alexander 2007: 78). Yet at the same time, 
the Rutelli and Veltroni administrations put forward a strongly essentialising 
                                                             
8 This information is available online through the website of the Lazio regional government’s health 
section; available at 
http://www.asplazio.it/asp_online/att_ospedaliera/fen_migratori_new/immigrazione/pubblicazioni.ph
p, accessed 12th December 2012 
9 For more information see the website of the Rome city council, available at 
http://www.comune.roma.it/wps/portal and www.programmaintegra.it, accessed 12th December 2012  
10 For example, see www.programmaretis.it, accessed 12th December 2012  
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understanding of cultural practices and identities, in particular in confrontation with 
Romani and other ethnicity populations (Clough Marinaro 2003, Picker 2011). In 
1994 Rutelli himself defined a ‘nomad emergency’ in Rome and promised to work to 
improve the hygiene and cleanliness of the Romani camps in the city by censusing 
and photographing the Romani population and establishing new camps under 
security observation (Clough Marinaro 2003: 207). This meant that they would be 
able to temporarily settle and practice their ‘nomadic lifestyles’, but would also be 
physically separated from mainstream society, evidencing the tension between 
decision makers’ rhetoric and practice. 
Nevertheless, despite this lack of integration measures, since 2004 
immigrants in Rome have been able to elect Regional Consultants (outlined by 
Deliberazione 191/2003, modified by Deliberazione 172/2006) and Adjunct 
Councillors for immigration, as a way of improving dialogue and interaction 
between immigrants and native citizens, organisations and institutions. The Adjunct 
Councillors have been chosen by secret ballot, with one representative in each 
municipality and the highest candidate from each continent (Africa, Oceania and 
Asia, Europe, Americas. EU nationals are not included) at the level of the Council. 
Yet, for the first elections of 2004, only 10% of the immigrant population was 
registered to vote and only 57% of these turned out on the day (Ardovino 2005:92 
and data from the Council of Rome). The influence of these elected individuals on 
the policy process has also been uncertain and much doubted (Alexander 2007: 72-
8). 
Integration measures and channels for political participation for immigrants 
in Rome should therefore be viewed as part of a closed opportunity structure in terms 
of funding and access to political institutions. Concern for socially excluded 
immigrants in the 1990s has resulted in the establishment of institutions that are 
channels for passing funding and influence to dominant gatekeeper social assistance 
NGOs and charities, such as through Programma Integra. This imbalance of power 
means that immigrant associations lack financial and social capital when it comes to 
participating in local politics. At the same time, in this closed context there has been 
no consensus on a public philosophy of immigration or long-term plan for responses 
to the presence of immigrants, resulting in a tendency to appeal to the voting public. 
The following section will examine how the identification and categorisation of 
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Romanian immigrants in the cities has been carried out by actors who adapt to this 
closed context of institutional and discursive opportunities for mobilisation. 
 
The local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Rome 
 
Residents of Romanian origin form the largest immigrant population in the Italian 
capital, which has consequently been dubbed the Capital of Romanian immigration 
(Ricci 2007). The population in Rome has followed the national pattern of rapid 
growth, particularly during the period following 2002. In 2003, the Romanian 
contingent of the region of Lazio, of which Rome is the capital, was recorded at 
23,551, rising to 89,466 in 2005, 158,509 in 2008 and 179,469 in 2009 (Caritas 
Roma 2007, 2009, 2010). Their incorporation has been into a dynamic and highly 
precarious labour market where informal or short-term formal opportunities are 
common, in which they have found employment primarily in the construction 
industry and the large tertiary service sector, composed on the one hand of 
restaurants, street vending and facilities for tourists, and on the other by a demand 
for domestic workers, nannies and carers for the elderly (CNEL 2003, 2006, 2009, 
Reyneri 2004, Caritas Italia 2010). As with across much of Italy, this has resulted in 
legal, documented residence being difficult to obtain or to retain. Indeed, although 
the Lazio region has the highest rate of job creation in Italy, it also has a higher than 
average rate of unemployment and job destruction (CNEL 2007: 70-1). This is 
reflected in official data from 2005 recording annual job creation at 96,392, which is 
almost matched by 91,853 jobs being lost in that year (CNEL 2008: 258). The 
precariousness of the labour market is also reflected in national rankings of Italian 
territories which placed Rome in 18
th
 position (out of 103) regarding the demand for 
foreign labour, but in 100
th
 position for social incorporation and 73
rd
 for social and 
occupational integration, according to data from 2006 (CNEL 2009). 
The political participation of the Romanian population in Rome has not been 
significant. Only one Romanian national has ever been elected as Adjunct 
Councillor, receiving 513 votes in 2004, which was a considerably lower result than 
the 2,539 votes received by the most voted candidate, of Philippine nationality. Of 
the fourteen Romanian candidates running in municipalities in 2004, none were 
elected, and in 2006 only two candidates ran, receiving 99 and 34 votes respectively 
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(neither was elected in their municipality). Only two Romanian candidates have ever 
received over 100 votes in these elections. Furthermore, with the accession of 
Romania to the EU in 2007 and the re-categorisation of Romanian nationals in Italy 
from ‘extracomunitarians’ to ‘comunitarians’, the right to participate in these 
elections was removed. As citizens of the EU, from this year Romanian nationals 
would instead be able to cast votes and stand in Italy’s local elections. This shift in 
status therefore provided a new opportunity for Romanians to have their interests 
represented and perhaps for local politicians to win votes off a numerous population. 
Yet in 2008 there was only one Romanian candidate, and she received only 53 votes 
(data from the Rome Council). The number of Romanian candidates in local 
elections rose from one in 2008 to eleven in 2011, yet the results show only one 
candidate receiving more than 100 votes whilst the mean for the remaining 
candidates was only 33 votes each (data from the Rome Council, for complete lists 
of candidates see figures 15 and 16 in the appendix).  
Attempts to explain this low level of political participation have highlighted 
perceptions and tendencies carried over from Romania’s past: 
 
“in the Romanian community there is a problem of disbelief regarding 
politics, regarding participation, and a lack of trust in institutions and 
organisations [...] in Romania we have had a revolution, we all believed in a 




As will be discussed further in the following chapter, this suggestion that the years of 
corruption following the transition to democracy in Romania have contributed to a 
strong sense of apathy amongst Romanian nationals regarding politics and their 
political leaders has been repeatedly presented as explaining low levels of Romanian 
political participation. 
Aside from these formal electoral channels, the principal actors claiming to 
represent the Romanian population in Rome have been relatively small cultural 
associations and a political party called the Party of Romanian Identity (Partidul 
Românilor în Italia - Partito Identità Romeni, PIR). Yet in 2007 there were only 
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three Romanian cultural associations in all of Italy registered with the Romanian 
Embassy (Ricci 2007: 103), although since then the number registered in and around 
the capital has increased to 28 (in 2011). In general the Romanian associations in 
Rome have been small in size and operated with limited resources. All have been 
registered as non-profit, voluntary organizations with a cultural focus, rather than as 
political movements or parties. Their level of formal organization has typically been 
low, with management and control normally carried out by one individual or a small 
council of members and funding coming from membership fees and sporadic, one-
off grants from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commune of Rome, 
the Ministry of the Interior, and the European Commission. These funding 
opportunities have not provided for either stability or expansive projects. 
In addition to this lack of material resources, social capital in the form of 
networks of cooperation and coordination between associations across Italy has also 
been scarce. There were no attempts to overcome this until the creation of the 
Romanian League in Italy (Lega della Romania in Italia) in 2007 and the Federation 
of Romanian Associations in Italy (Federazione delle Associazioni dei Romeni in 
Italia) in 2009. Both were intended to establish a space for coordination among 
different organizations and be a stable point of reference for the population to gather 
around. Both also eventually failed due to internal fighting, corruption and 
individuals working for their own benefit (Harja and Melis 2010: 91). In Rome, 
similarly, the context was described in one interview as ‘a fragmented community as 
in the rest of Italy [...] everybody does whatever pops into their head’ (Interview 
04/07/2011). Individualism, personal gain and an inability to tie-in the broader 
population that they claim to represent were thus highlighted as weaknesses of the 
capital’s associations: 
  
‘no, no, everyone is on their own! Also with the associations [...] there might 
be only one, or two people but then they make their own network of 





For many associations the short-lived Federation of Romanian Associations in Italy 
was the only moment of collaboration and following its failure they returned to 
largely solitary actions. 
This fragmentation illustrates a lack of consensus between associations 
regarding their role and their perception of the status of the Romanian population. 
The declared motivation for the formation and mobilization of the Romanian 
representatives has predominantly been to build connections with Italian society, 
improve integration and understanding between Romanians and Italians and defend 
the legal rights of Romanian residents in Rome, although some have also been 
criticised as acting simply as leverage for individuals attempting to gain personal 
benefits. Also, distinct understandings of Romanian have been identity presented by 
them. Some such as the Party of Romanian Identity, Italy-Romania Future Together 
(Italia-Romania Futuro Insieme), and Romanian Spirit (Spirit Romanesc), 
emphasized Christian values and the moral principles of the Catholic and Orthodox 
Romanian Churches as central to a process of social integration: 
 
‘An important factor in the national community of Romania has been the 
spiritual gift, that treasure of culture and popular tradition’  
(association website, Romanian Spirit, accessed 10
th
 July 2011) 
 
‘we are engaged with constantly promoting a positive image of the migratory 
phenomenon and reinforcing communication between local and immigrant 
communities [...] certain that a better reciprocal knowledge of the spiritual 
values and cultures of these peoples favours a spirit of collaboration and 
communion among people from different nations’  





Other organizations such as the Forum of Romanian Intellectuals in Italy and the 
Academy of Romania promoted a specifically Latin-Roman historical identity as a 




‘We propose to promote Romanian culture in Italy and Europe, dialogue 
between Italian and Romanian intellectuals and international cooperation 
among writers, artists, thinkers, students, journalists, and religious and 
political representatives’  





Distinct again were those presenting a rights-based discourse against the unjust 
treatment of Romanian nationals by Italian institutions (Friends of Romania).  
Prior to 2008, this fragmentation between Romanian actors was accompanied 
by sparse connections with other actors in Rome’s politics or public debate. 
Consequently, Italian parties were criticised for being reluctant to open their ranks to 
Romanian members or appeal to Romanian voters: 
 
‘the centre-Left, not knowing what the voting tendency of these citizens 
would be, whether they would vote for Right or Left, has not done anything 
[...] and on the other side, the centre-Right is not interested [...] they won the 
2008 national elections and elections in Rome by using tabloid stories (casi 
di cronaca) which had Romanians as protagonists, so for them it was 
important that the Romanians did not vote’ 
(Interview 05/07/2011) 
 
However, a different perspective was more critical of the Romanians themselves; 
 
‘the problem is that the Italians have understood the importance of this 
community and the importance of this vote, but the Romanians have not! 
Because the Romanians are used to Romania, where they vote for whoever 
offers an extra beer, it is a vote in exchange’ 
(Interview 05/07/2011) 
 
Aside from the cultural associations, the most visible pro-Romanian actor in Rome 
has been the Party of Romanian Identity. The party itself was formed in 2006 and by 
2011 declared to have some 10,000 members around the country. It has a website, 
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prints a Romanian language weekly newspaper and holds conferences and small 
protests in the capital. Whereas the above associations are non-political in their 
constitutions (whilst not usually in practice), PIR is explicitly political as the only 
Italian political party aimed at Romanian residents. It has built connections with a 
small cluster of Romanian cultural associations, particularly Friends of Romania, the 
Party of Romanian Identity, We Are Romanians, the Forum of Romanian 
Intellectuals in Italy and Voice of Romania (Vocea Romanilor). 
Furthermore, these connections with other Romanian associations have been 
established at the same time that the Party of Romanian Identity has collaborated 
with Italian political parties. This came for the first time in 2007, with the Union of 
Democrats for Europe (Unione dei Democratici per l’Europa) and Go Italy! (Forza 
Italia!). The Party has subsequently cooperated in elections with Italian parties by 
providing its own candidates, promoting candidates of other parties, and organising 
informative events and conferences. In Rome in 2008 the Party supported the Civic 
List of Gianni Alemanno, the successful mayoral candidate from National Alliance 
and in 2011 it had also signed a collaborative agreement with Silvio Berlusconi’s 
centre-right party People of Liberty. However, despite the anti-communist 
perspective of PIR, this network of Romanian associations does not reflect a 
particular shared ideology favouring right or left. The leader of We Are Romanians, 
Silviu Ciubotaru has been included in electoral lists for the PD, for example, and all 
of them were involved in the establishment of the Friends of Romania parliamentary 
association in 2009 that brought together 48 members from all political groups. The 
parliamentary association was opened with a debate in the Chamber of Deputies at 
the Italian Parliament, with cross-party interest and involving the Forum of 
Romanian Intellectuals in Italy, the Party of Romanian Identity and Friends of 
Romania. In the fragmented population of Romanian associations and the closed 
opportunity structure of Rome’s politics, these ties have been rare and as a result the 
Party of Romanian Identity has held a significant position in networks between 
Romanian actors and autochthonous ones. 
The formation of these connections amongst Romanian associations, on the 
one hand, and between Romanian associations and Italian political parties, on the 
other, has followed a pragmatic logic intended to overcome ideological cleavages. 
Between associations, the objective has been to create a sense of unity between 
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Romanians in order to present a broad consensus to the Italian institutions and 
public. This placed a sense of common purpose as Romanian nationals above left or 
right wing preferences or associations with rival parties. Yet with Italian political 
parties, the objective has been to open channels in the closed institutional structure 
through personal contacts. The result was a post-ideology, pragmatic networking 
strategy; 
 
‘we cannot align with either the left or the right because, you know, if you 
are with the left and the right get into government, no, you have to always 
keep a central line […] even if I am from the right, for me that doesn’t mean 
anything, now I don’t have an ideology because here you can’t have an 
ideology defined as right wing […] no, you can’t have one, and I can always 
say that the left have done more for the foreigners in general than the right’ 
(Interview 06/07/2011) 
 
‘The party [PIR] is without ideology because we are open, we have good 
relations with all the Italian parties [...] we have collaborated with all of them 
apart from the Northern League […] we judge how political groups act city 




Moreover, these associations and their leaders have rarely been able to influence 
public debate through the press. Archive searches in the Rome editions of Il 
Giornale, Il Messaggero, Corriere della Sera, and La Repubblica reveal that there 
were no references to them prior to 2005, and in the three years of 2005 to 2007 only 
nine references were made.  
So, in summary, the participation and mobilisation of the Romanian 
immigrant population in Rome since the first Romanian immigration in the 1990s 
can be described as scarce and fragmented. When the first associations formed, they 
found themselves without financial, social or symbolic capital and in a structural 
context characterised by few opportunities to influence political parties or decision 
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makers. This structure will be relevant again in the following chapter in reference to 
the establishment of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy. 
 
The dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration in Rome 
 
The political and public responses to Romanian immigrants in Rome have generally 
followed the pattern of national discourse noted in the previous chapter: as the 
population has grown, their presence has become an increasingly salient issue 
associated with questions of public order and crime. Previous studies have 
concentrated in particular on the year 2007 and the murder of Giovanna Reggiani as 
the most significant point in the development of a public image of Romanians as 
violent criminals (Access to Rights and Civic Dialogue for All 2012, Angelescu 
2008, Barbagli 2008, Cajvaneanu 2008, Devole 2008). In this way, it has been 
commented that ‘from the 1st of January 2007, the date of the entry of Romania into 
the European Union, discrimination seems to have been directed towards the 
Romanians in Italy’ (Cajvaneanu 2008: 217). 
However, in reality there has been a longer development of the issue. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, when there was a relatively low number of Romanian 
immigrants in Rome, contrasting responses arose in public debate. The arrival of 
Romanians, as well as other nationality immigrants and ethnic minorities, elicited 
localised protests, framing them in political and press communication in opposing 
ways as either victims or a threat.  
On the one hand, Romanians were framed as victims due to being 
discriminated against in the labour market or being homeless, which should be 
understood as a continuation of reponses to the Pantanella crisis and a lack of 
immigrant housing. In the national daily Corriere della sera an article entitled ‘The 
city under the bridges’ examined the living conditions of homeless Poles, Albanians 
and Romanians who had gone to Italy to escape poverty (La città sotto i ponti, 18
th
 
July 1996), whilst another described 50 people sleeping in a ‘Romanian village’ in a 
park in Rome as attempting to escape poverty and forget ‘years of suffering as 
factory and railway workers’ under Ceausescu (Il bosco dei salvaggi, 15th January 
1996). Similarly, in 2002, the Catholic charity Caritas and the trade unions Italian 
Union of Work (Unione Italiana del Lavoro, UIL) and the General Italian 
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Confederation of Work (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, CGIL) 
described Romanian immigrants as victims of their ‘terrible history’ and labour 
market conditions which objectified and de-humanised them (Corriere della sera, 




On the other hand, Romanians were also referenced in the press in reports of 
prostitution rings, minor crimes and, in particular, a prevalence of Romani gypsies. 
In 1999 the Rutelli administration’s proposed building of new temporary camps, as 
outlined above, was stopped by protests from local residents who blocked streets and 
chained themselves to the site gates (Clough Marinaro 2003: 213). As with the 
essentialist perspective of the Rome administration during the 1990s that saw 
gypsies as a population with a fixed and unchanging nomadic character to be 
protected by segregation, the political and press references to Romanians viewed 
their presence as a problem that should be resolved by their removal. For example, in 
1996 the ex-fascist right wing councillor Teodoro Buontempo of National Alliance 
claimed that  
 
‘[the mayor] has not realised that in the nomad’s caravans there are ex-
Yugoslavs, Romanians and Albanians, which means foreigners who are not 
nomads … we want them out of inhabited areas: the camps should be 
temporary and put in open countryside’  
(Corriere della sera, Arrivano i campi nomadi, 18
th
 June 1994) 
 
The left responded to these protests from local neighbourhoods and right wing 
politicians against the construction of camps with public statements that contained a 
clear focus on security, a distinction between those legally resident and others who 
were undocumented, as well as concern over the dominance of the right on the issue: 
 
‘it is better for us to be severe rather than for the xenophobes to be, our 
laissez faire approach would surely not help the immigrants: we cannot leave 
these contradictions in the hands of the right’  





‘it is right to protect the documented Romani, but the criminals will be 
expelled’  
(Francesco Rutelli, PDS, La Repubblica, Casilino 700, sgombero all’alba, 29th 
December 1999) 
 
This clearly reflects the identity crisis and uncertainty that reigned in the main party 
of the left regarding how to respond to immigration at this time, as noted in the 
previous chapter. It also shows the beginning of a left-right consensus on the 
acceptance of segregation as an effective policy measure. 
Throughout the 2000s the dominant tendency in Rome increasingly became 
the use of the threat frame of Romanian immigration (Barbagli 2008, Cajvaneanu 
2008, Devole 2008, Harja and Melis 2010). In the press, there was an abundance of 
headlines of the type ‘two Romanians stopped, they killed a friend’, ‘mummy, a 
Romanian has molested me’ and ‘the assassins of a pensioner stopped: they were 
heading for Romania’. Responses from citizens and politicians to acts of violence 
also went against the Romanian population. For example, in October 2006 a group of 
thirty Italian men attacked and set fire to a bar that was frequented by Romanians 
who had been causing disturbances for months by playing loud music, drinking and 
parking badly. The attack followed an argument the day before that had seen three 
Romanian men shot in the legs and abdomen by Italian men in the same area. For 
many of the local residents, although the action was outside the law and rumoured to 
have been orchestrated by neo-fascist groups, it was accepted as necessary to bring a 
sense of normality back to the area. Such normality was framed by a clear perception 
of cultural difference between Italians and Romanians; 
 
‘I work, pay my taxes and don’t bother anyone. But they [Romanians] don’t 
do anything from morning to night, they drink and nobody asks anything of 
them. They’ve become the bosses’  





The outcome was that local residents did not condemn the event because it marked 
an end to an unliveable situation (Cuppone 2010: 120), with which the mayor of 
Rome from the Democratic Party, Walter Veltroni, seemed to agree by announcing 
immediate deportations: that day 75 undocumented Romanians from the centre of 
Rome were removed (Corriere della sera, Trullo: la protesta arriva in commune, 4
th
 
October 2006). As found in the national debates of the previous chapter, here the PD 
accepted that problems with Romanian immigrants were caused by their presence 
and should be resolved by their removal. 
The same dynamic was repeated in response to the death of an Italian woman 
in a fight with two Romanian women in April 2007 and in October of the same year 
when the Italian woman Giovanna Reggiani was murdered. The mayor Veltroni 
reacted by stating that the accession of Romania to the EU had opened the doors to 
the arrival of particularly aggressive criminals and that there was a ‘specific 
problem’ with this nationality (for a summary see Barbagli 2008). It was 
subsequently suggested that mass deportations should be considered, and in 
November the Rome Prefecture announced that 5,000 Romanians were ready to be 
expelled in order to ‘clean the water of infected fish’ (La Repubblica, Romeni, 
scattano le espulsioni. “Via i primi cinquemila” 2nd November 2007). Reports 
claimed that twenty individuals were deported from Rome and Milan in the first 





Mailat himself remained in Italy to face trial. Such deportations, regardless of their 
connection to the specific murder case, were justified by the same frame which 
defined Romanian immigration as a threat to be resolved through segregation and 
removal. 
But why was this threat frame employed? Two logics can be highlighted. 
One was founded on an understanding of population groups as fixed and sharing an 
essentialised, unchanging culture and intended to protect the cultural specificity of 
immigrant and minority groups. This developed from the Rutelli administration’s 
response to Romani settlements in the late 1990s, which in turn could be seen as in 
line with a prevalent essentialist cultural ideology in the post-socialist left in other 
cities such as Florence and Bologna (Però 2005, Picker 2011). The second logic was 
one of electoral politics in the form of pragmatic reactions to negative public 
                                                             
11 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7078532.stm, accessed 14th January 2013  
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opinion. In this way, Rome’s mayors reacted to the sentiments of residents in 
neighbourhoods in which tensions arose, resulting in convergence between right and 
left on the need for controls and security measures because this was demanded by the 
people. In fact, this switch to security was already noted in the 1990s as a result of 
‘submission to the anti-Roma hostility of parts of the voting public’ (Clough 
Marinaro 2003: 203). The choice of multiple deportations constituted the 
development of the logic of separation due to cultural difference into one of security 
to reassure voters. At the same time, the lack of local representation for Romanian 
immigrants meant that they were not a relevant constituency for politicians. 
Responses to these framing processes came from Caritas, the trade union 
CGIL and the Romanian associations. In 2008 Caritas published a volume of essays 
aiming to provide an objective view of the phenomenon of Romanian migration 
beyond the dominant trend of public debate, and its presentation to an overflowing 
room of press, activists, immigrant campaigners, Romanian cultural association 
representatives and the public illustrated the demand for such a publication 
(Interview 06/07/2011). In the same year, a bilingual Romanian-Italian manual to the 
workplace was presented by the Italian Federation of Wood, Construction and 
Extraction Industry Workers (Federazione Italiana dei Lavoratori del Legno, 
dell’Edilizia, Industrie affini ed Estrattive, FILLEA), part of the CGIL. These were 
followed by a bilingual book on ‘Romanians in Italy’ from Caritas in 2011 as well as 
a novel ‘Ionut’s Journey’ about a Romanian construction worker’s integration in 
Italy, which was presented by FILLEA to a full room of politicians, press 
representatives and civil servants at the offices of the Region of Rome in the same 
year (Olezzante 2011). In this way, both Caritas and the CGIL have illustrated a 
capacity to produce knowledge through these publications and communicate it to a 
relevant audience of decision makers that cultural associations have not been able to 
reach so easily, although it has taken them a long time to do so. 
In contrast, a lack of material resources and symbolic capital in relation to the 
press and relevant political actors has made the mobilisation of the Romanian 
cultural associations difficult. However, the increasing salience of public debate on 
Romanian immigration did provide an opportunity for mobilisation in two ways. 
Firstly, the negative images provided an opportunity for a shared victim frame to 
unite Romanian actors. The frame was composed of a problem facing Romanian 
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nationals such as discrimination, a denial of political rights, or a lack of employment 
opportunities compared to other nationalities. This problem was presented as caused 
by Italian individuals, institutions or laws, and could be resolved through greater 
justice and equality for the Romanian population: 
 
‘The justice system has to run its course and those responsible have to pay 
[for their crimes]. But I think the problem here are not the Romanians in 
Italy, as much as it is the ignorance of Italian people’  





‘over the last months ‘Romanian-phobia’ has spread, a collective hysteria 
which Romanian carers and nurses are beginning to lose their jobs for’  





‘Let us open spaces for participation from Romanian citizens, for security 
without discrimination [...] among our community fear is spreading, above all 
among those who live in the outskirts of the large cities’  





Despite differences in perceptions of the roots of a Romanian identity from one 
association to another, there has been alignment and consensus with this victim 
frame of the meaning of ‘being Romanian’ in Italy. This followed the motive 
expressed above of uniting the Romanian population in order to present reciprocal 
understandings of their situation in Italian institutions and society.  
Secondly, a distinct alignment strategy saw Romanian actors express 
consensus with the security-based frame that dominated public debate. They 
accepted that there was a problem in Rome of crime caused by Romanian nationals, 
but suggest that increased cooperation, vigilance and security measures by both 




‘[we require] legislative interventions aimed at delinquents [...] for those in 
prison with life sentences their benefits should be eliminated. Italy needs to 
do the same as Romania, where if someone steals a chicken, they have three 
years in prison’  





Alignment with the dominant threat frame of the wider public debate in this way 
required a boundary to be defined between good, hard-working Romanians and the 
badly-viewed, criminal, violent Romanians prevalent in press reporting and public 
perceptions: 
 
‘we are making Romanian migrants aware so that they report their co-
nationals who are involved in violence and criminality [...] the right way to 
act should be: get your head screwed on or we will report you to the police. 
The Romanians in Italy are estimated at between 800,000 and one million 
and they can constitute a precious network for reinforcing security’  





This strategy has resulted in the associations and Party of Romanian Identity being 
more present in the mass media, with the number of direct quotes from them rising 
from nine between 2005 and 2007 to thirty two between 2008 and 2010. In this way, 
the strategies used to make claims to a Romanian identity that was not a threat were 
adapted to the discursive opportunities in Rome. 
In summary, the dominant view of Romanian immigration in Rome has been 
defined by the choices of local actors of Italian and Romanian nationality 
organisations. In particular, local politicians’ choices have been shaped by 
essentialist cultural interpretations of Romanians, and in particular the Romani 
minority, and motivated by an instrumentalist logic of following local public opinion 
in order to secure the support of the electorate. This was facilitated by a structural 
context characterised by closed institutional opportunity structures and a dense 
concentration of resources in three ways: firstly, despite the establishment of 
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directly-elected mayors and the increasing powers of city councils in cities such as 
Rome, the Romanian population (or other immigrant populations) was not eligible to 
vote in local elections until after 2007. These Mayoral and council candidates would 
compete for the votes of the Italian public, the number and availability of which was 
not directly reduced by deporting Romanian immigrants. Secondly, integration 
measures for immigrants in Rome have concentrated primarily on the access of 
individuals to housing and the labour market and have not provided resources for 
group-level organisation or political participation. This has limited the capacity of 
actors of immigrant origin, such as the Romanian associations studied here, to build 
significant networks of support or influence policy measures and local debates. 
Thirdly, when opportunities have arisen for funding integration initiatives and being 
present on local representative bodies, these have been taken first and foremost by 
local Italian organisations. As a result, the participation of immigrant origin 
organisations must engage with these gatekeeper organisations. In the case of 
Romanian immigration, Caritas and the CGIL were the providers of a counter-
argument to the dominant threat frame but this mobilisation came late. 
Consequently, a Romanian voice was at least initially unable to make an alternative 
claim to the dominant framing process due to an unavailability of material resources 
or ties to the press, political parties or political institutions. 
Finally, representatives of the Romanian population have not, moreover, 
sought to entirely discredit the dominant view but rather align with it by balancing 
victim and threat frames. This was made possible by a boundary defining process 
distinguishing between who were positive and beneficial Romanians for the city of 
Rome and who were not. In this way they adapted to the dominant perspective in 
public debate in an attempt to build consensus with Italian political parties and press, 
illustrating how a negative framing pattern could constitute a discursive opportunity 
structure for mobilisation of specific actors through boundary-making. Nevertheless, 
this did not result in a shift in power, because it had relatively little success at 
changing the dominant framing pattern. Indeed, change would only came after the 
period studied in this thesis, as evidenced particularly clearly by the right wing 
Mayor of Rome, Gianni Alemanno in a speech on the occasion of the national day of 




‘I am happy to be here today among you. You are true friends. There is a 
profound bond, fraternal, between Romania and Italy, Rome and Romania. 
Remember, that you can vote for your Council in Rome [...] Feel yourselves 
as citizens of Rome! Be a part of this community! In every population and 
community there are the right people and the mistaken ones. You are the 
majority of Romanians who behave well and give much to this city’ 
 
In doing so, Alemanno aligned his categorisation of Romanian immigrants with that 
of Romanian actors in 2007 by adopting their same boundary definition process 
between good and bad individuals. However, this could only occur in combination 
with the new structural context in which Romanians could participate in local 
elections as EU citizens. By calling on them to vote, he thus strategically and 
rationally followed the logic of electoral politics to include, rather than exclude, 
Romanian nationals. This constitutes a dramatic and opportunistic shift from the 








The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Spain 
 
The variation between regional and local political settings in Spain must be 
understood in the context of two process; historical sub-state nationalism and 
institutional decentralisation or ‘territorialisation’ (Brugue’ et al 2000 see also Davis 
2009, Gibernau 2000, Gil Araujo 2009, Grau Creus 2005, Moreno 1997). The result 
is a varied pattern of cultural, social and political boundaries across regional and 
local contexts. 
Firstly, a history of regional allegiances, cultures and languages have 
persisted in Spain’s regions and contributed to the formation of a state of multiple 
                                                             
12 For example, during the electoral campaign of 2008 Alemanno was reported to have promised the 




nations. Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the term ‘Spain’ 
had for many largely constituted a geographical definition rather than representing a 
political community, and was recognised as such by foreigners rather than the native 
community (Núñez Seixas 1999), whilst during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, late industrialisation and weak state penetration of peripheral areas 
underlined an inability to establish allegiance to the state (Nadal Oller 1975). This 
was contrasted by a concentration of economic and political power in regions such as 
Catalonia and the Basque Country (Guibernau 2000, 2006, McRoberts 2001, Núñez 
Seixas 1999, Ringrose 1998). In Catalonia, the Catalan language as well as the art, 
architecture and history of the Renaixenca movement of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries provided cultural grounds for claims to autonomy vis-à-vis the 
central state, whereas in the Basque Country this was grounded in an ethnic 
conceptualisation of identity based on the Euskera language and blood-line 
inheritance. In both regions, these claims represented a voice of unity against the 
centralised Francoist government and in contemporary Spain have constituted the 
source of demands for their recognition as nations without states. More recently calls 
for increased autonomy and devolution of competences have been exemplified by 
demands from Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist parties in 1998 for Spain to 
be officially defined as multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-national (Guibernau 
2000: 63). In this way, the local dimension of society and politics in Spain has been 
shaped by the historical development of internal boundaries between culturally 
different regional movements. 
Secondly, and intertwined with the political demands for autonomy from the 
sub-state nationalists outlined above, institutional decentralisation in the post-Franco 
era has seen the establishment of seventeen regions known as autonomous 
communities (comunidades autónomas) with legislative and policy making powers 
in a range of areas. In some regions these powers have a long history: autonomous 
governments had already existed in Catalonia from 1913 to 1923 and again from 
1932 to 1938 and the Basque Country was also granted an autonomous statute in 
1933, as was Galicia in 1936, although these were not implemented before Civil War 
broke out in 1936 (Guibernau 2000: 58). The current arrangement of regional 
governments and the decentralisation of competences to them was outlined in the 
Constitution of 1978, which declared that ‘the State is organised territorially into 
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municipalities, provinces and autonomous communities […] All of these bodies 
enjoy self-government for the management of their respective interests’ (Art. 137). 
In municipalities, councils and mayors were to be directly elected (Art. 140), and in 
autonomous communities a regional legislative assembly would consist of deputies 
elected by proportional representation. The regional administrations have so far been 
granted law and policy making competences in fields such as public transport, 
housing, agriculture, cultural activities, healthcare and education (Art. 148). This 
means that, although the Constitution claimed that the central state would have 
exclusive competence on nationality, immigration and the status of aliens on Spanish 
territory (Art. 149), autonomous communities actually hold the capacity to decide on 
questions that define the boundaries of social citizenship and influence the inclusion 
and exclusion of foreigners in their polities. 
Together, sub-state nationalism and institutional decentralisation have had 
significant implications in terms of the local dimension of immigrant integration and 
political participation. On the one hand, differing philosophies of integration across 
regions have provided the normative foundations for local laws and policies 
concerning immigration (Davis 2009, Fauser 2008, Gil Araujo 2009). For example, 
Catalonia’s approach to immigration and integration has been highly conditioned by 
the political promotion of a unitary Catalan culture in response to arrivals from the 
rest of Spain in the early twentieth century or from around the world in the twenty 
first century, resulting in the presence of immigrants being interpreted as a positive 
contribution to Catalonia if it can be mitigated by their cultural assimilation to the 
Catalan national project (for examples see Cardás i Ros 2007, Pujol 1976, Vandellós 
1935). The objective of maintaining an integrated common public culture in 
Catalonia has motivated immigrant integration policies that emphasise equality, 
social cohesion, diversity, normalisation, political participation and the Catalan 
language as their central principles (Fauser 2008, Gil Araujo 2009). Similarly, it has 
been found that the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) has 
made use of its competences to define its own distinctive approach to social 
citizenship, which offers incentives for foreigners to move to the Basque community 
and in doing so, they ‘suggest that the Basque national community has different 
values and priorities than the Spanish one and therefore requires more autonomy’ 
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(Jeram 2012: 3). In Madrid a distinct ‘intercultural’ approach can be found, as will 
be outlined below. 
On the other hand, the implication of the multi-level structure of politics and 
policy making in Spain is also that different localities establish varying modes of 
politics and channels for political participation. For example, in Catalonia the 
Barcelona city council’s long history of opening channels for local political 
participation influenced the form taken in 1985 of the Working Group on Refugees 
and Foreigners (Grupo de Trabajo de Refugiados y Extranjeros), which brought 
together political parties, trade unions, businessmen, NGOs and experts (Fauser 
2008: 137). This was followed by the Municipal Immigration Council, established in 
1997, which was constituted almost entirely by immigrant associations and followed 
the institutional structure outlined by local Consultative Councils (Consejos 
Consultativos) that had served since 1985 as a way of widening citizen participation 
in the city’s post-dictatorship politics (ibid. :136-141). In contrast, in a range of 
northern regions funding has been granted primarily to autochthonous institutions 
and organisations for immigrant reception, rather than promoting the participation of 
immigrants themselves in decisions. In this way, in Asturias the native ‘third sector’ 
is favoured, in Galicia NGOs and local councils are, and in Cantabria local councils 
and the regional Youth and Education Council are the beneficiaries (Fernández 
Suárez 2008: 57-8). In this way institutional opportunity structures in Spain’s local 
contexts vary not only in terms of the formal and normative content of policy 
measures, but also in the institutional structures and relations that underpin their 
implementation. The following sections will illustrate how this is the case in the 
region and city of Madrid and the way that this has influenced the evolution of the 
politics of Romanian immigration in the city. 
 
The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Madrid 
 
The administration of the Community of Madrid has been decided by deputies who 
are chosen by election every four years for the regional parliament, the Madrid 
Assembly (Asamblea de Madrid). The outcome of these elections has seen the centre 
right PP dominate the Community of Madrid for the two decades since 1991 (see 
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figure 13). Thus, there has been stability and consistency during the period in which 




Figure 13. Election results for the three largest parties in the Madrid Assembly, 1983-2007 (data from 
Asamblea de Madrid, IU did not run prior to 1991) 
 
 
These PP administrations have favoured Spanish social organisations for 
managing immigration, in particular Catholic organisations that have extensive 
experience of providing services aimed at social inclusion for poor and 
disadvantaged populations. Early developments were small in scale, with one-off 
projects with cultural mediators during the 1990s and an EU-funded local integration 
project in two municipalities from 1996 (Fauser 2008: 142, Gil 1998). These 
measures were carried out by local NGOs and district authorities and did not 
generally include immigrant representatives. Subsequently, resources from the 
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Charity for reception centres, although these are open to all in conditions of need and 
not only to immigrants. The Association of the Spanish Catholic Commission for 
Migration (Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración, ACCEM) has 
also been favoured for social intervention projects with immigrant families and 
Eastern European ethnic minorities.
13
 Aside from these projects, the process of 
establishing participatory channels for immigrants is a recent development, as will be 
outlined below. 
The first immigration plan for the Community of Madrid was published in 
2001, under the regional government of the PP. Entitled the Plan for Social and 
Intercultural Coexistence (Plan Madrid de Convivencia Social e Intercultural), it 
underlined the importance of ‘dialogue, participation and equal responsibility’ across 
the city (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2004: 4). The driving concepts of the first Plan 
were equality and respect for cultural difference through shared norms, tolerance, a 
shared model of what it meant to live in a plural and diverse society and equal access 
to resources (Ibid.: 47-51). When presenting the plan in public, the Mayor of Madrid 
stated that the city was constituted by ‘not only what we were, but above all what we 
are beginning to be, and in this shared task there is space for everyone’ (referenced 
in Madrid Convive 2005a: 2). Similarly, in 2006, the Councillor for Immigration 
declared that ‘Madrid has always been an open community. A region characterised 
by being welcoming because among its population there are people who come from 
all around the world’ (de la Calle 2006). She outlined the three objectives of the 
integration model in Madrid in as equality of opportunities, social cohesion and 
corresponsibility, understood as the acceptance of change by immigrants and the 
autochthonous population (de la Calle 2006). The second Plan for Social and 
Intercultural Coexistence concentrated specifically on immigrants and aspired to 
their ‘full and free incorporation in Madrid’s society’ (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 
2008: 6). It was guided by the three principles of universality independent of an 
individual’s origins or administrative situation, active integration, and 
interculturality (Ibid.). These values reflect a clear consensus emphasising tolerance 
and democratic participation in response to immigration. The intercultural approach 
                                                             
13 For more information see Madrid Convive, available online at 
http://www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/ayuntamiento, accessed 10th December 2012 
182 
 
in the city of Madrid thus mirrors the cross-party consensus in Spain on the values to 
be upheld in post-transition Spain that was outlined in the previous chapter.  
Yet despite this ‘intercultural’ focus to integration measures, immigrant-
specific services have been created in the form of Immigrant Social Assistance 
Centres (Centros de Atención Social a Inmigrantes, CASI) (Davis 2009: 148), which 
were added to in 2006 by Centres for the Participation and Integration of Immigrants 
(Centros de Participación e Integración de Inmigrantes, CEPI). The CEPI have been 
more prevalent, and are described as meeting places for new and old madrileños, 
offering educational courses, legal support, employment workshops and cultural 
activities (inmigra-madrid). They cater to specific nationalities, but not exclusively: 
the Romanian-Hispanic Centres in Alcalá de Henares and Coslada (Centro Hispano-
Rumano) are CEPIs which offer Romanian language services such as translations 
and cultural activities as well as promoting local money-wiring services, loans and 
employment to people of Romanian origin. It has been suggested that this continues 
the city’s tradition of integrating different social and cultural groups from within 
Spain into the national patria grande by giving space for their culture of origin, or 
their patria chica (Davis 2009: 150). Neither are they managed by immigrants 
themselves: rather than connecting pre-existent associations and organisations of 
Romanian origin, the Romanian CEPIs have been established and managed by the 
Fundación Iberoamérica Europa, the President and ex-vice President of which are 
ex-Members of Parliament and Senators for the PP. This tendency to involve 
autochthonous organisations and actors rather than immigrant associations has been 
common in Madrid (Fauser 2008: 142). For some the Romanian-Hispanic Centres 
have been portrayed in negative terms as an attempt to undermine the existent 
associations and separate this population from local citizens, whilst for others this 
has not been the case and they have been seen positively as providing a space for 
activities to be held in. 
Further steps for immigrant integration and political participation have been 
the Madrid Forum for Dialogue and Coexistence (Foro Madrid de Diálogo y 
Convivencia) and district tables for dialogue and coexistence (Mesas Distritales de 
Diálogo y Convivencia). Both of these were intended to create spaces for 
participation and dialogue but were not given a formal presence in the policy 
process, although the district tables could present motions to policymakers. The 
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Madrid Forum was established in 2007 and followed the format of the national level 
Forum, including ten immigrant associations among its 64 members (raised to 68 in 
2011) such as representatives from the city council, the autonomous community, the 
Spanish State, and other civil society organisations from charities to NGOs, political 
parties, trade unions, business representatives, and neighbourhood associations. In 
2011 these associations were elected by the entire body of registered immigrant 
associations in the Community of Madrid. The District Tables existed from 2006 to 
2010 and involved a wider range of actors, with each table composed of a 
combination of local charities or NGOs, immigrant associations, and individuals. 
However, it was felt at times by members that participation was limited, at least in 
terms of the quantity of people reached, and that impact was inhibited by a lack of 
technical knowledge and exclusion from policy making (Entredistritos 2008: 4-5, 
Madrid Convive 2005b: 3). Of the 141 projects carried out by the District Tables 
only three were concerned with ‘citizen participation’ and four with ‘strengthening 
associations’ (Entredistritos 2009: 3), and instead of widening immigrant political 
participation, the majority of the tables’ work was instead focused on labour market 
insertion (thirty one projects) and ‘coexistence and integration’ (forty one projects) 
(Ibid.). In general, Madrid’s forum and district councils have mostly been populated 
by autochthonous NGOs and institutional representatives. As will be illustrated 
below, this separation of immigrant representation from the policy making process 
has made immigrants visible in local society but not very influential in achieving 
policy outputs in their favour. 
So, in summary, the official conception of immigrant integration in the 
Community of Madrid can be understood as working towards interculturality 
whereby a process of change in the host society towards immigrants has 
accompanied adaptation from immigrant populations towards the hosts. An 
inclusive, open discourse from regional and city administrations has emphasised 
universality of access to welfare, labour opportunities and participation, social 
cohesion through active interaction, and the development of a shared vision of a 
diverse Madrid through the notions of co-responsibility and intercultural exchange. 
Tolerance and democratic participation have constituted central elements of the 
public philosophy of immigrant integration in the city, reflecting consensus on the 
post-transition cleavage that emphasises the liberal democratic character of 
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contemporary Spain. However, in practice there has been the establishment of spaces 
for segmented integration along lines of national origin. Implementation has also 
favoured autochthonous actors, in particular Catholic NGOs and charities and 
individuals with close links to the governing PP. The following section will analyse 
how the Romanian population has been categorised and Romanian actors have made 
a claim to their identity in this structural context. 
 
The local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid 
 
For early migratory patterns from Romania, the city of Madrid represented one of the 
most significant places of settlement, along with Castellón and Zaragoza (Domingo 
et al 2008: 6). This growth was very rapid; in 1998 there were only 906 Romanian 
nationals registered in the Community of Madrid region which rose to 13,961 in 
2001 and 189,477 in 2008, an increase of over 200% in a decade (data from INE). In 
2011, the latest year available, 219,095 Romanian nationals were registered in the 
region.  
Almost a quarter of the registered Romanian workers in Spain are found in 
the Community of Madrid (Domingo et al 2008: 11). The greatest concentrations of 
Romanian population are found in the towns of Alcalá de Henares, Coslada and 
Arganda del Rey on the outskirts of the capital. As in the rest of Spain, their 
occupations have been gendered: dominant roles have been in construction and 
services for men and domestic work for women, both of which have a high level of 
informal employment, whilst in domestic work there are also frequent cases of 
exploitation particularly when the worker is undocumented (Domingo et al 2008, 
Marcu 2009a, Pajares 2007, Viruela Martinez 2008). In fact it has been estimated 
that in 2005, prior to the amnesty to legalise the status of migrants in the same year, 
the level of undocumented residence of Romanians in the city of Madrid was equal 
to 76% of the registered population (Diálogos 1). As in Rome, this data illustrates 
how much of the Romanian immigration to Madrid prior to the accession of 
Romania to the EU in 2007 was incorporated into a precarious and largely informal 
labour market, frequently without legal resident status. However, regardless of their 
legal status, during the period of this study all immigrants in Madrid and across 
Spain have enjoyed access to healthcare and education as long as they are signed 
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onto the municipal register. This has provided an opportunity to access basic 
services, and survey data has also suggested that the majority of immigrants in 
Madrid are satisfied with the availability and standard of healthcare, housing and 
education (Calatrava and Marcu 2006). 
As outlined in the previous section there have been few opportunities for 
direct participation of Romanian immigrants in electoral politics in Madrid prior to 
their entry to the EU in 2007. At the level of specific districts, the participation of 
Romanian actors has generally been low and the participants in the district tables 
have predominantly come from Latin America or Morocco: Romanian nationals or 
associations have been mentioned only twice in the eight editions of the newsletter 
and diary of events for the twenty one district tables, Entredistritos, and following 
elections to the tables in 2006 only one percent of positions were held by individuals 
or associations of this nationality, compared to forty nine percent of Spanish 
nationality, fourteen percent Ecuadorian and ten percent Colombian (Madrid 
Convive 2006: 5-8). 
Nevertheless, from 2007 there has been an abundance of Romanian electoral 
candidates in the Community of Madrid (for full lists see figures 16 and 17 in the 
appendix). From the electoral register prior to the local elections of 2007 some 27 
candidates have been found on lists, with particular concentrations in the 
municipalities of Arganda del Rey, where seven candidates ran for the Greens, and 
Alcalá de Henares, where the list for Democratic Solidarity was headed by the 
Romanian Gheorghe Gainar and included four more co-nationals (Boletín Oficial de 
la Comunidad de Madrid, Num 102, 01/05/2007). Yet, despite this relatively high 
number of candidates, the electoral support for these lists was low: in 2007, the 
almost entirely Romanian list for the Greens in Arganda del Rey received only 1.1% 
of the vote (214 votes), the list headed by Gheorghe Gainar received only 0.12% of 
the vote in Alcalá de Henares (108 votes) and the only Romanian elected was Gica 
Craioveanu for the PP, an ex-professional footballer in Getafe in 2007 (and he did 
not take his seat). Furthermore, the total participation of Romanian nationals in the 
local elections of 2007 was also low: although Romanian voters around the country 
totalled 66,330, giving them the second highest turnout of foreign voters in absolute 
numbers (behind British immigrants), this represented only 12.5% of the total 





). For 2011, the number of Romanian candidates recorded rose to 
56, with notable concentrations in Morata de Tajuna, where an independent party put 
forward an almost entirely Romanian list (10 candidates), and in the municipality of 
Villamanrique de Tajo the Iberian Party for Romanians (Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos, PIRUM) put forward seven candidates (Boletín Oficial de la Comunidad 
de Madrid, Num. 93, 20/04/2011). However, the level of support and turnout did not 
rise at this time. As in Italy, it has been suggested in interviews and academic 
research (Pajares 2007) that this is due to a political culture of apathy and distrust in 
response to experiences of politics in Romania. 
The Romanian population across Spain has been defined in previous studies 
as a population with weak social networks, a lack of links between individuals of the 
same nationality and distrust of social and political organisations (Pajares Alonso 
2007, 2009). The low turnout of voters would appear to support this, but does not 
reflect the entire situation because there has been a number of associations that claim 
to represent the Romanian population. The first associations for Romanian 
immigrants were formed and based in the towns of Alcalá de Henares and Coslada to 
the north of Madrid. In these towns there was the greatest concentration of Romanian 
immigrants, with a plaza in the centre of Coslada later being denominated the ‘Plaza 
of the Romanians’ due to the way that they gathered there during the day. In Alcalá 
de Henares the Cultural Association for the Support and Integration of the Romanian 
People (Asociatia Culturala de Sprijin si Integrare a Romanilor, ACSIR) was the 
first formed in 1998, and in Coslada the Spanish association Obatalá was also 
formed in 1999 and would focus on helping Romanians find employment, access 
public services and organise in cultural activities as this nationality came to represent 
the vast majority of immigrants in the town. At this time the first associations were 
also formed in other parts of Spain such as Barcelona (in 1999) and Castellón (in 
2001). A decade later, in 2009, the total from the Community of Madrid registered 
with the Romanian Embassy had grown rapidly to reach 36. 
The associations are voluntary and non-profit organisations that have 
benefited from the provision of resources by the local administration. They have 
                                                             
14 The Romanian turnout represents a proportion of the total population of Romanian immigrants 
rather than of the eligible Romanian voters. However, when the same figures are used for other 
countries the level of Romanians remains low in comparison, below the 29% of the French 
population, 28% of Italians or 27% of British, but above the Poles (9%) and the Bulgarians (11%). 
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been funded from a combination of public and private sources from Spain and 
Romania. Funds from the Romanian government are limited and give little stability, 
whereas the grants from the Spanish government and Madrid administration have 
been significant in providing for projects and maintaining associations operating, 
although only for those who have been able to complete successful applications in 
the bidding process, and private sponsors for public events have included the 
international money-transfer companies Money Gram and Western Union. At the 
same time, the CEPI centres have provided spaces for Romanian associations to 
cheaply hold meetings and public events. 
Relations between associations have been varied. On the one hand, 
corruption and distrust have been common. The objectives of many have been to 
make money and perhaps hold a small cultural event, and the motives for their 
existence have often been questioned by others: 
 
‘Many people don’t have a background in associations and they make their 
associations as a personal economic source for their lives’ 
(Interview 28/11/2011) 
 
‘A Romanian associative culture does not exist. In other words, there are 
Romanian associations but they are directed and managed completely by 
political powers. Why? Because they are associations that do not aim at 
helping the Romanian community but rather at making money … Romanians 
have little associative culture, the phrase “non-profit” does not make sense 
for many of them’ 
(Interview 29/11/2011) 
 
Such criticisms appear to be confirmed by the high number of ‘dead’ associations 
with no recorded activities, no contact details and that have not responded to any 
contact for this project.  





‘There are all sorts. I cannot say that there is a unanimous representation, but 
there are collaborations between groups of associations. I mean, there are 




The specific objectives of these associations are varied, but all declared to work 
towards ‘integration’ through recognition of the rights and cultural identity of the 
Romanian population, whether through projects in schools, family excursions, arts 
and crafts, informative events, protests and so on. For example, the associations Dor 
Roman and Scanteia emphasised folkloristic cultural events such as performing 
traditional dances and painting Easter eggs, whereas others would undertake 
religious events such as the establishment of the Romanian Orthodox church in 
Alcalá by ACSIR and others, an Orthodox mass organised in the town square by the 
Association of Romanians in Móstoles, and suggested links between members of the 
Federation of Romanians in Europe (FADERE) and the Adventist church.
15
 Other 
associations such as Obatalá and ‘European Dialogue’ (Asociación Cultural 
Hispano-Rumana Diálogo Europeo) combined cultural events aimed at promoting 
the image of Romania in Spain with information on rights, political participation and 
calls for social inclusion, particularly as citizens of the EU since 2007. As this 
variety illustrates, there has been a range of ways of perceiving the identity and 
needs of Romanian immigrants in Spain presented by the associations. The 
expression of these identities in public has been interpreted as contributing to the 
socio-cultural integration of this population, and has been funded as such by grants 
from the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration and local 
administrations. 
Collaboration for these projects has been particularly common between the 
associations based in Coslada (Obatalá, Association Decebalus and the Association 
of Romanians from Coslada and San Fernando), although the central node across the 
Madrid area has been the Federation of Romanian Associations in Spain (Federación 
de Asociaciónes de Rumanos en España, FEDROM). Registered officially in 2004 
                                                             
15 For more information see online, available at http://spanish.adventistworld.org, accessed 9th 
September 2011  
189 
 
(although negotiations between members began in 2002), FEDROM brought 
together four associations from Madrid (ACSIR, Association ROM-Madrid, 
Romano-Hispanic Association ‘Romania’ and the Association of Romanians from 
Coslada and San Fernando) and one from Castellón (Association of Eastern 
Countries, in Valencia). In 2006 this expanded to nine members and in 2008 this 
expanded further to twenty associations from across Spain, eight of which were 
based in Madrid. The objective of the Federation has been to bring together 
associations that work for the integration of Romanians in Spain in order to ‘promote 
respect, living together, and the spread of the Romanian culture in Spanish society’. 
FEDROM provides an important resource for these associations, as it has constituted 
the only organisation to have its own headquarters, lawyer and up to date, fully 
working website (Interview 29/11/2012). On the website for FEDROM the contact 
details for all of the associations from the Community of Madrid have been made 
available to the public, regardless of whether they are members of the federation or 
not, meaning that the site could also act as an information hub for Romanian and 
Spanish organisations and institutions. 
The ties between Romanian associations have also been accompanied by a 
range of connections with government institutions and Spanish organisations. 
Indeed, the atmosphere has been described positively as one of inclusion and 
collaboration with local government institutions: 
 
‘It began in this way, a collaboration of support and information for the 
development of the activities of the associations of immigrants. The 
Immigration Council [of the Community of Madrid] deserves pretty big 
praise for this. There has been an open and hard-working relationship, not 
something abstract without any access. 
(Interview 9/12/2012) 
 
The CASI and CEPI centres have also been positively reviewed for providing 
material resources, from funding to space for meetings, and regular access to 
telephones and computers. Indeed, it has been suggested that the CASI in Alcalá 
contributed to the formation of FEDROM by providing a meeting space and granting 
funds for the travel expenses of representatives from outside Madrid (Interview 
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30/11/2011), evidence of how the local administration’s objective of establishing 
democratic participation of immigrant representatives has been developed in 
practice. 
Regarding ties between the administration and associations, FEDROM has 
provided the principal link, acting as a gatekeeper in a similar way to the role 
traditionally occupied by Catholic organisations and trade unions. In the 
participatory channels for immigrants in Madrid outlined in the previous section, 
FEDROM has been the only Romanian representative. In 2006 the Director of 
Madrid’s Immigration Council in the regional administration declared that they 
would offer logistic support for the presentation of projects by FEDROM and its 
member associations and in the same year the Federation was placed on the Forum 
for the Social Integration of Immigrants. It has also sat on the Madrid Forum for 
Dialogue and Coexistence since its inauguration in 2007 and its President was 
elected vice-President of the Forum in 2011. FEDROM has signed agreements for 
projects for the reception and integration of Romanian immigrants, cultural activities 
and cultural mediation with four town councils (Alcorcón, Coslada, Don Benito and 
Aranjuez) and in 2009 was included in the CON-FLUENCIA Forum for gender 
equality at the Ministry of Equality. Links with organisations of immigrants of other 
nationalities were formalised in 2008 through the REDCO network of 21 
associations from around Spain, and conferences and public events have also been 
held since the same year in collaboration with the General Workers’ Union trade 
union (Union General de Trabajadores, UGT). In this way FEDROM has provided 
an important node not only for connecting Romanian associations to each other, but 
for linking these with the material resources and opportunities for representation 
provided by Spanish institutions and organisations. 
A wide range of ties have also been formed with Spanish political parties. In 
particular, the PP has been active in publicly supporting Romanian immigrant 
activities. For example, in 2006 the President of the Community of Madrid from the 
PP formally opened the first Congress of Romanians in Spain, in Coslada.
16
 In the 
same year, the Romanian Elena Roman of the Association Dacia was placed as 
                                                             
16 For more information see the Madrid city council service, available at 
http://www.madrid.org/esperanzaaguirre/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3228:esp
eranza-aguirre-inaugura-el-i-congreso-de-la-comunidad-rumana-en-espana&catid=3:noticias-
generales&Itemid=50, accessed 12th December 2012 
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Director of Immigration for the PP administration of Alcalá de Henares, the Mayor 
of which authorised the building of the first Romanian Orthodox Church and was 
reported to have spent 60,000 Euros on public celebrations of the national day of 
Romania (El País, Medio millón de nuevos votantes, un gigantesco ‘caramelo’ para 
los partidos, 31
st
 December 2006). As noted above, in electoral politics, the director 
of ARCIS, Gheorghe Gainar, also headed the Solidarity and Democracy (Solidaridad 
y Democracia) electoral list in Alcalá de Henares in 2007, although the whole list 
received little more than 100 votes.  
However, these relations and connections have been interpreted in differing 
ways. For some, it represents an important part of the political process by 
establishing communication between decision makers and the public: 
 
‘Politicians need partners, and if they don’t have them, they invent them in 
order to manage, in some way, things between Spain and Romania. So, in 
some way, you get an association to do something for you’ 
(Interview 29/11/2011) 
 
For others, however it has been viewed more critically as an exchange of favours, of 
offering grants for immigrant-related projects in return for promotion of the party: 
 
‘There are associations that have done electoral campaigns for the PP here 
and that way have received a grant. Of course, it’s not money in an envelope, 
but a call for grant proposals is made and they are given it’ 
(Interview 28/11/2011) 
 
It is particularly significant that these links between associations and local political 
parties have been established since 2006 and with a view to the participation of 
Romanian nationals in the local elections of 2007 and 2011. In fact, interest in the 
voter preferences and actions of the political parties towards the new electorate from 
2007 was already a significant issue in the press from 2005 (El País, Los Partidos, a 
la caza del voto de los inmigrantes que irán a las urnas en 2007, 13
th
 November 
2005), illustrating a concern for how to react to the entry of Romania to the EU. At 
the same time, references to the Romanian associations have been recorded in the 
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Spanish press since 2001 and risen in the years before the entry of this population to 
the EU in 2007 (figure 14). Indeed, between 2005 and 2007 there were 36 references 
to them in the newspapers El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón, 19 of which were 
quotations from the director or spokesperson for FEDROM. 
The general pattern of Romanian immigrant politics in Madrid has thus 
evolved in the context of an open institutional structure with opportunities for 
collaboration and representation of Romanian interests in local politics. Connections 
with Spanish institutions and organisations have come in response to the symbolic 
capital of these actors as representatives of Romanian immigrants in the city and 
their social capital as points of contact for their co-nationals, particularly in the case 
of political parties that have been interested in ensuring that they appeal to the new 
European voters after 2007. In return, ties and connections have been accompanied 
by access to material resources for the Romanian associations. 
Figure 14. References of Romanian associations from Madrid in the newspapers El País, El Mundo, 
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So in summary the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid has been 
characterised by the presence of institutional channels for cultural recognition and 
representation and the provision of material and network resources through 
autochthonous institutions and organisations. On the one hand, funding opportunities 
from the national government, regional and local administrations and private 
companies have promoted the formation of associations and encouraged them to 
undertake cultural activities. On the other hand, the city administration and local 
political parties have also shown themselves to be open and encouraged the activities 
of Romanian associations, although this has been criticised as due to a superficial 
and not particularly transparent hunt for votes in the years preceding and following 
2007. At the same time, the Romanian population itself has, aside from the short-
lived associations that have sporadically arisen for personal or political purposes, 
been organised in a coherent and cohesive manner through the formation of a 
Federation that has been able to act as a node between them as well as giving them a 
voice in public and political debate.  
 
The dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid 
 
How have the identification and categorisation of Romanian immigrants in Madrid 
developed over time in this institutional and relational context? 
During the 1990s, the public image of the very small Romanian population of 
Madrid was tied to that of gypsies. In particular, at the end of the 1990s and early 
2000s there was an intense debate on gypsy camps around Madrid. The removal of 
one camp in Malmea passed into national political debate, as evidenced in the 
previous chapter, but others nearby in the north of the city in 1999 and 2000 and in 
Vallecas in the south in 2001 and 2002 were also the source of much debate. In the 
Madrid Assembly there were 13 debates on Romanians between 1998 and 2000, and 
these were all in reference to Romanian gypsy camps. Local tensions were also 
visible with neighbourhood protests such as those in the summer of 1999 from the 
residents of the northern neighbourhood of Begoña, where a petition of 2,500 
signatures contributed to the removal of a camp nearby, which took place on the 8
th
 
of July (El País, un laberinto de salida incierta, 17
th
 August 1999). There were 
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frequent reports in the press of the clearing of camps and once the camp residents 
were re-installed in the Madrid council’s temporary housing in November there were 
further complaints that there were insufficient resources for the population (El País, 
un centenar de niños rumanos lucha contra la helada en tiendas sin agua ni luz, 14
th
 
November 1999. The left wing newspaper El País presented the population as 
victims of social exclusion, poverty, hunger and misery at the hands of a 
dysfunctional administration. The right wing ABC presented them as an ethnic group 
that would not change its way of life and could not be integrated (ABC, somos 
nomadas, esta es nuestra vida, 23
rd
 September 2001). However, throughout this 
period press headlines from across the studied newspapers referred directly to them 
as a national rather than ethnic category: ‘the Romanians’ of the camps. 
At this time there was very little concern for Romanian nationals of a non-
ethnic minority background. For the PP administration, the Romanian population 
was one of gypsies who had particular cultural differences with the Spanish 
population that urged a distinct integration plan based on building segregated, 
temporary camps. These camps were justified by the councillor Pilar Martinez López 
as due to the fact that ‘the nomad population has the singular trait, that in its country 
of origin, it slept under the stars in its own vans and in the cold’. The PSOE directly 
criticised the PP administration for their management of the situation, yet did not 
disagree on the causes of the presence of camps being the specific cultural character 
of the ‘nomadic Romanian gypsies’. The criticism of the PP did not argue against 
creating temporary segregated camps but complained that there was not enough 
camps for all of them (El País, El PSOE exige otro campamento para los rumanos 
no censados, 4
th
 January 2000), and an IU member of the city council similarly 
criticised the methods of the administration, but not the definition of Romanians as 
nomads, stating that  
 
‘it is certain that there is a type of immigration that is more nomadic, but the 
government in response should create provisional reception infrastructures 
and reach agreements with the rest of the institutions to carry out social 
policies’  
(El País, El alcalde declara que la ‘etnia rumana’ no viene a Madrid a trabajar, sino 
a situarse en la marginación, 16
th




Across all of the parties, there was consensus regarding the need for policies for the 
population of the camps that protected their rights and ensured their social inclusion: 
 
‘We have a responsibility to procure the well-being of the most unprotected 
and vulnerable sectors of our community [… we act] according to the most 
scrupulous respect for these peoples’ human rights and dignity’ 
(Martinez Lopez, PP, Asamblea de Madrid, 2/8/1999) 
 
‘[we should] avoid problems such as this, which have to be solved with 
solidarity, tolerance and the most scrupulous respect for the dignity of the 
people and their human rights, becoming xenophobic and hostile attitudes 
towards immigration’ 
(Almeida Castro, PSOE, Asamblea de Madrid, 2/8/1999 
 
This fixed cultural identity is similar to that noticed in the city of Rome during the 
same period. Yet in Madrid there was consensus over the cause of the problem 
(gypsy culture), its implications (social exclusion and lack of dignity) and also the 
resolution to implement (camps). Both representatives’ emphasis of dignity and 
tolerance represent a clear consensus, whilst disagreement was instead in reference 
to logistical and technical questions concerning the length of stay for individuals in 
the camps, their location and the responsible administrative body. 
With increasing Romanian immigration in the 2000s, however, the debate 
shifted. As the Romanian immigrant population grew, stories of gypsies took up a 
smaller proportion of press reporting, and between 2000 and 2006 there were no 
debates at all regarding Romanians in the Madrid Assembly. A piece in El País in 
2001 examined the settlement of Romanian nationals in Alcalá de Henares and 
Coslada, emphasising the poor living conditions in Romania and the shared Latin 
language and cultural heritage of the two countries (El País, Del Europa del Este al 
este de Madrid, 10
th
 September 2001), whereas in the right wing press there appeared 
an increasing number of headlines reporting crimes, such as ‘Convicted, two 
Romanians for kidnapping and rape’ and ‘a gang of Romanians is stealing from 
drivers in the South station’. Reports of a Romanian Orthodox Church being set on 
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fire in Arganda del Rey in 2002 also reached national parliamentary debate due to 
the presence of neo-Nazi groups in the area, as evidenced in the previous chapter, 
although local fears of being ‘invaded’ by the arrival of ‘buses loaded with 
Romanians’ were also reflected in reports. (ABC, Tensión vicinal en Arganda ante el 
aluvión de inmigrantes y los incidents xenófobos, 13
th
 May 2002). As a result, for 
one Romanian interviewee who arrived in 2003, there was already a sense of 
suspicion in the city: 
 
‘I had never in my life thought that in any country in the world, at any 
moment, someone would say to me ‘hey, you’re a criminal!’ [… and] it 
wasn’t like they stopped in the street and said ‘you are a criminal!’ but it was 
the press, and above all the older people’  
(Interview 28/11/2011) 
 
However, these issues were rarely discussed in the local parliament or in public. 
The growth of debate on Romanian immigration and the increasing visibility 
of Romanian actors in Madrid truly came after 2005. This was due to the continued 
growth of the Romanian population as well as the preparation for the accession of 
Romania to the European Union in 2007. These factors are inter-related: the 
accession of Romania to the EU, with the granting of rights to free movement and 
local enfranchisement, brought fears of an increasing growth of the population from 
2007 but also meant that Romanians could represent a potentially influential 
electorate in local elections, particularly in the towns in which their presence was 
significant, such as Coslada and Alcalá. 
Two framing processes can be highlighted over this time in debates and press 
reporting. On the one hand, a victim frame was presented by representatives of 
FEDROM, composed of defining Romanian nationals as being disadvantaged due to 
their structural exclusion in laws, state policies and labour market conditions. The 
normative implication was that social exclusion was negative for the Romanians 
themselves but also for Spanish society as it meant that they could not contribute 




‘Today Romanians have very limited expectations for their work, but a time 
will come in which they will not conform to accessing only the lowest levels 
of the productive system. Their qualifications are not recognised’. 
(Miguel Fonda, FEDROM, El País, 24/6/2006) 
 
‘The most certain is that Romanians have jobs here, even if they are informal 
ones, but what they want is to legalise [their status] and pay their taxes’ 
(Gelu Vlasin, FEDROM, El País, 28/10/2006) 
 
At this time the trade unions, in particular the General Union of Work (Union 
General de Trabajo, UGT) and Workers Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, 
CCOO), were supporting a delay on the opening of the Spanish labour market to 
Romanian nationals as part of the EU accession process. Whilst the former 
underlined that they did not think there would be ‘an avalanche’, the latter was 
concerned of a threat of the arrival of Romanians: 
 
‘We consider a transition period to be prudent, in line with other countries, 
because we fear that if it is not done, a quantitatively significant movement 
could be produced that generates imbalances in the Spanish labour market’ 
(Julio Ruiz, CCOO, El País, Los sindicatos proponen retrasar la entrada de 
rumanos y búlgaros al mercado de trabajo, 27th October 2006)  
 
Despite being a recognisable representative for much of the Romanian population in 
Madrid and having a visible presence in local politics and press, FEDROM was not 
enable to prevent the restrictions to the Spanish labour market participation coming 
into force between 2006 and 2008. This policy outcome thus illustrates the limited 
weight of the Federation in policy making regarding the labour market in comparison 
to the trade unions, reflecting the continued strength of organised interests in a client 
politics decision making model. Despite giving organised Romanian representatives 
an opportunity for mobilisation, this restricted institutional structural context thus 
maintained a power differential vis-a-vis Spanish organised interests. 
On the other hand, however, the presence of Romanians in Madrid was also 
framed as an opportunity by politicians, press and Romanian actors. The first 
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reference in this sense came in 2005, with a report in the newspaper El País on the 
impact of immigrant populations being allowed to vote in the local elections in 2007: 
 
‘The political parties have not let the situation go unnoticed and they are 
carrying out the first actions to bring the over a million new voters to their 
ground […] all of the politicians consulted by El País recognise that the 
immigrant vote will have a decisive influence in the local elections and they 
agree that the most important thing is to encourage participation’ 
(El País, Los partidos a la caza del voto de los inmigrantes, 13th November 2005) 
 
Similarly, in 2006 the large Romanian population was described as a ‘gigantic sweet 
for the parties’ (El País, Medio millon de nuevos votantes, un gigantesco ‘caramelo’ 
para los partidos, 31st December 2006) and in 2007 the Romanian vote was defined 
‘a highly valued good’ to compete over (El País, A la caza del voto de Pircalabescu, 
1st March 2007).  
This framing of Romanian immigrants as an electoral opportunity in the 
period preceding and following 2007 must be seen in conjunction with the attempts 
of political parties, particularly the PP, to treat Romanian immigrants favourably in 
public. For example, in Alcalá de Henares the PP administration provided for the 
national day of Romania to be celebrated and permission was granted for an 
Orthodox Cathedral in 2006. The President of the Community of Madrid, also from 
the PP, visited Romania in the same year to discuss immigration, Romanian culture 
and bilateral relations between Madrid and Bucharest (ABC, Rumanos de ida y 
vuelta, 1
st
 February 2006). Romanians were included on party lists, described by one 
member of the PP as a decision taken at the regional rather than local levels of the 
party, suggesting that it constituted part of a wider party strategy rather than a 
reflection of local activism or participation: 
 
‘They offered it to me. In the Popular Party there was an interest, not at local 
level but at provincial and regional levels, in that they were considering that 
there could be participation from immigrants in the local elections. And as [in 





At this time, the President of Romania and the head of the Romanian Orthodox 
Church visited the PP administration in Madrid and Romanian political parties 
signed agreements with the PP and the PSOE before establishing offices and 
networks throughout Spain too, the motivations and implications of which will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
In contrast, the parties on the left also framed the Romanian immigrant 
population as an opportunity, but this was seen as part of a wider development of an 
inclusive and participatory democracy rather than an appeal to a specific nationality 
population: 
 
‘A population as important as the Romanian one in Coslada cannot live with 
its back to the rest of the citizens and we need them to build an open and 
solidary city’ 
(Agustín González Plasencia, PSOE, in ABC, 27/8/2006) 
 
‘[the Romanians] have the same rights and obligations as any other group of 
residents’ 
(Julio Setien, IU, in El País, 1/3/2007) 
 
These comments illustrate a universal approach to immigration which saw the 
presence of Romanians as part of a wider process of establishing social inclusion and 
equality. 
The actions of the Spanish political parties in framing Romanian immigration 
as an opportunity followed two distinct logics. For the PP, it involved selecting a 
specific nationality group as the basis for electoral campaigns. This was the same 
logic of treating immigrants as separate nationality groups that had been behind the 
original establishment of CASI and CEPI integration centres. For the parties on the 
left, the opportunity frame implied a more universalistic and less segmented view of 
the Romanian community and immigrant integration in general. However, these 
were both closely linked to the accession of Romania to the EU and in particular to 
the granting of local voting rights. Indeed, whereas FEDROM’s mobilisation around 
a victim frame prior to EU membership did not produce a change in the policy of 
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restricting labour market access, the possibility of Romanian voters influencing 
electoral results after 2007 resulted in close relationships between political leaders 
and Romanian representatives. The change was clearly noted by a Romanian 
representative in Alcalá in 2007: 
 
‘Now I feel happy because, when we arrived as immigrants we always had to 
ask [the political parties for things], and now it is them who offer’ 
(Nelia Pircalabescu, Association of Romanians from Coslada and San Fernando, in 
El País, 1/3/2007) 
 
In this way, the structural change in the status of Romanian nationals provided an 
opportunity for a shift in the way that Romanian immigration was framed. Among 
the local politicians debating Romanian immigration there was consensus on the 
opportunity provided by the population.  
To summarise, as found in Rome the dynamic of defining the boundaries of 
‘who is who’ in Madrid has been tied to the way that structurally situated actors have 
presented the Romanian population in public. While the Romanian population was 
small, the only publicly visible issues about them were concerned with their presence 
in gypsy camps around the city. Yet as the population has grown so this aspect has 
diminished. In part, this is simply because increasing Romanian immigration has 
resulted in gypsies constituting a smaller proportion of the total population and thus 
a smaller proportion of public debate. However, it has also been accompanied by a 
qualitative shift towards viewing the presence of Romanian immigrants as an 
opportunity, which has gathered cross-party consensus. At the root of the 
opportunity frame was an appeal to the votes of the Romanian immigrants that 
became citizens of the EU with local voting rights in 2007. This was particularly the 
case with the PP in places such as Alcalá de Henares where the Romanian population 
was especially large.  
The very fact that the public framing of the presence of Romanian 
immigrants as an opportunity came at the same time that restrictions were applied to 
further Romanian immigration, however, illustrates the way that politicians and 
decision makers speak in different ways and follow different logics of action 
according to their audience. In this way, whereas the opportunity frame followed a 
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majoritarian vote-maximising logic prior to elections, the restrictions to the labour 
market reflected the greater bargaining power of organised labour interests in 
decision making (Freeman 1995). In this way, in Madrid there has been an opposite 
policy gap to that found in Italy, as an open discourse has accompanied increasing 
immigration controls rather than a restrictive discourse whilst opening borders for 
foreign workers. 
Moreover, this move to categorise Romanian immigrants due to the 
opportunity that their presence provided was a noticeably early development that 
came in the years before their membership of the EU in 2007. This was quite 
different to the pattern found in Rome, where the impact of the shift in legal and 
political status from accession the EU did not even occur in the years after 2007. The 
explanation for the situation in Madrid lay in the institutional and discursive 
structures that had shaped the local politics of immigration there. Solidarity, equality 
and participation had been the defining principles of the local policies for immigrant 
integration in Madrid, repeating the same values that constituted the post-transition 
cleavage outlined in the previous chapter. The channels for political representation 
and participation promoted the organisation of immigrants along lines of nationality 
and, to this end, material resources were made available for the formation of 
associations. This facilitated the formation of Romanian organisations, in particular 
the Federation FEDROM, which would in turn benefit from the tendency of political 
parties and institutions to favour specific, large gatekeeper organisations over others 
in communication networks. In such a structural context, reaching and appealing to 
representatives of Romanian origin in anticipation of their vote was easily achieved 
through interaction with established associations or by funding new ones. In sum, the 
availability of material resources and the development of social capital bonds 
between Romanian actors and local Spanish actors in Madrid facilitated their 
mobilisation in anticipation of the Romanian enfranchisement in 2007. 
Finally, although the structural context has facilitated the formation of 
communication networks and the presentation of an inclusive view of Romanian 
immigrants as an opportunity, it has only empowered Romanian actors in a limited 
way. On the one hand, it is true that through their social capital and situation in an 
inclusive institutional context, Romanian associations gained access to material 
resources that enabled them to operate, hold cultural events, establish an Orthodox 
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church, celebrate the national day of Romania and undertake projects for their 
‘integration’. However, on the other hand these resources did not enable them to 
prevent the Spanish government from placing restrictions on their inclusion in the 
labour market from 2007 to 2009, a policy decision that showed the trade unions to 
be the winners, illustrating their greater power in policy making. Following from the 
end of the period of study for this thesis, labour market restrictions were re-applied 
in 2011, with no widespread responses from the Romanian actors. In this way, the 
local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid represents an 
opportunity for inclusion as cultural and political members of the polity, but also a 
restricted empowerment that does not enable them to influence wider policy 





The topic of this chapter was the local dimension of responses to Romanian 
immigration in the local contexts of Rome and Madrid. An open definition of the 
‘local dimension’ was employed to cover the regional and city administrations of 
Lazio and Rome in Italy, and the Community and city of Madrid in Spain. This 
enabled inclusion of the varied structures, discourses, activities and social relations 
that shape society and politics in these places. Indeed, in both cases some of the 
actors referenced were based around these cities, although they did carry out 
activities in them.  
The analysis presented in this chapter has found the local dimension to be a 
significant site of the politics of immigration and the definition of the social 
boundaries of inclusion in the polity. A wider range of actors have engaged in the 
definition of Romanian immigration than that found in the national debates of the 
previous chapter. These included political parties, local administrations, charities, 
trade unions, NGOs, press and Romanian cultural associations. This illustrates the 
way that, although local institutional structures may provide wider opportunities for 
a greater range of voices to engage in the negotiation of ‘who is who’, the greater 
resources that are enjoyed by dominant political parties and social organisations with 
national reach, such as trade unions and the Catholic Church, continue to ensure a 
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balance of power in their favour that permits their control of the dominant framing 
pattern. 
In both cases the way that Romanian immigrants have been framed has been 
broadly similar to that found in the national dimension. In Rome, there has been a 
dominant threat frame that has been presented with consensus across right and left 
wing parties, whereas in Madrid there has been a more inclusive approach, 
emphasising how the presence of Romanians constitutes an opportunity. These 
distinct patterns have occurred as actors have adapted to their structural settings and 
the quite different arrangements of institutions, discourses and networks in the two 
cities.  
In Rome, the opportunity structure favoured Italian political parties and 
dominant autochthonous gatekeeper organisations, whilst Romanian immigrants had 
limited access to material resources and formed a fragmented and divided body of 
actors. At the same time, in Rome there has been no real understanding of 
immigration as a structural phenomenon with implications beyond the labour market 
and no over-arching consensus on a public philosophy of immigrant integration in 
the city. The rise of a dominant discourse seeing Romanians as a threat was in part a 
continuation of an essentialising interpretation of cultural difference as requiring 
segregation and separation, through building temporary camps for Romani gypsies 
or deporting Romanian immigrants. However, it was also a repetition of that seen in 
the previous chapter as a vote-maximising logic saw public concerns emphasised and 
brought to the fore by both major parties on the right and left. Disenfranchised 
immigrants were unable to exercise an influence in the sense that they were not, until 
2007, potential voters. In this context of a closed institutional structure, the 
opportunity for mobilisation of a counter-argument from Romanian actors came in 
the form of alignment with the only consensual discourse; that of the threat frame. 
In contrast, in Madrid there was a much greater availability of material 
resources for Romanian associations, which facilitated the positioning of FEDROM 
as a significant actor in contact with autochthonous institutions. At the same time, a 
clearly defined philosophy of integration based on the concept of interculturality and 
emphasising tolerance and democratic participation as central values to 
contemporary Spanish society and politics motivated the construction of social 
spaces and cultural associations for immigrants. Across left and right wing parties 
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there was consensus in debate on the importance of the notions of tolerance for 
cultural difference and equal access to resources that underpinned this philosophy. 
Thus, the values of a post-transition cleavage emphasising democracy and tolerance 
have continued to broadly shape the local dimension of politics in Spain, which has 
been put into practice through policies facilitating the formation and mobilisation of 
immigrant-specific organisations. Consequently there was relatively little discussion 
of Romanian immigration at all, despite the fact that public opinion surveys have 
recorded an increasingly negative view of immigrants of this nationality, as noted in 
earlier chapters. When responses to Romanian immigration were made, moreover, 
they were positive, driven by a logic of vote-maximising in anticipation of 2007.  
Despite this difference in context and frame content the logic of action of 
dominant actors in each case has been similar: local elected political actors have 
been concerned with appealing to voters. In Rome, local politicians called for 
deportations and underlined an apparently criminal, violent nature to Romanian 
immigrants in response to public tensions, accompanied by Romanian actors who 
have also emphasised the presence of criminal co-nationals in order to define 
themselves as a potential resource in fighting crime. In Spain, moreover, local 
politicians have formed connections with Romanian actors and facilitated social and 
cultural activities for them in order to appeal to their potential votes. The granting of 
local voting rights to Romanian immigrants has thus provided a vital shift in the 
opportunity structure and changed the way that local politicians refer to them. In 
Madrid, local politicians could benefit from their established networks with 
Romanian actors in order to appeal to potential voters, whereas in Rome a longer 
process of mobilisation and negotiation through frame alignment from specific 
Romanian actors would be required to overcome the uncertainty of Italian 
politicians. In short, a greater imbalance of power in Rome has posed more 
significant barriers to influencing the dominant frames used to categorise Romanian 







The Cross-border Dimension of the Politics of Romanian Immigration in 




So far, this thesis has analysed the national and local politics of Romanian 
immigration in Italy and Spain by studying how different social and political actors 
have negotiated the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant. These actors have 
used material, symbolic and network resources to mobilise publicly, framing 
Romanian immigration in ways that balance their view with their discursive and 
institutional contexts. This chapter will contribute further by asking how actors, 
structures and resources from beyond the territorial borders of Italy and Spain have 
too influenced these negotiations. Indeed, individuals, organisations and institutions 
in both countries have established and maintained political, economic and personal 
links with Romania and other countries. At the same time, their movement and legal 
status has recently been characterised by the granting of cross-border rights by both 
the Romanian State and the European Union (EU). The issue to be studied here is 
how these cross-border relations and processes have influenced the politics of 
defining the meaning of ‘who is who’ in Italy and Spain.  
The ‘cross-border dimension’ referred to here illustrates the way that social 
networks, boundaries of socio-cultural belonging, avenues of capital and resources 
and institutional structures are multi-dimensional and layered; they are not simply 
tied to the territorial borders of cities, regions or countries. Transnationalism has 
gained much popularity as a way of describing and interpreting such cross-border 
activities and processes in studies of globalisation, international migration and EU 
integration. This literature is concerned with how structures, networks and flows of 
people, ideas, rights, capital, goods and services that go beyond the territorial borders 
of individual countries are embedded in local settings. Similarly, the objective of the 
current chapter is, to paraphrase Faist, to explain whether ‘old’ national and local 
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terms of citizenship, belonging and membership acquire ‘new’ meanings in a context 
of cross-border flows and activity (Faist 2010: 34).  
In the specific case studies of this thesis, cross-border activity has increased 
in recent years at the macro-level of the Romanian State and the EU and at the meso-
level of political parties and organisations. This has offered increased opportunities 
for political representation of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain, but not 
resulted in widespread participation in practice. As will be evident here, neither has 
it influenced the dominant framing patterns that have characterised responses to 
Romanian immigration in these countries. Thus, although there has been a 
significant level of cross-border activity, the impact this may have on the politics of 
immigration is contingent on the balance of power and choices of political actors in 
the local context. 
This argument will develop over three main sections. The first will outline 
the theoretical basis for an understanding of cross-border activity by summarising 
the academic literature on transnationalism in the context of globalisation and 
European Union integration. The second examines the development of cross-border 
activities of Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain, describing how a cross-border 
dimension to the politics of immigration has only developed in the late 2000s and in 
a primarily top-down, elite-led way with few resources and little in the way of 
initiatives to encourage widespread participation. . Finally, the third section analyses 
the influence of this cross-border dimension on the negotiation of what it means to 
be a Romanian immigrant in Italy in Spain. It will be argued that, despite developing 
significantly during the 2000s, the cross-border dimension has not resulted in the 
empowerment of Romanian actors to transform the dominant framing patterns that 
have already been witnessed in the national and local dimensions of the previous two 
chapters. In fact, the Romanian State has been slow and under-resourced when it has 
come to reacting to situations of need of Romanian citizens abroad, whilst political 







Transnationalism in the context of globalisation and European Union 
integration 
 
This section will set out the relevance of examining cross-border activity within 
Europe, in particular how processes of transnationalism and European Union 
integration are illustrative of ‘changing forms of cross-border mobility, membership 
and citizenship’ (Faist 2010: 13). 
Over the past two decades, transnationalism has become widely referenced 
across the social sciences, and particularly in immigration studies (for example, 
Amelina and Faist 2012, Bauböck and Faist 2010, Kivisto 2001, Levitt 2001, Portes 
2001, Portes et al 1999, Vertovec 1999, 2001, 2009). Indeed, international migration 
and transnationalism have been described as ‘reciprocally interconnected 
phenomena’ (Kivisto 2001: 551). One of the founding studies of the contemporary 
interest in the topic, from Nye and Keohane, defined transnational relations as cross-
border interactions involving ‘at least one actor [who] is not an agent of a 
government or an international organisation’ (1971: 332). Similarly, Portes has 
distinguished transnational activities from international relations between states and 
multinational activities of single large corporations due to the way that they are  
 
‘initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be they organized groups 
or networks of individuals across national borders […] even when supervised 
by state agencies, the key aspect of transnational activities is that they 
represent goal-oriented initiatives that require coordination across national 
borders by members of civil society’ (Portes 2001). 
 
Similarly, Faist has defined transnational spaces as ‘relatively stable, lasting and 
dense sets of ties reaching beyond and across borders of sovereign states’ (2010: 13) 
and Vertovec has noted how ‘most social scientists working in the field may agree 
that “transnationalism” broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people 
or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (1999: 447).  
Defined in these open terms, some form of transnationalism is a situation 
found in the everyday lives and political, socio-cultural and economic activities of 
many, although not all, international migrants. Furthermore, mobility and the 
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maintenance of ties and interactions across the borders of states may influence how 
they understand their own identity, undertake their everyday activities, organise 
collectively and participate politically and economically within or across different 
places and localities (Vertovec 2009: 24).  
Transnational activity cannot be viewed in isolation from the multi-
dimensional and multi-location flows and processes that characterise contemporary 
globalisation. Indeed, much theory and empirical analysis has explored the way that 
cross-border flows of capital, ideas, people, goods and services in the current phase 
of globalisation have contributed to a blurring of the boundaries between local, 
national and international levels of politics, economics and social relations (see for 
example, Beck 2005, Castells 2000, Sassen 1996, 2006, Talani 2004, 2009, Walker 
1993, 2010). This research has promoted a move away from ‘methodological 
nationalism’, which posited that the cultural boundaries of nations were fixed and 
coincided with the administrative and territorial boundaries of states and societies, 
towards a focus on mobility and networked flows of people, ideas and capital among 
diverse spatial locations (Beck 2005). In this way, for Castells globalisation and 
modern communications technology have contributed to the formation of a ‘network 
society’ in which dynamic flows of capital and information, and therefore power, are 
embedded in specific local institutional and cultural networks (2000, 2009, 2010). 
Similarly, Sassen has suggested that global cities such as London, Tokyo and New 
York are hubs of power because they are where financial and social networks are 
most densely concentrated, from information technology and the finance sector to 
physical interaction and transaction between highly diverse peoples (1991, 1994, 
2006). However, whereas these studies are interested in characterising and 
explaining shifts in economic, social and political structures in the global age, 
transnationalism studies ask what the implications of this are for the actions of 
individuals, organisations and institutions. In the same way, the cross-border 
dimension of the politics of immigration is concerned with examining how agency 
can be enacted within this layered and multi-dimensional global context (Faist 2010: 
23). 
These developments are particularly evident in the European Union. Cross-
border activity and flows have constituted a central part of the social and political 
development of the EU, although the precise notion of ‘transnationalism’ has been 
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used less frequently than would perhaps be expected in academic studies (for 
examples that do, see Hurrelmann and DeBardeleben 2011, Kaiser and Starie 2005, 
Rogers 2000). As noted in previous chapters, the cross-border free movement of 
workers and businesses between Member States of the Community were objectives 
in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the removal of obstacles to goods, services, 
workers and capital has been an objective since the Single European Act of 1985 
(Maas 2007: 37). Despite this process being driven to a large degree by the economic 
interest in creating a common market (Talani 2004), many policy makers and 
academics also aspired that cross-border mobility and ties would contribute to the 
construction of a unified EU polity. According to this perspective, free movement 
and a shared labour market would eventually spill over into feelings of loyalty 
towards shared institutions and a sense of cultural and political unity among equal 
Europeans (Eder 2006, Herrmann and Brewer 2004, Laffan 2004, Maas 2007, Spohn 
2005). From 1992 the establishment of an EU citizenship regime in which rights to 
employment, mobility, non-discrimination and local and supranational political 
participation have been bundled at the EU level (Bauböck 2010) appears to further 
this process by providing opportunities for vertical connections to form between 
individuals and organisations in civil society and the EU institutions, as well as 
horizontal ties to develop between freely moving citizens. This has led Kaiser and 
Starie to argue that the increasing constitutionalisation of the EU ‘expands the scope 
for cross-border exchanges, transnational socialization and policy transfer below the 
EU level’ (2005: 1). In short, as with the studies of immigrant transnationalism 
mentioned above, in this European studies literature it has been suggested that cross-
border relations and processes provide opportunities to change the way that people 
think of themselves, their everyday activities and their connections to institutions, 
organisations and other people. 
However, the study of transnationalism has also been problematic, 
particularly so in the context of the EU, for the following reasons: 
Firstly, approaches to ‘transnational’ relations have been criticised for 
focusing on a reductive interpretation of ties and allegiances as restricted to two 
nation states and for favouring essentialised national categories over those based on 
gender, ethnicity or mutual interest (Wimmer 2007).  
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Secondly, transnationalism has often been referred to as a ‘concept’ yet has 
little, if any, explanatory value; rather, the notion of transnationalism represents a 
description of a context in which relations and processes from beyond the territorial 
borders of states are embedded in local and national contexts. As noted by Cingolani 
and Piperno in reference to international migrants, ‘transnationalism is not an 
ontological property [… but rather] one of the many dimensions of the migration 
experience, tied to precise choices and opportunities’ (2005: 17). In light of this, the 
study of the cross-border dimension of the politics of immigration must be 
concerned with how cross-border relations and processes provide opportunities for 
political actors to engage in the negotiation of ‘who is who’ and why these actors 
decide to make specific choices.  
Thirdly, in studies of the EU, transnationalism has problematically been 
presented as a macro-theory of social and political integration, due to the teleological 
assumption that increasing opportunities for cross-border activity will lead directly to 
the construction of a sense of unity and shared identity among individuals and 
groups (see for example Kaiser and Starie 2005). In contrast, and as the previous 
chapters of this thesis have already illustrated, cross-border mobility and shared 
rights of EU citizenship do not necessarily lead directly to this outcome. Instead, 
national and local boundaries of inclusion or exclusion have been defined through 
negotiations between specific actors who have not always wanted to welcome EU 
citizens from other Member States. In this way, citizenship of the EU is not only 
bundled at different administrative levels, but also socially embedded in local 
contexts. An understanding of the impact of cross-border activities and processes on 
the development of a polity of the EU must therefore concentrate on how political 
actors in specific settings adapt to the shifting transnational context to negotiate their 
role and presence. 
From these diverse studies, some cornerstones for the analysis of this chapter 
can be uncovered. It will firstly be asked, in the following section, whether cross-
border relations exist, between who and why. Subsequently, the way in which 
political actors claiming to categorise or represent Romanian immigrants respond to 
these cross-border relations and processes will be analysed. The chapter thus 
examines how the negotiation of ‘who is who’ in reference to Romanian immigration 
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is structurally situated in structures and differentials of power that are not necessarily 
bounded by the borders of the Italian and Spanish States. 
 
 
The cross-border dimension of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain 
 
Cross-border activity and flows have already figured largely in academic research on 
Romanian migration in Europe. However, the emphasis has been narrowly placed on 
the phenomenon of migration networks between locations of origin and settlement 
(Cingolani 2007, Cingolani and Piperno 2005, Eve 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008, 
Marcu 2009b, 2011, Potot 2008, Sandu 2005, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008). This 
section will summarise this literature before moving on to discuss the specific 
political cross-border activities that have developed involving individuals, 
organisations and State institutions. In doing so it will illustrate the way that as the 
Romanian emigrant population has grown so too have the opportunities for cross-
border political activity. 
 
The micro-level: individuals 
 
Emigration from Romania has both benefitted from and encouraged further the 
development of cross-border mobility patterns, kinship ties and economic relations. 
As will be illustrated below, accession to the EU has also undoubtedly influenced 
this cross-border activity with the outcome that by 2010 Romanian migrants 
constituted the largest nationality population of mobile citizens moving from one 
Member State to another (data from Eurostat) 
Although the general settlement pattern amongst Romanian migrants in Italy 
and Spain has been reported as fragmented in and beyond the local contexts of 
settlement (Cingolani 2007, Eve 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008,), the migration process 
has to a large degree been facilitated and driven by close interconnections between 
personal contacts, kinship networks and migrant brokers (Pajares 2007: 102-4). In 
this way, Sandu has illustrated how friendship and kinship ties have constituted 
important resources for emigrants from Romania, such as early migration by ethnic 
Hungarians and Germans being facilitated by their great number of relatives or 
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acquaintances abroad, while subsequent patterns forged ties linking regions and 
villages in Romania with specific localities in other countries (2005: 560-2). In 
Spain, for example, the prevalence of migrants in Coslada from the same Adventist 
congregation in Romania, and agricultural workers in Almeria from the region of 
Teleorman in southern Romania also attest to the significance of these interpersonal 
contacts (Potot 2008: 90).  
However, as visa free travel and later free movement rights have been 
granted and transport connections have improved, networks have become less 
significant and diverse types of mobility have arisen. In this way, patterns of circular 
or temporary migration became more common as individuals could travel from 
Romania to Italy for ‘working holidays’ in short term roles (Eve 2008: 82-3, Gabriel 
Anghel 2008: 792) and ‘networks that favoured intense, cyclical mobility between 
Romania and Spain were formed’ (Marcu 2011: 1). The ease of mobility 
characterising these temporary movements has meant that employers in Italy and 
Spain have had access to a flexible labour source whilst workers have benefitted 
from higher earnings than those in Romania, enabling them to pay for their own 
homes, buy a new car or television, or send a child to university upon return 
(Cingolani and Piperno 2005: 8, Eve 2008: 84). In this way, the granting of free 
movement rights is said to have boosted consumption ‘at home’ as it became easier 
than before to travel back to Romania to spend the wealth found abroad (Gabriel 
Anghel 2008: 798). For some, free movement between the countries also meant that 
life could be balanced between living in one or the other place; 
 
‘I have two homes, I am from here and from there, and there is no trouble, no 
suffering. Since there are two languages in my head, it is normal to have two 
homes, right?’ (interview referenced in Marcu 2012: 42) 
 
For others an eventual return to Romania is often considered, from regular holidays 
in the summer to years spent abroad before returning or only temporary seasonal 
emigration (Cingolani 2005: 4, Pajares 2007: 126-9). Finally, for some in Spain 
permanent return has been reported as an option since the economic crisis began in 
2008 (Marcu 2011, 2012). 
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The increasing cross-border mobility outlined here has been accompanied, to 
a degree, by economic cross-border flows. On the one hand, Romanian goods have 
been sold in shops in Italy and Spain (Cingolani 2007: 10-13). On the other hand, 
remittances have provided a significant source of income to Romania since the late 
1990s, whether through formal transfer systems or informal cross-border deliveries 
(Ban 2009: 12-4). However, little investment from the emigrant population has been 
reported in Romanian business (Pajares 2007: 124-5). This activity has also been 
described by Cingolani and Piperno as a form of ‘weak transnationalism’ occurring 
irregularly and being based on individual strategies and connections rather than 
collective organisation (2005: 3). 
These factors illustrate how the limited and inconsistent cross-border 
activities between individuals have not established a stable transnational social 
space.  
 
The macro-level: States and EU institutions 
 
At the macro-level, both the Romanian State and institutions of the EU have 
developed avenues for vertical cross-border links to be made with Romanian 
migrants in Italy and Spain. 
The Romanian State has increasingly attempted to strengthen connections 
with the growing population of political exiles and emigrants around the world. 
Government departments have created opportunities for cultural, economic and 
social activities to be carried out in the countries of settlement of Romanian 
emigrants. In particular, in 1998 an Under-Secretariat for Romanians Abroad was 
created. It was renamed the Department for Romanians Abroad (Departamentul 
pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, DRP) and transferred to the Ministry of Public 
Information in 1999, then moved to the General Secretariat of the Government in 
2003, to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister in 2004 and finally to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2005, where its budget and activities have increased 
(Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, The History). The objectives of the 
DRP have been ‘preserving and affirming the ethnical [sic.], cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of Romanians’ as well as ‘strengthening the links between 
Romania and the Romanian communities abroad’ by offering grants for cultural, 
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educational and religious projects and building closer ties to ‘personalities or 
organizations from the Diaspora’ (Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, 
DRP Objectives). In 2004, the Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and 
Family also established a Department for Labour Abroad (Departamentul pentru 
Muncă în Străinătate) with the objectives of improving the social and economic 
conditions and protecting the rights of emigrants (Sandu et al 2004).  
However, the impact of these departments has been doubtful. The 
Department for Labour Abroad has been described as unknown by many Romanians 
and ineffective by others (Pajares 2007). The choice of projects of the Department 
for Romanians Abroad has also been criticised and the amount of funding available 
described as ‘limited’ (Interview 28/11/2011). Indeed, the Department has been 
under-resourced for the size of the Romanian emigrant population and inactive when 
it has come to building and maintaining institutional ties in the countries of 
Romanian immigration. The impact of funding has been further restricted by the 
exchange from the Romanian lei to the euro, so that from the perspective of emigrant 
organisations ‘what is a large amount for them, is little for us’ (Interview 
09/12/2011). In sum, the Departments for Romanians Abroad and for Labour Abroad 
have been viewed as symbolic developments with little real impact on the lives of 
Romanian emigrants.  
The most high profile cultural activities in Italy and Spain that have been 
directly funded by the Romanian State are those of the Academy of Romania in 
Rome (Accademia di Romania in Roma), and the Romanian Cultural Institute in 
Madrid (Instituto Cultural Rumano). Both form part of a network of 16 Romanian 
cultural institutes across the world, headed by the ‘Romanian Cultural Institute’ in 
Bucharest, which was established in 2003 in order to increase the visibility of 
Romanian culture in the world and communicate with foreign audiences. In Rome, 
the Academy of Romania has had an historic and prestigious presence in the city, 
existing as a school since 1921 before being inaugurated as a cultural academy in 
1933, with Mussolini in attendance (Giornale Luce, January 1933).
17
 Its activity has 
to this date focused on studying the arts and humanities and promoting Romanian 
culture through exhibitions, concerts, conferences and shows. The Cultural Institute 
                                                             
17 At the entrance to the Academy there remains a stone plaque from 1932 of donators on which 
Benito Mussolini is the only Italian name. 
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in Madrid was formally established only in December 2006, although it had existed 
as a smaller Cultural Foundation for the previous five years and it contains spaces for 
art exhibitions, classes, workshops and film screenings (albeit in a considerably 
smaller space than that of the Academy in Rome). These Institutes employ the 
material resources provided by the Romanian State to project a positive international 
image of modern and traditional cultural activities and products from Romania. As a 
result, their audiences have principally been the respective Italian and Spanish 
populations in these capital cities, rather than Romanian emigrants (Interview 
21/11/2011). 
The opportunity for vertical linkages to form between individuals and the 
Romanian State has also, moreover, been established through the granting of 
external voting rights to Romanian citizens abroad. Since 1991, the Romanian 
citizenship law has allowed dual citizenship, with national enfranchisement, for 
individuals who either lost or were forced to renounce their membership in the past 
(Burean 2011, Iordachi 2009, Popescu 2012). This enabled the repatriation of many 
individuals without them having been residents in Romania and their 
enfranchisement from abroad, with their votes in national and presidential elections 
being added to the Bucharest circumscription. In 2008 this was expanded when four 
deputies and two senators for ‘the diaspora’ were established. Eligible to run and 
vote were emigrants who could demonstrate being resident in their host country and 
dual-nationality Romanian citizens abroad (Popescu 2012). Despite these 
opportunities, however, in the Romanian presidential elections of 2009 the 
Romanian turnout in Italy and Spain was low, with 42,500 votes cast in Italy and 
38,500 in Spain, considerably below the total Romanian population in either country 
(Burean 2011: 102). As suggested by Harja, although this represented a rising voter 
turnout it is still ‘very far from marking a mass or ‘physiological’ participation in the 
political life in Romania’ (2011: 101). Thus, an institutional opportunity for vertical 
ties between emigrants and the Romanian State has been established, yet has 
provoked little in the way of bottom-up participation.  
Similarly, since the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007, Romanian 
immigrants in Italy and Spain have been granted the right to participate in local and 
European Parliament elections. As noted above, this constituted an opportunity for 
the formation of vertical political ties between Romanian nationals and local and 
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supranational institutions. However again, the granting of local voting rights has not 
brought about a significant level of electoral participation from Romanian nationals 
in either Italy or Spain, as noted in the previous chapter, and neither has the 
possibility of voting in elections to the European Parliament. Indeed, it was reported 
that for the European elections of 2009, only 28,467 Romanians registered to vote in 
Italy and 49,317 in Spain (Popescu 2012: 107).  
In summary during the 1990s and early 2000s there were very few 
opportunities for cross-border political activity and the resources available were 
minimal. In later years, despite an increase in both opportunities and resources for 
Romanians abroad, vertical ties between Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain 
and either the Romanian State or EU institutions have involved only a minority of 
the population. 
 
Meso-level: Organisations and Institutions 
 
At the meso-level of organisations there has also been a growth in cross-border 
activity as the Romanian populations in Italy and Spain have grown. The principal 
organisations have been political parties and religious institutions which have 
expanded in response to the shift in the status of Romanians as voters abroad and 
citizens of the EU. As with macro-level developments, these have nevertheless only 
recently been established.  
Since the late 2000s, the two largest Romanian parties, the Democratic-
Liberal Party (PD-L, Partidul Democrat-Liberal) and the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD, Partidul Social Democrat), have both been active within the emigrant 
population as this has grown and specific seats for Romanians abroad in the national 
parliament have been created. This interest has responded to the importance of the 
emigrant vote in legislative and presidential elections that were decided by very 
small margins. In Romanian politics, conflict and polarisation between communists 
and anti-communists, as well as patronage and clientelism by both, characterised the 
1990s and led to instability in the 2000s. In response, after winning the elections of 
2000 the Social Democratic Party (PDSR, Partidul Democratiei Sociale) merged 
with the other historic Social Democratic Party to form a new Social Democratic 
Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) and emphasised a new platform built on 
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modernisation, integration with the EU and globalisation (Ciobanu 2007: 1438). 
However, the elections of 2004 produced an evenly divided parliament between the 
PSD’s coalition on the left and the so-called Alliance of Truth and Justice coalition 
on the right, the latter with a weak majority. In the same year, the presidential 
election was also won by only 250,000 votes by Traian Basescu of the Democratic 
Party (Partidul Democrat). After this victory, the Democratic Party promptly left the 
Socialist International and adopted a populist right wing approach from 2005 
onwards, finally merging with the Liberal party in 2007 to form the Democratic 
Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal, PD-L), the largest party on the right 
(Ciobanu 2007: 1441). Following the legislative elections of 2008 the PD-L was the 
largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies with 51 seats, only two more than 
the PSD and Conservative coalition in the opposition, and in the 2009 Presidential 
election Traian Basescu of the PD-L was re-elected, albeit in contested 
circumstances after receiving 50.3% of the vote in the runoff and being accused of 
fraud. In such close elections, the external vote of Romanians abroad could prove 
significant, and indeed it was; in 2009 the re-election of Basescu as Romanian 
President was assured by the 115,831 votes that he received from Romanians abroad, 
polling 78.9% of the external voter turnout (Burean 2011: 100).
18
  
Both of these principal parties have opened offices in Italy and Spain as part 
of an expansion into ‘diaspora’ politics. The diaspora sections of the PD-L and PSD 
consist of branches in Spain and Italy, each with smaller local organisations. The 
first PD-L branch in either country was established in 2005 in Castellón, in Spain, 
and since then they have also arisen in many other cities across Italy and Spain. The 
leader of the PD-L in Castellón, William Brinza, was elected to the Romanian 
parliament as representative of the diaspora in 2009, and he has since emphasised the 
importance of Romanian remittances, promoted return migration of emigrants and 
criticised the lack of support offered to emigrants by the Romanian government. 
Similarly, the PSD has existed in Italy since 2005, although the foundation of its 
Italian section was only formally communicated in 2010 (PSD Italia, PSD Italia– 
proiecte generale de activitate) and in Spain since 2007, when the first branch was 
                                                             
18 For reports on these elections see also Impact News Romania, Rezultate finale : Băsescu câştigă cu 
71 de mii de voturi, 7th December 2009, available at 
http://www.impactnews.ro/Alegeri/Rezultate-finale-:-B%C4%83sescu-





 The declared aims of the PSD Diaspora section have been 
to stimulate and maintain links between party members and sympathisers in 
Romania and abroad, developing relations of dialogue, promoting the party and 
contributing to an improved political image of Romania abroad (Statute Art. 5-6).  
Both the PD-L and PSD have also reached formal agreements with the 
primary Italian and Spanish political parties to collaborate in elections. Since 2009 
the Romanian PD-L has collaborated with the Italian PDL and the Spanish Popular 
Party (PP), gaining support for the presidential candidacy of Traian Basescu and in 
return promoting the electoral lists of the latter in European Parliament elections. 
The PSD also signed a bilateral agreement with the Spanish PSOE to act as ‘sister 
parties’ in 2008; in November of the same year they ran joint local campaigns for the 
elections for the Romanian parliament and in June 2009 the vice-president of PSD 
Spain was supported as a candidate on the party lists for European Parliament 
elections. In Italy an agreement of cooperation was signed between the PSD and the 
Italian Democratic Party (PD) in 2010 in which the PD promised to support PSD 
candidates in Italy during Romanian elections and establish an office for the Italian 
section of the party, whilst the PSD would support PD candidates among potential 
Romanian voters. In both countries, the PD-L has however been the most effective at 
mobilising electoral support; in the presidential elections of 2009, for example, they 
won 78% of the vote in Italy and 81% in Spain (Burean 2011: 102). 
The development of these activities in only recent years has been due partly 
to the increasing size of the Romanian population during the 2000s, and particularly 
to the changing legal and institutional context found since 2007. Indeed, following 
the period of 2007 and 2008 the benefits of establishing branches of the PD-L and 
PSD in Italy and Spain increased significantly because of the added seat in the 
parliament for the Romanian ‘diaspora’ and the growth of the Romanian electorate 
abroad.  
The granting of accession of Romania to the EU at the same time also 
provided two further opportunities. On the one hand, the PD-L and the PSD were 
able to join European Parliament party groups; the former became a member of the 
European Peoples Party and the latter of the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
                                                             
19 A general overview of the PSD Italian and Spanish branches are available on their websites, at 
http://psditalia.eu and http://www.psdbarcelona.es, accessed 10t`h February 2013 
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These shared groups were explicitly mentioned in the collaboration agreements with 
Italian and Spanish parties: shared membership reflected shared interests and 
ideologies, thus creating a justification for mutual collaboration. On the other hand, 
the granting of local voting rights to Romanians in Italy and Spain has provided a 
potential source of support for Italian and Spanish parties. The Romanian parties 
were viewed as possible interlocutors with potential voters, reflected in the 
collaboration agreements’ explicit mention of joint campaigning. The establishment 
of party branches in ‘the diaspora’ and connections with local actors has in this way 
reflected how Romanian parties could adapt to the changing institutional context by 
making use of networks in the European Parliament and mobilising their symbolic 
capital as recognisable actors for the Romanian migrant population (despite the fact 
that low turnout figures reflect the level of this capital to be considerably less than 
could have been expected).  
A similar process has occurred regarding the establishment of Romanian 
religious networks in Italy and Spain. The three churches that are relevant in this 
respect are the Romanian Orthodox, Pentecostal and Adventist Churches. These 
Churches are all examples of institutions that are rooted in specific local contexts in 
Italy and Spain whilst also constituting a cross-border network in various countries 
within and beyond Europe. The largest, the Romanian Orthodox Church, has been 
described in interviews and reports as perhaps the only institution capable of 
bringing Romanian emigrants together with a sense of community by constituting a 
meeting point and cultural anchor (Interviews 04/07/2011, 30/11/2011, see also 
Harja and Melis 2010, Neagu 2008). The Pentecostal and Adventist Churches can 
both instead be defined as ‘global’ churches and have benefitted from funding from 
around the world, in particular from individuals in the United States, making them 
‘transnational by nature’ (Cingolani 2007: 16). The Romanian Orthodox Church has 
also benefitted from the attention of Romanian and, in Spain, local autochthonous 
political actors, whereas this has been less the case with the Adventist and 
Pentecostal Churches despite President Basescu’s visit to the Adventist parish of 
Coslada in 2008, where there is a particular concentration of this religion.  
The Romanian Orthodox Church has historically been the principal religious 
institution in Romania and among Romanian emigrants. During the 1990s, parishes 
in Italy and Spain were under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Archiepiscopacy of 
220 
 
Paris, although it has been suggested that individual parishes have been more 
concerned with their own local communities and formed few links beyond their local 
area or country (Cingolani 2007: 17, see also Ihlamur 2009). In Italy the first stable 
Romanian Orthodox parish was established in 1975, in Milan, followed by others in 
1978, 1981 and 1983. These were the only parishes in the country prior to the fall of 
the Ceausescu regime in 1989 and they were often suspiciously viewed by the 
Romanian exile population as potential spies providing information to the securitate 
(Ihlamur 2009: 232, see also Stan and Turcescu 2005). By 2004 this had risen to 34 
parishes, an estimated 85 by 2007 and 122 in 2011 (Episcopia Italiei, no date, 
Ihlamur 2009: 242). In Spain, the first Romanian Orthodox parish was established in 
Madrid in 1979 and as the emigrant population has grown since the 1990s so has the 
number of parishes; in 2010 there were 76 parishes from across Spain on the register 
of Orthodox Churches from the Romanian Embassy. Although the Church has seen 
its role as one of spiritual guidance, the ceremonies and events have also typically 
represented a meeting place for individuals where they have been able to share 
information about residence regulations, employment opportunities, housing, and so 
on. This would usually occur outside the Church during or after services, although in 
Barcelona the parish has provided a weekly drop-in session through which the priest 
and congregation were reported to have enabled hundreds of people to find jobs 
through their personal connections. 
As with the political parties, the Romanian Orthodox Church has also 
experienced its most significant expansion in Italy and Spain since 2007, prior to 
which its presence was complicated by the institutional contexts of these countries. 
The Church was not recognised as an official religion in Spain until 2005 or in Italy 
until 2012, which resulted in limited material resources such as places of worship, 
economic contributions from the state or tax exemptions. In contrast, the global 
networks of Pentecostal and Adventist Churches have provided sufficient material 
resources for their establishment. Romanian Embassy records showed there to be 
nine Adventist priests in Coslada in 2010, and only four in other parts of Spain. 
During this period the Catholic Church provided spaces for Orthodox events and 
ceremonies in both countries, although some places of worship were improvised and 
had to be dismantled afterwards (Harja and Melis 2010: 27). In Italy it was also 
commented that new priests would have to find their own employment in order to 
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support themselves before the contributions from parishioners were enough to 
maintain them, yet this came during a period when residence permits for priests were 
difficult to obtain because they would not be granted to representatives of a church 
that was not formally and legally registered with the state (Interview 08/07/2011). 
The first parish in either country that successfully obtained permission to build its 
own church and cultural centre was that of Barcelona, although it was achieved 
without external support: 
 
‘For years we tried, through the city council and the bishop, to get a space 
that was a little more dignified, and they haven’t helped us at all, not at all, 
and this parcel of land is from our own effort’ 
(Interview 23/11/2011) 
 
The context during this period leading up to the accession of Romania to the EU can 
therefore be described in both Italy and Spain as one of a closed institutional 
structure providing few opportunities for stability or expansion and a lack of material 
resources. In both Italy and Spain the process of gaining formal recognition for the 
Church came from individual priests in their local parishes; they would only get 
attention from political leaders once these required a way of building networks 
within the Romanian emigrant population. 
However, this pattern changed significantly in subsequent years. In Italy, the 
Romanian State provided funding for the building of a Holy See in 2008 whilst in 
Spain an increasingly open approach from local government representatives in public 
accompanied the granting of space for the construction of places of worship, first in 
Alcalá de Henares in 2006 and later the Carabanchel district of Madrid and the town 
of Guadalajara in 2010 (El Mundo, La primera iglesia rumana ortodoxa en España 
será realidad en Alcalá en dos años, 31
st
 October 2007). Furthermore, the granting 
of these sites was accompanied by communication and public appearances with 
diplomatic representatives, Romanian political actors and leaders of the Orthodox 
Church. For example in Italy President Basescu attended the inauguration of the 
Romanian Diocese in 2008 (Ihlamur 2009: 263-4), and the laying of the first brick of 
the churches in Alcalá de Henares in Spain in the same year, along with the Patriarch 
of the Romanian Orthodox Church, William Brizna (PD-L representative for the 
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diaspora), Romanian MEPs, and the Mayors of Alcalá de Henares and Madrid 
(Adevarul, Traian Basescu a vizitat Biserica Adventista din Madrid, 5
th
 October 
2008). In both countries, this arrival of Romanian politicians at Orthodox Church 
events constituted a push to establish networks of support among the emigrant 
population. In Spain in particular, moreover, this was accompanied by support from 
local Spanish politicians with the same objective, as emphasised in one interview: 
 
‘We here in the Council […] we know that the churches are the only 
organised interlocutor in the Romanian population, and if there are no 
associations then you have to go to the churches’ 
(Interview 29/11/2011) 
 
The situation of the Orthodox Church was therefore inseparable from the changing 
legal and political contexts in the EU and in Romania. Social networks within the 
emigrant population were viewed as a potential source of electoral support for 
Spanish parties and for the Romanian PD-L in the period leading up to and following 
the institutional developments of 2007 and 2008. In this context, the accession of 
Romania to the EU has been significant due to granting free movement rights to 
priests as citizens of the EU and promoting greater interest from local political actors 
in building linkages within potential voters in the Romanian population. 
To summarise, the development of Romanian meso- and macro-level cross-
border political relations and processes in Italy and Spain has come in a 
predominantly top-down fashion and not been met with significant participation 
from the majority of the Romanian populations at the micro-level. These 
developments have only come since the late 2000s, following the growth of the 
Romanian populations of these countries and in response to a shifting opportunity 
structure. Cross-border activity in this context has functioned in three ways. The first 
is as a foreign policy tool, projecting a positive image of Romania abroad through 
cultural events in the network of Cultural Institutes and by funding the projects of 
Romanian cultural associations. The second is as an economic tool by building and 
maintaining perceived and material connections between emigrants and Romania 
with a view to them continuing to send remittances. The third is as a political tool by 
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harvesting the benefits of the external vote in Romanian presidential elections, as so 
effectively exemplified by Basescu’s PD-L in 2009.  
 
 
The cross-border dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration 
 
The previous sections have examined the structural conditions that have led to an 
increase in the cross-border activity of the Romanian emigrant populations of Italy 
and Spain. This section examines whether these activities have influenced responses 
to the presence of Romanian nationals in these countries.  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the cross-border dimension had little 
influence. At this time the populations were small, although growing, and cross-
border activities were limited to individual-level mobility patterns and economic 
transfers. Romanian or European politicians had not taken interest in this emigrant 
population whilst the Orthodox Church remained without resources and concentrated 
on the spiritual concerns of its parishioners. Indeed, the only regular example of an 
identification of Romanian culture was in Italy, where the Academy of Romania in 
Rome regularly held exhibitions and conferences on classic and modern art, poetry 
and prose, religion and the Latin roots of the two countries. The dominant patterns 
noticed in previous chapters of a negative representation in Italy and a more positive 
one in Spain were thus unchallenged by cross-border actors. 
Nevertheless, the period prior to and following 2007 saw an increased range 
of Romanian political voices in Italy and Spain. As outlined above, this was a period 
in which a shifting institutional context was accompanied by increasing 
organisational networks between actors claiming to represent the Romanian emigrant 
population. In this context, financial capital from the Romanian Department for 
Romanians Abroad and the cultural capital of Romanian political parties and the 
Orthodox Church facilitated the expansion of the cross-border dimension of the 
politics of Romanian immigration in both countries.  
In Italy, as noted in previous chapters, this was a period of confrontation with 
a widespread perception of Romanian immigration as a threat. Following the 
murders by Romanian nationals in 2007, and the retaliatory attacks by Italian 





 November 2007), there were protests in front of the Italian embassy in 
Bucharest. Under this pressure, tense exchanges between Romanian and Italian 
government representatives and political parties came to the fore. The Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release through its Embassy in Italy, 
declaring that it  
 
‘condemns in the strongest possible way this act of aggression against 
Romanian citizens [...] all of the Romanian public opinion hopes that the 
institutions of the Italian State take the necessary measures to ensure that 
xenophobic acts of this kind are not repeated’ 
(Il Giornale, Bucarest: l’Italia fermi la xenofobia, 3rd November 2007) 
 
At the same time, in Bucharest there were public protests in front of the Italian 
embassy to Romania, leading the ambassador to comment that ‘we are living a 
period of increasing crisis in the relations between the two countries’ (Correre della 
sera, Bucarest, corteo di protesta davanti all’ambasciata italiana, 7th November 
2007). Following strong lobbying from pro-Roma ethnic minority organisations in 
Brussels (European Network Against Racism 2008), a plenary of the European 
Parliament on the treatment of Romanian Roma in Italy took place in May 2008, in 
which the European Commission also declared that  
 
‘the EU and Member States must do their utmost to improve the social 
inclusion of the Roma [...] Community law guarantees that Romanian 
citizens enjoy the same  
 
freedoms as those of other countries of the Union, and that the Commission 
will ensure that their rights are respected’ 




                                                             
20 For a review of the debate see the European Parliament press release, violence against the Roma 
goes beyond Italy, say MEPs, 20th April 2008, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20080519IPR29255, accessed 10th February 2013 
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These comments clearly framed Romanians (particularly but not exclusively those of 
Romani ethnicity) as victims and called for a shift in the Italian States’ actions.  
However, the claims from abroad had little direct impact on the local and 
national responses to Romanian immigration in Italy. As has been widely discussed 
in the previous chapters, despite the Italian parties PD and PDL condemning the 
violent attacks there was already, and would continue to be, consensus that 
Romanian immigrants posed a threat due to their criminal nature (Il Giornale, 
Bucarest: l’Italia fermi la xenofobia, 3rd November 2007). The continuation of this 
was particularly evident in the response of the Northern League member Paolo 
Grimoldi to the Romanian government’s concern: 
 
‘A lecture from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was just what was 
missing. They should think instead about taking back the criminals that they 
have sent out in such large quantities [...] The Embassy and the Government 
of Romania, that today are so concerned, why did they not show the same 
concern when their citizens invaded our cities, stole from our elderly and 
raped our women?’ 
(Giovani Padani-Lega Nord, Grimoldi: La Romania non ci faccia ramanzine e si 
riprenda i suoi delinquenti, 6th November 2007) 
 
In 2009 the tensions were still present in an interview with the Romanian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in which he complained about ‘certain approaches, above all on 
the part of some representatives of the Italian government that are directed at inciting 
xenophobia through a very aggressive and provocative rhetoric’ (Corriere della sera, 
Il ministro degli Esteri romeno: “nel governo italiano incitazioni a xenophobia”, 9th 
February 2010). In the same year, the Romanian Orthodox Church also sent a letter, 
written in first person, to national and local authorities and Italian Catholic parishes 
entitled Cara Italia (Dear Italy) in which it expressed the pain of being discriminated 
against as an outsider and criticising the tone of press and political references to 
Romanian immigration. This too confirmed the continued pattern of treatment 
despite the calls from Romanian government representatives. 
As the Romanian political parties became more established in Italy, they also 
engaged in identifying the Romanian immigrant population as victims. However, for 
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both the PD-L and the PSD the victim status was due to different factors. For the 
PD-L representative of the diaspora, William Brinza, it was due to a lack of action 
from the Romanian government: 
 
‘It is enough to open an Italian newspaper and you see only bad news, all 
committed by Romanians. It started with the case of Mailat [the murderer of 
Giovanna Reggiani] that was treated lightly by the Tariceanu government and 
now the situation has worsened’ 
(William Brinza, www.williameuropa.eu, 24/02/2009) 
 
The PSD instead lay responsibility with the Italian parties of the right, with the 
leader of the PSD in Romania, Victor Ponta, commenting in 2010 that he was 
‘worried about the situation of Romanians in Italy, which form the largest Romanian 
diaspora community, but also the most severely threatened by the radical anti-
immigration policy of the populist right’ (PSD Italia, Victor Ponta semneaza un 
accord istoric cu Pier Luigi Bersani, www.psditalia.eu).
21
 Both parties refrained 
from criticising their own Italian and European partners. Indeed, the possible 
implications of insulting a partner was seen in the European Parliament in 2007 
when the far right party group ‘Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty’ collapsed; 18 
Romanian members left the group in response to an accusation from Italian member 
Alessandra Mussolini that the Romanian population was ‘making crime a way of 
life’ (La Repubblica Metropoli, Crisi Romania-Italia, Europarlamento diviso, 19th 
November 2007).  
Significantly, the LN had greater freedom due to not belonging to a European 
Parliament group with Romanian members. In this way, the fragmentation among 
parties provided an opportunity for autonomous action for the LN despite its Italian 
coalition partners’ agreements with Romanian partners in the European Parliament. 
In Spain, as the previous chapters have shown, a negative threat frame was 
not prominent in national or local responses to Romanian immigration during this 
period. If anything, there was emphasis placed on the cultural and historical 
                                                             
21
 A report can be read at http://psditalia.eu/agenda/victor-ponta-se-intalneste-cu-romanii-din-italia, 
accessed 10th February 2013 
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similarities between the two countries. For example, in an interview in 2007 Horia 
Barna, the Director of the Romanian Cultural Institute underlined that 
 
‘The similarity between our civilizations is impressive, and I would like to 
highlight the profound Latin character of the Romanian people, key to the 
East of Europe, and the Latin character of Spain on the other side of the 
continent. Both civilizations were on the borders of the Romanian Empire 
and following its collapse they both maintained their Latin character’ 
(Horia Barna, quoted in ABC, Horia Barna: “Las culturas rumana y española 
guarda parecidos impresionantes” 27/05/2007) 
 
Furthermore, the Romanian government representatives and politicians who were 
present in Spain did not publicly discuss Spanish social or political issues, but 
repeatedly emphasised the view that Romanian immigration was temporary, evoking 
the image of ‘home’ to their audiences. In this way, in 2008 President Traian 
Basescu, speaking on a visit to Madrid asserted that 
 
‘in three years it will be much better in Romania. I assure you that in 
Romania you will find a workplace in the next period, a well paid, decent 
working place’  
(quoted in Soros Foundation 2009: 36) 
 
Similarly, as part of the PD-L campaign in 2009 William Brinza offered free flights 
home and support for their first house and the PSD in Spain campaign promoted 
opportunities for an ‘effective and ordered return policy that enables the sons of the 
diaspora to be returned in dignified conditions so that they help to build the new 
Romania’. 
It has been argued that the attempt to remind emigrants of their homeland 
serves as a way of promoting patriotism and making it more likely that remittances 
would be sent back, providing a significant source of revenue (Soros Foundation 
2009: 36). Indeed, this was suggested in comments made by President Basescu on a 
visit to Madrid in 2008 in which he thanked the emigrants for their remittances and 




‘Romania has managed to secure good economic growth, with the 
considerably great support that the over two million Romanians abroad have 
given by sending large amounts of money to the banks in the country and I 
thank you for that […] I do not think that Romania should recover in one way 
or another all of its citizens.We have a large space, the European space where 
we can meet anytime’  





These speeches were not aimed at influencing perceptions or policies in Spain, nor 
were they directed at a Spanish audience, but they were instead constructed for the 
Romanian nationality population. 
Cross-border political activity has therefore developed in different ways in 
Italy and Spain and the content of the claims to the meaning of being Romanian has 
varied in both countries. In Italy, the Romanian State and the EU institutions 
responded to actions in Romania and Brussels by issuing public announcements. Yet 
the dominant threat frame did not change, even following the inclusion of Romanian 
political parties in European Parliament groups and the signing of agreements for 
collaboration with Italy’s PDL and PD. As noted in the previous chapter’s study of 
the context in Rome, local politicians at this time were unsure how or in what 
numbers the Romanian population would vote, and so had little incentive to change 
the status quo and promote their participation. Instead, the LN in particular continued 
to frame Romanians in the same way following 2007. 
In Spain, moreover, the Romanian State and EU institutions were not active 
in the same way. Even when similar concerns regarding xenophobia could have 
arisen, such as following an arson attack on the Romanian Orthodox Church in 
Arganda del Rey in 2002, there was consensus from all Spanish political parties that 
Romanians were victims and that tolerance should be emphasised in response. 
Chapter five showed how the stability of the dominant catch-all parties, the PP and 
the PSOE, and their consensus on the importance of emphasising democracy and 
tolerance in contemporary Spain underlined these debates. Chapter six also 
illustrated how the logic of vote-maximising by local politicians, particularly from 
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the PP, led to favourable public announcements and actions for Romanian 
immigrants in the city of Madrid in the years prior to and following 2007. Here, the 
development of a cross-border dimension has added further to these processes by 
providing a possible communication channel to Romanian nationals in Spain at 
election time in the form of Romanian political parties. Connections between 
Romanian and Spanish organisations and political parties were already developing in 
cities such as Madrid, Castellón and Barcelona in preparation for the accession of 
Romania to the EU in 2007, promoting the development of collaborative activities 
that would facilitate the building of networks within the local Romanian populations 
in Spain. Finally, these actors were also voicing the assumption that Romanian 
campaigning was only temporary and would be followed by return migration, which 
may have contributed to maintaining a pattern of taking Romanian immigration off 
the public agenda. 
Finally, the more recent participation of Romanian political parties in Italy 
and Spain may have not contributed to the image of Romania in a positive way. 
Following the elections of 2009 accusations of fraud by the PD-L and PSD were 
common in both countries. Voters were not required to register prior to the election-
day but could arrive at the polling booth with a valid Romanian document of 
identification and confirmation of residence in the country in which they were 
voting, such as an entry on the municipal register in Spain. It has been suggested that 
voters could therefore be driven from one polling booth to another and cast their vote 
repeatedly. Other suggestions were that votes could be bought: 
 
‘I have seen some things [...] of the 15,000 Romanians [in this town], 3,000 
vote for the Romanian election, which is not many, and I saw a leader of one 
political party, I don’t even remember which one, passing around 20 euro 
notes [...] it is illegal, but it happens’ 
(Interview 29/11/2011) 
 
The outcome was a negative view amongst interviewees in Italy and Spain, and a 
reaffirmation of the perception of Romanian politics as corrupt and untrustworthy 




‘I haven’t voted because, you know, I haven’t had time and I don’t like 
politics anyway [...] I am not going to waste a day going there to vote for 




‘after the revolution both the party on the left and the one on the right have 
made a mess […] they have tried everything in Romania, they haven’t 
thought about the population, and here’s the result you see, over two million 
Romanians have gone abroad’ 
(Interview 06/07/2011) 
 
Indeed, corruption has been a problem in Romanian since the end of the Ceausescu 
regime and although political activity is formally democratic, patronage networks 
within parties and corruption by economic elites have been highlighted as persistent 
dangers to the rule of law (Transparency International 2012). Stories of corruption 
may reinforce these perceptions and explain the inability of Romanian parties in Italy 
and Spain to encourage any significant electoral participation of their co-nationals. It 
could also place a question mark over the future of this cross-border political 





In this chapter it has been asked if actors, structures and resources stretching beyond 
the borders of Italy and Spain have played a role in influencing responses to 
Romanian immigration in these countries. This has been defined as the cross-border 
dimension of negotiating ‘who is who’. The study has been shaped by the academic 
literature on transnationalism and globalisation, which has illustrated how cross-
border activities and processes across micro-, meso- and macro-levels may influence 
the negotiation of the social and political boundaries of membership to national 
polities. This incorporates an awareness of how local and national opportunities for 
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political participation and mobilisation can change as a result of shifting structural 
settings beyond the country’s borders into this thesis.  
In particular, the most significant shifts in this development of a cross-border 
dimension to the politics of Romanian immigration have been the establishment of 
external voting rights by the Romanian State and the granting of EU citizenship 
rights to Romanian nationals, which have led to joint campaigning, public 
appearances and the provision of places of worship in cities such as Madrid, 
Castellón and Barcelona in Spain, and to a lesser degree Rome and Turin in Italy. 
However, these discrepancies between the two countries illustrate effectively how 
the influence of the cross-border dimension is contingent on local contexts and the 
specific choices made by local political actors. 
International migration and European Union integration have in this sense 
facilitated a reinterpretation of the terms of citizenship of Romanian emigrants in 
Italy and Spain. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Romanian migration to these 
countries was described as fitting into a typical Southern European model, 
characterised by a high degree of undocumented residence and informal or 
precarious labour. As noted in more detail in chapter four, stable membership of the 
citizenry of these countries was made difficult by legal residence being arduous to 
obtain and hard to maintain and opportunities for political participation in local or 
national politics being limited. The development of cross-border political structures 
and processes, especially since the latter half of the 2000s, has brought about a 
change in this context that has seen Romanian nationals enfranchised in presidential 
elections in Romania and in local and European Parliament elections in Italy and 
Spain, as well as facilitating the expansion of cultural projects and the stability of the 
Romanian Orthodox Church outside of Romania. This is a clear example of the 
bundling of citizenship rights at distinct administrative levels (Bauböck 2010). 
However, the development of cross-border rights has only changed the 
formal status of the Romanian population but not enabled actors to influence how 
local public responses to their presence have played out. Indeed, the cross-border 
dimension has only become significant in recent years; it had no role in the 
negotiation of responses to Romanian immigration during the 1990s or the 2000s. At 
this time, the resources committed by the Romanian State or made available by the 
Romanian Orthodox Church were inadequate for such a dramatically growing 
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emigrant population. Since then, the cross-border dimension has developed in an 
almost entirely top-down way, by which increased activity has been found on the 
macro-level by the Romanian State as well as on the meso-level by political parties 
and religious institutions, but without promoting widespread popular participation or 
the development of a general, stable cross-border social system. The result has been 
an opening opportunity structure for political actors but limited provision of material 
resources and little in the way of empowerment to define the social boundaries of 
what it means to be an immigrant in these countries. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the Romanian State’s activities are merely symbolic gestures to show attempts 
to regulate emigration, whilst the connections built by the diaspora branches of 
Romanian political parties have been concerned with gaining power in Romania, 
rather than in Italy or Spain. In this way, the cross-border dimension of the politics 
of immigration in these countries introduces a range of diverse actors whose 













In the contemporary era of globalisation, international migration has become a social 
and political fact across Europe. However, responses to the presence of immigrants 
have varied from one country to another. This thesis has asked why different 
responses arise to the presence of immigrants in host societies and what influences 
how immigration is represented in public debate. As this concluding chapter will 
summarise, the study of the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain 
contributes to an understanding of these questions. The chapter will also seek offer a 
critical reflection on the influence of citizenship of the European Union on the social 
and political integration of intra-EU migrants and to situate these case studies in the 
existing literature, asking whether the politics of immigration differ in Southern 
Europe compared to other countries. 
These questions are of utmost social and political relevance at a time when 
immigration has become a politically salient and emotionally charged topic across 
much of Western Europe. In particular, right-wing populist movements with growing 
support bases have called out against the presence of immigrants as posing a range of 
threats. For example, since the 1980s the Belgian Vlaams Blok has claimed that a 
mass invasion of foreign guestworkers provides an existential threat to the ethnic 
purity of the Flemish population of the country (Mudde 2000: 97-9), whilst the 
French Front National has widely spread propaganda depicting Muslims as a 
mysterious and dangerous presence due to their apparent religious extremism and 
tendency towards terrorism (Hargreaves 1995). More recently, Swiss local elections 
in 2008 saw the distribution of posters depicting a black sheep being kicked off the 
Swiss national flag whilst in 2012 and 2013 there have been reports of neo-Nazi 
groups in Greece attacking immigrants in the street and entering hospitals to remove 
undocumented workers. In light of this, Betz commented that immigrants have 
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become ‘by far the most important targets of contemporary right-wing radical 
populist resentment’ due to the way that they ‘offer a wide range of points of attack’, 
from complaints about taking jobs from natives to posing a burden on the welfare 
state, from representing a perceived threat to the cultural purity of national identities 
to providing an security risk through terrorist activity (Betz 1998: 6). 
However, these complaints have not only been voiced by the far-right. 
National leaders across Europe and beyond have also taken to criticising the socio-
cultural diversity that they see as introduced by immigrants, announcing the Death of 
Multiculturalism as an adequate policy frame for social cohesion. In this way, 
multicultural policies have been criticised for emphasising the cultural differences of 
immigrants and not creating cohesive, unified communities. For example, in October 
2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that 
 
‘of course the tendency had been to say, “let's adopt the multicultural concept 
and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other”. But 
this concept has failed, and failed utterly.’  
(The Guardian, Angela Merkel declares death of German multiculturalism, 
17
th
 October 2010). 
 
At the same time, her colleagues stated that they were committed to a ‘dominant 
German culture’ and feared becoming ‘the world's welfare office’ (Ibid.). The British 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, was in agreement in a speech on the same issue in 
February 2011 in which he commented that  
 
‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel 
they want to belong.’22 
 
                                                             
22 The Prime Minister’s speech has been made available online at 




Britain and Germany are not the only countries to have followed this route. Among 
others, in June 2011 it was asked if the acquittal of the politician Geert Wilders from 
charges of discrimination against Muslims signalled the death of Dutch 
multiculturalism (Time World, 29
th
 June 2011), whilst in 2008 Andrew Jakubowicz 
of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Civil Societies in Australia had already mentioned 
the ‘slow death’ of multiculturalism there too (2008).  
The contribution of this thesis to understanding such shifts in political 
postures is to highlight the processes, strategies and power balances that underpin 
them. When these political actors publicly state that immigration is a problem, they 
frame the presence of immigrants in specific ways. This involves claiming that 
certain social groups can be distinguished from others according to their ethnicity, 
religion or nationality, that their presence has implications for social cohesion, and 
that strict terms and conditions should regulate their residence. In other words, they 
take part in a process of defining ‘who is who’ deciding the inclusion and exclusion 
of individuals and groups in a given political community (Jenkins 2008). In this way, 
the politics of immigration is a process of negotiating the social and political 
boundaries of the polity. 
Much academic analysis has called out against rising xenophobia and 
discrimination in societies of immigration. For example, van Dijk has analysed 
political discourse in a range of countries and media and found that the construction 
of a negatively-viewed out-group in contrast to a positively-viewed in-group is a 
highly prevalent way of maintaining an imbalance of power between the two (1987, 
1991). Annual reports from the Spanish Observatory of Racism and Xenophobia 
(Observatorio Espanol del Racismo y la Xenofobia, OBERAXE) have also equated 
the presence of immigrants with rising and persistent xenophobic attitudes among 
Spanish society and urged political responses to prevent tensions arising (Cea 
D’Ancona and Valles Martinez 2008). Nevertheless, a large body of research has 
also agreed with the public fears that immigration poses a threat to bounded, 
culturally unified national communities. Perhaps most famous of these has been 
Huntington’s claim that Mexican immigration has posed an existential threat to the 
traditional values of the USA (2004). Huntington’s view that cultural differences 
between Mexicans and Americans are unassailable and opposing mirrors the fear 
expressed previously by Schlesinger, who commented that ‘the historic idea of a 
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unifying American identity [… was] in peril’ due to cultural diversity (1992:17). It 
has not only been conservatives to address this issue, as evidenced by Kymlicka’s 
claim that the cultural diversity brought by immigrants to countries such as Canada 
placed the stability and persistence of the ethnic minorities that were already present 
there in danger (Kymlicka 1994, Kymlicka and Norman 2000). 
Despite their different viewpoints, these political debates and academic 
studies share the same assumption that immigration involves the arrival of culturally 
diverse social groups and always results in the emphasis of xenophobic sentiments. 
Yet this fails to account for cases where this has not happened. One such case study 
has been found in the political responses to Romanian immigration in Spain that 
have been examined through this thesis. Indeed, despite a rapidly growing Romanian 
population, public concern over immigration (recorded in Eurobarometer surveys) 
and negative public opinion towards Romanian immigrants in particular (recorded in 
surveys by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas), political debates have seen 
this nationality described as cultural twins from across a ‘Latin bridge’ from one side 
of Europe to the other, as a magnificently integrated population in Spain and as an 
opportunity for local democracy. In contrast, in Italy a Romanian immigrant 
population of a similar size, cultural character and class structure to that found in 
Spain has been publicly criticised for apparently having a violent criminal nature and 
posing a threat to public order and security.  
The case studies of this thesis thus emphasise how negative responses to the 
presence of immigrants are not automatic or natural. Furthermore, the distinct 
experiences in Italy and Spain also suggest that the characteristics of immigrants, 
such as the size of the population, the language that they speak, their class or their 
social structure are, on their own, insufficient variables to explain different responses 
to their presence. The Romanian immigrant populations of Italy and Spain are 
broadly similar in their characteristics and social status; what differs between the 
cases are the social and political contexts in which immigration and political 
negotiations about its implications have occurred.  
Analysis of the politics of Romanian immigration as a situated negotiation of 
meanings has required a shift away from the previous approaches mentioned above. 
Immigration has been seen as a problem by them because the identity and cultural 
diversity of immigrants has been employed as a variable to explain social tensions. 
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In contrast, this thesis has understood identity to be a potentially shifting and 
malleable process of classification. This requires the presentation of certain 
characteristics as distinguishing certain individuals as culturally-similar to each other 
and different to the mainstream or majority population (Barth 1969, Goffman 1959). 
Yet this thesis has illustrated how this is a plural process through which individuals, 
organisations and institutions make a claim to the legitimacy of their perspective. In 
sum, the classification of who is who is a negotiated process whereby a range of 
voices aspire to build the necessary consensus for their perspective to dominate as an 
accurate reflection of society.  
Participation in this negotiation of the character and implications of 
Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain has required the mobilisation of material, 
social and symbolic resources and has been shaped by different structural 
opportunities for action in each country. It is in this way that the politics of 
immigration is conceived as a structurally-situated, plural process of negotiation 
between actors with differential access to types of capital (Bourdieu 1986, 2010 
[1990]). What is more, it is also in this way that the politics of Romanian 
immigration in Italy and Spain tells us more about the actor strategies and political 
contexts found in these countries than it does about the immigrants themselves. 
In the Italian case responses to Romanian immigration have been immersed 
within a wider critique of immigration, led by the Northern League in the early 
1990s. In a polarised political structure and a social context in which the dominant 
left-right, Communist-Christian Democrat cleavage of the previous decades had lost 
relevance amidst corruption charges and rising distrust of elites, the right-wing 
parties came forward as a voice of the people, different to the discredited leaders of 
the past. They had little in common apart from a desire to win elections, and 
immigration provided one of their few consensual issues; a perception of immigrants 
as a threat to public order, security and employment served as a point of agreement. 
Immigration (particularly but not only that of Romanian origin) acted as a meta-issue 
enabling a range of social problems to be apparently resolved through passing 
immigration legislation, with the threat frame enabling the building of consensus 
amongst coalition partners who held divergent views on other issues. 
At the same time, factions on the left were divided, failing to form strong 
governments when in power and struggling to build a shared post-socialist platform 
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in opposition. Immigrants, particularly of a Romanian origin, were presented 
contradictorily, both as victims of the policies and discourse of the right but also as a 
threat, by emphasising their involvement in human trafficking and prostitution 
networks or by calling for their deportation in 2006 and 2007. Aside from political 
parties, the only other Italian organisations with a voice were Caritas and the trade 
unions, and they did not mobilise a counter-argument to the dominant threat frame 
until 2008. Similarly, the Romanian government would only respond in the years 
after 2007, their calls for moderation responding to protests in front of the Italian 
embassy in Bucharest. Despite gaining recognition in the Italian press, these calls 
were unable to establish consensus among the polarised Italian party politics and 
were met with stern replies from members of the Northern League in particular. The 
outcome was discussion of the implications of Romanian immigration by a small 
range of actors from Italian political parties. 
In the Spanish case, however, Romanian immigration has rarely been on the 
agenda and when it has gained in salience there has been cross-party consensus on 
the status of Romanian immigrants as victims to be supported or as an opportunity 
for local democracy. In contrast to the context found in Italy, Spanish society and 
politics have been generally shaped by the consensus and moderation characterising 
the transition to democracy following the end of the regime of General Franco. 
Spain’s contemporary democracy was marked by acceptance of a need for stability 
in order to protect the legitimacy of the Spanish State and differentiation from the 
past by emphasising respect for democracy, the protection of rights and tolerance of 
diversity. In debates on Romanian immigration the two stable catch-all parties of left 
and right, the Socialist PSOE and the conservative PP, have positioned themselves in 
line with this post-transition cleavage by emphasising the need for social inclusion 
and tolerance. Consensus has been reinforced by the broad range of support enjoyed 
by these parties and an absence of dissenting voices. 
In local politics, active policies for establishing representative organisations 
of immigrants have been prevalent where the Romanian population has been most 
concentrated. Strong connections have developed between representatives of the 
Romanian immigrant population, local authorities and branches of the principal 
political parties. Public funding and the formation of a national Federation 
(FEDROM) facilitated this further by building networks among autochthonous 
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institutions and the organisations of Romanian immigrants. This closeness kept the 
negotiation of responses to Romanian immigration to a small network of political 
elites of Spanish and Romanian origin, following a typical client politics model of 
consensus-building. Yet it also enabled targeted electoral campaigns to be carried out 
in towns such as Coslada and Alcala de Henares following the granting of local 
voting rights to Romanians in 2007. In this way, the Spanish case reflects how a 
strong normative cleavage and close organisational networks are likely to result in 
consensual responses to the presence of immigrants. Indeed, this was clearly the case 
when a local election candidate for the PP published a pamphlet stating ‘we do not 
want Romanians’, as he was criticised by the regional and national branches of his 
party in order to maintain the publicly moderate and tolerant status quo, as well as 
the potential support of Romanian local associations, in other areas of Spain. 
Perspectives of ‘who is Romanian’ in these countries are in this way 
inseparable from an awareness of the way that actors respond to existent frameworks 
of meaning and adapt to their structural context. In Spain, the stability of the 
dominant political parties and social organisations contributed to maintaining a 
dominant existent framework in the form of the post-transition cleavage, which in 
turn influenced how specific issues such as Romanian immigration were interpreted. 
In Italy, however, the crisis of the party system in a context of declining social 
cleavages meant that actors with disparate views and interests were able to enter into 
power on the back of weak coalitions held together by consensus on specific issues, 
such as immigration. In a Spanish context of concentrated social capital, Romanian 
immigration was taken off the agenda; but in an Italian context of polarised politics, 
the threat of Romanian immigration was a source of symbolic capital and thus 
pushed onto the agenda.  
In this context, how could new voices be heard and change be brought about 
to the dominant framing patterns?  
Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain have not acted as a cohesive, united 
community or with any sense of mass participation. For Romanian immigrants in 
these countries there were few opportunities to have their voice heard prior to 2007, 
with no right to enfranchisement and legal residence tied to the holding of a formal 
employment contract despite the fact that many immigrants were employed in short-
term roles or the informal labour market. Moreover, the situation would change 
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during the 2000s. As part of the accession procedure for Romania to join the EU, 
visa-free travel facilitated mobility from 2002 and citizenship of the EU added rights 
to non-discrimination and participation in local and European Parliament elections 
from 2007. During the same period, the Romanian government established elected 
positions in the Romanian parliament to compete for the votes of Romanians abroad. 
The legal context has thus been one of increasing opportunities for Romanian 
nationals in Italy and Spain to have a voice in distinct local, national and 
transnational political arenas, illustrative of the way that rights in the EU are bundled 
at different levels of governance. Yet these institutional developments have not 
resulted in any widespread political participation in either country. Indeed, it was 
only specific associations and political parties which did mobilise by making a claim 
to represent the Romanian immigrant population. In a strict sense, they did not truly 
stand for their countrymen; they were not chosen or held to account through 
elections and only ‘stood for’ Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain in a weak 
descriptive sense, by sharing language and nationality with them (Pitkin 1974).  
However, specific organisations have benefitted from the structural changes 
brought about from 2007. In Spain, local policies promoting the formation of 
immigrant associations provided an opportunity for networks to develop between 
political parties and individuals or groups claiming to represent the Romanian 
population. Particularly in Alcala de Henares, building connections with Spanish 
political parties was a way of gaining specific rewards, such as funding to celebrate 
the national day of Romania, a space for a Romanian Orthodox Church and positive 
comments in public events and the press. At the same time, Romanian political 
parties could cooperate with their Spanish partners for electoral purposes, benefitting 
mutually from each other in order to achieve complimentary goals, namely, winning 
elections in their respective countries rather than competing for the same 
constituencies. In this way, changes to EU and Romanian legislation have provided 
an opportunity for new voices to be heard in the local politics of Spain. In Italy the 
process was distinct; Italian political parties were more resistant to change due to 
uncertainty regarding the preferences of the Romanian population and to a lack of 
knowledge regarding potential partners from amongst the fragmented and divided 
range of Romanian organisations. The response of a small network of Romanian 
associations and the Party of Romanian Identity was to align with the security and 
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public order-based threat frame of Italian parties in political and public debate, 
reproducing the lines of closure that were already dominant. In a context of few 
funding resources and a closed institutional structure dominated by gatekeeper 
organisations, this mimicking strategy provided a quite distinct way of building 
social capital to that found in Spain. 
The structure of relations amongst these actors and the distribution of social 
and symbolic capital therefore influenced way that change in the negotiation of ‘who 
is Romanian’ could occur in the shifting institutional environment heralded by 
accession to the EU. In this sense, the cross-border rights of citizenship of the EU 
can provide an opportunity for the political participation and inclusion of intra-EU 
migrants, but the extent to which this occurs and the direction that it takes is tied to 
the actions, relations and mobilising strategies of local actors. In sum, the structural 
context in Spain was more conducive to an active appeal to the new Romanian 
electorate than that found in Italy. 
Finally, the opening chapters of this thesis outlined how Italy and Spain have 
often been studied through the lens of a specific Southern European model of 
immigration patterns and immigrant integration policies. However, when it comes to 
immigration frames in political and public debate, the dynamics found in this thesis 
go beyond the setting of Southern Europe. For example, Scholten has found in his 
study of Dutch integration frames that a traditionally inclusive multiculturalist 
approach in the Netherlands developed within largely technocratic channels amongst 
a small network of actors, similar to the consensual client politics found in Spain 
(2011). He also shows, moreover, that an increasing diversity of academic 
viewpoints on immigrant integration frames subsequently enabled politicians to pick 
and choose according to their own interests and opinions, creating a more 
fragmented and confrontational approach to policy making. This fragmentation 
marked the arrival of a populist exclusionary turn akin to that found in Italy, with 
calls for policy making to be out in the open and to reflect their vociferous claims of 
the concerns of the people. Furthermore, in comparing the Dutch model to other case 
studies, Scholten also illustrated how such situational factors and specific actor 
strategies influenced the direction of change of integration frames in France, 
Germany and Britain (2011: 285-6). Elsewhere, Bommes has similarly illustrated 
how a structural shift in integration policies was part of a local turn in Germany in 
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response to the realisation that immigrants had become a ‘normal clientele’ of the 
German federal welfare state (2013). For Bommes, this shift provided an opportunity 
for mobilisation by local administrations, welfare associations and NGOs to 
influence immigrant integration measures in a new direction, but that this could not 
be achieved without gaining publicly recognised legitimacy for their view by 
aligning it with existent models (2013: 126). This suggests that the structural 
contexts and strategic dynamics found in Italy and Spain are not dissimilar to those 
found elsewhere, although further comparative study would be required to go 
further. 
These insights offer potential for a deeper understanding of why different 
responses arise to the presence of immigrants in host societies. Returning to the 
beginning of this concluding chapter, they may also provide a chance to explain the 
decision making and strategic dynamics behind tensions with immigrants from far-
right populists to mainstream politicians heralding the death of multiculturalism. If, 
as argued throughout this thesis, it is not simply cultural diversity which lies behind 
groups and group identities, then closer inspection requires examining the choices 
that these actors have made in response to their discursive and institutional contexts. 
This is not to say that people’s concerns or fears regarding immigration should be 
entirely ignored, but rather that tensions with immigrants may have more to tell us 
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Figure 15. Candidates and votes, Romanian representatives in Rome (2004-2006) 
Source: http://elezioni.comune.roma.it 








2004 513 2.86% Yes 
Emil Sorin CEHAN 
Adjunct Council 
(Commune) 





2004 99 0.55% no 
Mihaela 
IAMANDII 
Adjunct Council  
(Municipality 8) 
2004 96 9.27% no 
Georgeta Laura 
POPA 
Adjunct Council  
(Municipality 10) 

































































































































2011 49 no 
Castel 
Madama 






2011 11 no 
 
Figure 16. Romanians in Communal elections in the province of Rome 
Sources: Romeni in Italia, Ministero dell'Interno, Comune di Ciampino, Comune di Pomezia, 
Comune di Riano, Comune di Castel Madama, Comune di Morlupo, Political parties 
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Municipality - 2007 Party list Candidate  List 
position 
Arganda del Rey Los Verdes Nina Dana Bolnavu 2 
 Los Verdes Daniel Radu Radu 4 
 Los Verdes Ion Bolnavu 5 
 Los Verdes Marian Grecu 7 
 Los Verdes Extera Curcan 8 
 Los Verdes Cornelius Curcan 9 
 Los Verdes Mariana Grecu 11 
Alcalá de Henares  Solidaridad Democrática Gheorghe Gainar 1 
 Solidaridad Democrática George Alexandru Gainar 5 
 Solidaridad Democrática Liviu Herman 11 
 Solidaridad Democrática Sergiu Lenghea 21 
 Solidaridad Democrática Doinita Violeta Luca Huci 26 
 Los Verdes Tiberius Iulian Solescu 13 
 Los Verdes Larisa Beatrice Solescu 14 
Carabana PP Adrian Deac 9 
Cobena PP Constantin Adrian 
Dascaleanu 
11 
 Cobena Iniciativa de 
Progreso 
Alexandra Ioana Turcu 8 
 PSOE Mihaela Anca Mitrut 5 
 Partido Democrata Espanol Nicolae Angelache 7 
Colmenarejo Agrupacion progresista 
independiente de 
colmenarejo 
Ingri Claudia Mertoiu  
Cubas de la sagra PSOE Viorel Alexandru Moldovan Suplente 
El Boalo Centro Democratico Liberal Cristina Iustina Rus 10 
 Centro Democratico Liberal Florin Daniel Rus 11 
El Molar Organización Nacional 
Centrista 
Sorin Ioan Budeanu 8 
Getafe PP Gica Craioveanu (ex-
football player) 
2 
Leganes PP Laurentiu Eugem Elie  
Navacerrada Coalicion Independiente de 
Navacerrada 
Antoneta Dumitra Secrieru 5 
Rascafria Candidatura Independiente 
Rascafria 
Mihaela Gheorghi  Suplente 
San Fernando de 
Henares 
Izquierda Unida de la 




Total:   27 (2 
suplentes) 
 
Figure 17. Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2007)
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Municipality - 2011 Party Candidate Name List 
position 
Alamo Grupo Alameno Municipal 
independiente 
Mirella Elisa Ciobanu 8 
Alcalá de Henares Partido Humanista Liviu Hermán 3 
 PP Ana María Román 18 
Alcobendas PSOE Dan Ilie Secheli 19 
Algete Primero Madrid Iulian Dragomir 14 
 PP Mariana Bortis 16 
Aranjuez PP Mirela Cojocnean 22 
 UPyD Elisaveta Basaraba 22 
Arganda del Rey PSOE Mariana Venec 9 
Brunete PP Daniel Madalin Zaborila 9 
 UPyD Ana Sabau 5 
 PSOE Eugenia Mateescu 8 
Buitrago del Lozoya PSOE Alexandru Ionut Avram 6 
Campo Real PP Adrian Alexandru Gheta 11 
Cobena Centro Democratico 
Liberal 
Nicolae Anghelache 8 
Coslada Agrupación Republicana 
de Coslada 
Cristina Larisa Donea 19 
 UPyD Claudia Tudor 22 
Colmenarejo Vive Colmenarejo Rodica Moromete 10 
 IU-LV Ligia Florina Bitoleanu 8 
Guadalix de la Sierra PSOE Mircea Stelian Radu 11 
Lozoyuela-Navas ECOLO Adrian Vasile Merdariu 5 
 Decisión Ciudadana Angelica Bobeica 3 
 Decisión Ciudadana Angela Claudia Cristea 7 
 PP Marius Florín Scarlat 6 
Fuenlabrada PP Iosif Sebastián Potroaca 26 
Galapagar PP Mihail Marius Bagiu 16 
Madrid Partido de los Fumadores 
de España 
Teodor-Alexandru Ciocan 53 
 Verdes Merdariu Adrian-Vasile 45 
Morata de Tajuna Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Ionela Mihaila 2 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Daniel Culcear 4 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Liliana Lefter 5 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
María Cristina Zaharie 6 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Costantin Gabriel Zaharie 7 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Daniel Georgian Spiru 8 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Stela Stet 9 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Petru Stet 10 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Simona Florica Toader 11 
 Partido Independiente de 
Morata 
Camelia Mirela Rosu 13 
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Paracuellos de Járama Unidos para Paracuellos  Liliana-Doina Pop 7 
 PP Ioan Mija. 12 
 PP Anca Albu 15 
Parla PP Mioara Risnoveanu 21 
San Agustin del Guadalix Alternativa Espanola Madalina-Mihaela 
Constantin 
10 
San Fernando de Henares PSOE Ioana-Aurelia Balint 17 
 IU - Verdes Rodica Moldvai 18 
Torrelaguna PP Marius Florin Scarlat 6 
Villamanrique de Tajo Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Georghe Fecior  1 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Minerva Fecior  2 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Vasile Viorel Achim 3 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Lidia Achim 4 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Matei Stef 5 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Rafila Stef 6 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Marioara Nicolescu 7 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Florin Nicolescu Suplente 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Liliana Cornelia Suplente 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Adrian Ardelean Suplente 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Veronica Radosav Suplente 
 Partido Ibérico de los 
Rumanos 
Hajnalka Simona Muntean Suplente 
Valdemorillo PP Lucia Ioana Anghelescu 12 
Valdeolmos-Alalpardo PP Ramona Claudia Popa  
Villanueva del pardillo Ciudadanos-Partido de la 
Ciudadania 
Maria Mihaela Vasiliu 8 
Total   56 (5 
suplentes) 
 
Figure 18. Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2011) 
 
 
